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Introducción 
Esta tesis se compone de tres ensayos empíricos sobre las consecuencias 
económicas de las diferencias en la calidad de la información segmentada que las 
empresas incluyen en sus estados financieros. En el primero, se estudia la relación entre 
la revelación de información segmentada y la calidad del resultado contable. En el 
segundo, se estudia el efecto de la relación entre la revelación de información 
segmentada y la calidad del resultado contable en el coste de capital. En el último 
ensayo se estudia el papel de la revelación de la información segmentada en el gobierno 
corporativo y su efecto en la eficiencia de las decisiones de inversión de la empresa. 
Esta tesis contribuye a la literatura sobre las consecuencias económicas derivadas de las 
diferencias en la calidad de la información contable. Los resultados muestran que el 
aumento de la calidad de la información segmentada conduce a unos resultados 
económicos positivos, como son un menor coste de capital y una mejora en la eficiencia 
de las decisiones de inversión. A continuación, se describen brevemente los principales 
resultados de los tres ensayos.  
El primer ensayo se titula La complementariedad entre la información 
segmentada y la calidad del resultado contable. Este estudio aborda la naturaleza de la 
relación, complementaria o sustitutiva, entre la revelación voluntaria de información 
segmentada y la calidad del resultado contable. La evidencia sobre la relación entre la 
calidad de los números contables reportados y la revelación de información es escasa, y 
las dos corrientes de la literatura (calidad del resultado contable y revelación de 
información) se han desarrollado de forma independiente en la literatura previa. El 
objetivo de este estudio es la integración de ambas líneas de investigación para 
comprender mejor la relación entre la calidad del resultado contable y la revelación de 
información segmentada. Para ello, se crea un índice de cantidad de información 
Chapter 1: Introduction. 
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segmentada voluntaria, basado en los requerimientos de información segmentada de la 
normativa SFAS 131: a cada empresa se le suma 1 punto por cada elemento revelado de 
forma voluntaria en cada uno de los segmentos de negocio / geográfico obligatorios, y 1 
punto por cada elemento de revelación en todos los segmentos de negocio / geográfico 
de carácter voluntario. Se espera que las empresas con mejor calidad del resultado 
contable tengan incentivos para ofrecer una información más completa de sus diferentes 
líneas de negocio y líneas geográficas para ayudar a los inversores a tomar decisiones de 
inversión adecuadas. Se espera que la complementariedad entre la revelación de 
información segmentada y la calidad del resultado contable aumente el valor de la 
empresa. Los resultados encontrados confirman que existe una relación positiva y 
significativa entre la revelación de información segmentada y la calidad del resultado 
contable. Estos resultados se sostienen también para la información revelada sobre 
líneas de negocio y líneas geográficas de forma separada. Los resultados también 
demuestran que la diversificación es un determinante crucial de los niveles de 
información segmentada. Es decir, las empresas que operan en un mayor número de 
sectores ofrecen un mayor nivel de información de líneas de negocio. Asimismo, las 
empresas que operan en un mayor número de países proporcionan un mayor nivel de 
información sobre sus líneas geográficas. Por último, encontramos que las asimetrías de 
información en el año anterior también determinan el nivel de revelación de 
información segmentada.  
El segundo ensayo se titula Información segmentada, calidad del resultado 
contable  y coste de capital. Este estudio analiza si las empresas que proporcionan 
mejor calidad del resultado contable y mejor calidad de la información segmentada 
obtienen un menor coste de capital. El trabajo se centra en la revelación de información 
segmentada, dado que este tipo de información mejora la capacidad de los inversores 
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para estimar los futuros flujos de caja de las empresas, y, en consecuencia, se espera que 
disminuya el coste de capital. Los resultados encontrados confirman que las empresas 
que proporcionan una mejor calidad de información segmentada, que complementa un 
resultado contable de calidad, tienen un menor coste de capital. Este resultado es 
robusto al uso de modelos de valoración de activos y al uso de medidas de coste 
implícito de capital. Además, los resultados muestran que una mejor calidad de 
información segmentada ayuda a los inversores a estimar los flujos de caja de la 
empresa, reduciendo los errores de predicción de los analistas. Esto es coherente con 
que la calidad de la información segmentada y del resultado contable reducen el riesgo 
de estimación. Los resultados también muestran que las empresas que proporcionan 
información segmentada de buena calidad reducen la covarianza entre los rendimientos 
de la empresa y los rendimientos de las empresas en el sector al que la empresa 
pertenece (subrogado de riesgo sistemático, no diversificable). Esta reducción, en el 
marco teórico proporcionado por Lambert, Leuz y Verrecchia (2007), conduce a una 
reducción en el coste de capital. A diferencia de Francis, Nanda y Olsson (2008), se 
utiliza una medida de la calidad, no de la cantidad, de la revelación de información. Los 
resultados muestran que es la calidad de la información, no la cantidad, lo que reduce el 
coste de capital. La calidad de la información segmentada se mide a través de los 
residuos de una regresión de la cantidad de la información segmentada sobre los 
determinantes de revelación de la información segmentada (calidad del resultado 
contable, diversificación sectorial y geográfica, y las asimetrías de información) y sobre 
una serie de controles.  
El tercer ensayo se titula El papel de la información segmentada en el gobierno 
corporativo y su efecto sobre la eficiencia de inversión de las empresas. Este estudio 
analiza el papel de calidad de la información segmentada en el gobierno corporativo y 
Chapter 1: Introduction. 
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su efecto sobre la eficiencia de las decisiones de inversión de la empresa. Se espera que 
la calidad de la revelación de información segmentada aumente la eficiencia de las 
decisiones de inversión de las empresas por dos razones. En primer lugar, porque la 
información segmentada, como se muestra en el ensayo anterior, disminuye el coste de 
capital, lo que a su vez, disminuye la sensibilidad de las inversiones a los flujos de caja 
generados internamente, y también reduce eventuales problemas de infrainversión. En 
segundo lugar, porque facilita el control sobre las decisiones del gerente (Berger y 
Hann, 2003, 2007, Hope y Thomas, 2008), lo que reduce los problemas de 
sobreinversión. Los resultados encontrados muestran lo siguiente: (1) las empresas que 
proporcionan información segmentada de mejor calidad presentan una menor 
sensibilidad de sus decisiones a la existencia de flujos de caja generados internamente; 
(2) la calidad de la información segmentada mejora la eficiencia de las decisiones de 
inversión (reduciendo los problemas de infrainversión y sobreinversión), y (3) 
mecanismos demasiado rígidos para monitorizar las decisiones de los gerentes 
aumentan los problemas de infrainversión y sobreinversión. En este caso, la calidad de 
la información segmentada desempeña un papel crucial para evitar las ineficiencias de 
inversión bajo la supervisión excesiva. Es decir, la calidad de la información 
segmentada y los mecanismos de gobierno corporativo se complementan entre sí para 
mejorar la eficiencia de las decisiones de inversión de la empresa. Este estudio 
contribuye a la reciente corriente de literatura empírica sobre el efecto de la calidad de 
la información contable sobre la eficiencia de las políticas de inversión de las empresas, 
mostrando que la calidad de la información segmentada juega un papel crucial para 
evitar que los gerentes tomen decisiones de inversión ineficientes. 
Chapter 1: Introduction. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction.  
This thesis consists of three empirical essays on the economic consequences of 
differences in the quality of the information about segments that firms include in their 
financial statements. In the first one I study the relationship between segment disclosure 
and earnings quality. In the second one I study the effect of the relation between 
segment disclosure and earnings quality on cost of capital. In the last essay I study the 
role of segment disclosure in corporate governance and its effect on firms’ investment 
efficiency. Overall, I contribute to a growing stream of literature on the economic 
consequences of differences in the quality of accounting information. My results are 
consistent with improved segment information leading to positive economic outcomes, 
like a reduced cost of capital and more efficient investment policies. Next, I discuss 
briefly the main findings of the three essays. 
The first essay is entitled The Complementarity between Segment Disclosure 
and Earnings Quality. This study addresses the nature of the relation, complementary or 
substitutive, between voluntary segment disclosure and earnings quality. The evidence 
relating the quality of reported numbers and disclosure is scarce, and the two streams of 
literature (earnings quality and disclosure) have developed independently from each 
other. The objective of this study is to integrate both views to deepen our understanding 
of the relation between earnings quality and segment disclosure. To this purpose, I 
create an index of quantity of voluntary segment disclosure based on the information 
requirements of SFAS 131: for each firm, I assign 1 point for every voluntary item 
disclosed in every compulsory business/geographic segment, and 1 point for every item 
disclosed in every voluntary business/geographic segment. Our claim is that firms with 
better earnings quality will have incentives to provide more comprehensive information 
of their different business or geographical lines to help investors make appropriate 
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investment decisions. This complementarity in the provision of earnings quality and 
segment disclosure is expected to increase firm value. The results I find confirm that 
there is a significant positive association between segment disclosure and earnings 
quality. This result holds for both business and geographic segment information when 
considered separately. The results also show that diversification is a crucial determinant 
of segment information levels. That is, firms operating in a higher number of sectors 
provide higher levels of business segment information. Also, firms operating in a higher 
number of countries provide higher levels of geographic segment information. Finally, 
we find empirical evidence that also information asymmetries in the preceding year 
determine the level of segment disclosure. 
The second essay is entitled Segment Disclosure, Earnings Quality and Cost of 
Capital. This study analyses whether firms providing better earnings quality and better 
segment information enjoy a lower cost of capital. I focus on segment disclosure given 
that it is expected to improve investors’ ability to estimate firms’ future cash flows, and, 
consequently, it is expected to decrease the cost of capital. The results I find show that 
firms providing better quality segment disclosure that complements good quality 
earnings enjoy lower costs of equity capital. This result is robust to the use of asset 
pricing-based tests and implied cost of capital-based tests. In addition, the results show 
that better segment disclosure improves investors’ ability to estimate firm’s cash flows, 
and reduces analysts’ forecast errors. This is consistent with quality of segment 
disclosure reducing estimation risk. Our empirical evidence, as well, supports that firms 
providing better segment disclosure reduce the assessed covariance between firm’s 
returns and returns of firms in the same sector. Such decrease in this assessed 
covariance (which is a proxy of systematic, non-diversifiable, risk) leads to a reduction 
in the cost of capital within the theoretical framework provided by Lambert, Leuz and 
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Verrecchia (2007). Unlike Francis, Nanda and Olsson (2008), we use a proxy of 
disclosure quality, not a proxy of disclosure quantity. Results show that it is the quality 
of disclosure, not the quantity of disclosure, what reduces the cost of capital. We 
measure the quality of segment disclosure through the residuals of a model that 
regresses quantity of segment disclosure on the determinants of segment disclosure 
(business and geographic diversification, earnings quality, information asymmetries) 
and controls. 
The third essay is entitled The Role of Segment Disclosure in Corporate 
Governance and its Effect on Firm Investment Efficiency. This study analyses the role 
of segment disclosure quality in corporate governance and its effect on firm investment 
efficiency. Segment disclosure quality is expected to increase firms’ investment 
efficiency because of two reasons. First, segment disclosure, as I find in the previous 
chapter, decreases the costs of external funds, which, in turn, reduces the sensitivity of 
investments to internally generated cash flows and eventual underinvestment problems. 
Second, it facilitates monitoring over manager decisions (Berger and Hann, 2003, 2007; 
Hope and Thomas, 2008), which reduces overinvestment. The results I find are as 
follows: (1) firms providing better segment disclosure present lower sensitivity of 
investments to internally generated cash flows; (2) better quality segment disclosure 
improves firms’ investment efficiency (reducing both under and over investment); and 
(3) too tight mechanisms to monitor managers’ decisions exacerbate under-investment 
and over-investment problems. In this last case, segment information quality also plays 
a crucial role to avoid investment inefficiencies under excessive monitoring. That is, 
segment information quality and corporate governance mechanisms complement each 
other to enhance firm’s investment efficiency. This study contributes to the recent 
stream of empirical literature on the effect of accounting information quality on 
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investment efficiency by showing that segment information quality plays a crucial role 
in detecting and deterring managerial investment decisions that do not increase the 
value of the firm.   
 
Chapter 2: The Complementarity between Segment Disclosure and Earnings Quality. 
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Chapter 2: The Complementarity between Segment 
Disclosure and Earnings Quality.  
2.1. INTRODUCTION 
The objective of this paper is to investigate the relation between earnings quality 
and segment disclosure. We expect that earnings quality and segment disclosure will be 
related in a predictable way. The literature on information economics suggests that 
firms provide information to decrease information asymmetries (Grossman and Hart, 
1980; Milgrom, 1981; Verrecchia, 1983). This provision of information could be 
achieved through several channels, including the reported accounting numbers and 
through additional disclosure. The empirical literature relating accounting numbers and 
disclosure provides mixed results, probably due to the use of empirical measures of 
disclosure that include information expected to be useful for investors (that 
disaggregates, explains or complements the reported numbers) and information that 
might not be useful for investors. 
In this study, we focus on segment disclosure. Prior literature suggests segment 
disclosure is useful for investors and increases firm value, as it increases the value 
relevance of accounting numbers (Chen and Zhang, 2003), it improves monitoring over 
management decisions, diminishing agency costs (Hope and Thomas, 2008), and helps 
reducing information asymmetries (Greenstein and Sami, 1994). Consequently, we 
expect firms providing better earnings quality will also be likely to provide 
comprehensive segment disclosure to additionally decrease information asymmetries 
and increase firm value. Thus, we expect that, holding everything else constant, firms 
with better earnings quality will prepare more expansive segment disclosures; however, 
below a given level of earnings quality, we expect the relation between segment 
Chapter 2: The Complementarity between Segment Disclosure and Earnings Quality. 
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disclosure and earnings quality to be independent, as for firms providing poor quality 
earnings the incentives for additional disclosure disappear.   
Using a sample of non regulated and non financial firms for the period 2001-
2006, we find that firms providing better earnings quality disaggregate more segment 
information, and this result is robust to controls for the determinants of segment 
disclosure. Our study contributes to the literature relating the quality of reported 
numbers and disclosure. These two streams of literature (earnings quality and 
disclosure) have developed mostly independently from each other. We contribute to 
understand the link between the two by providing empirical evidence that segment 
disclosure and earnings quality show a complementary relation. We also find that this 
complementary relation only holds if the earnings quality is sufficiently good.  
The remainder of the paper is as follows. In Section 2.2 we present the 
theoretical development on the relation between segment disclosure and earnings 
quality. In Section 2.3 we present the research design, describing our proxies for the 
quantity and quality of segment information and the method to analyze the relation 
between earnings quality and segment information. In Section 2.4 we present the 
results. Finally Section 2.5 summarizes and concludes. 
2.2. SEGMENT DISCLOSURE AND EARNINGS QUALITY  
2.2.1 The importance of segment disclosure 
Companies are increasingly international and increasingly diversified. The 
valuation of an international or a diversified firm requires information not only about 
overall firm activity, but also about segments of the firm because performance, risk and 
potential growth of different business or geographical lines vary appreciably (SFAS 
131; Ernst and Young, 2005; Palepu, Healy and Bernard, 2004). Investors and analysts 
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need segment information as they require information to help them in predicting firm’s 
future cash flows. Without this disaggregation in segments, predicting future cash flows 
of the firm becomes more difficult (AIMR, 1993). As a response to users requests, 
regulators require segment disclosure with the objective of providing “information 
about the different types of business activities in which a firm engages and the different 
economic environments in which it operates to help users of financial statements to a. 
Better understand the enterprise’s performance, b. Better assess its prospects for future 
net cash flows and c. Make more informed judgments about the enterprise as a whole.” 
(FAS 131, paragraph 3). 
A wealth of academic research has focused on segment reporting, showing 
several benefits of improved segment information: (i) it is expected to help current and 
potential investors to improve their capital allocation decisions. Previous literature finds 
that segment characteristics are useful in equity valuation and that the value relevance 
of accounting numbers is higher in firms that provide disaggregated segment 
information rather than in firms that do not disaggregate such information, especially 
when operating segments have increasingly different profitability and growth 
opportunities (Foster, 1975; Tse, 1989; Wysocki, 1998; Basu, Kim and Lim, 1999; 
Chen and Zhang, 2003; Hope, Kang, Thomas and Vasvari, 2009); (ii) it permits better 
monitoring of manager’s decisions, decreasing information asymmetries between 
managers and debt– and equity– holders, reducing empire building decisions and 
improving investment efficiency. Previous literature shows that when firms provide 
information about the diversification of the firm and about the resource transfers across 
segments, they facilitate and improve the monitoring over manager decisions, and 
reduce information asymmetries (Greenstein and Sami, 1994; Berger and Hann, 2003, 
2007; Hope, Kang, Thomas and Vasvari, 2008; Hope and Thomas, 2008); and (iii) it is 
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useful to financial analysts, who will use the more comprehensive segment information 
to improve their earnings forecasts. In this context, previous literature shows that 
analysts issue more accurate earnings forecasts if they have available good quality 
segment data (Kinney, 1971; Collins, 1976; Baldwin, 1984; Balakrishnan, Harris and 
Sen, 1990; Hussain, 1997). 
2.2.2 The relation between segment information and earnings quality 
 Prior literature shows that in the absence of disclosure related costs, individuals 
disclose information to obtain certain benefits (Spence, 1973). In particular, firms will 
have incentives to voluntarily disclose relevant information to the market to reduce 
information asymmetry and agency costs (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Grossman, 1981; 
Milgrom, 1981; Hughes, 1986; Morris, 1987). Managers can obtain these economic 
benefits related to the provision of information through improvements in the quality of 
their firms’ reported numbers. However, even if reported numbers provide a true and 
fair view of the situation of the firm, it is likely that, given that reported numbers are too 
aggregated, they are not sufficient to make appropriate economic decisions. Segment 
disclosure is expected to help in disaggregating the information and to facilitate an 
efficient allocation of resources. Consistent with this expectation, prior empirical 
research shows that segment reporting decreases information asymmetries (Greenstein 
and Sami, 1994) and agency costs (Berger and Hann, 2003, 2007; Hope and Thomas, 
2008). Consequently, we predict that firms with better earnings quality will have 
incentives to provide more comprehensive segment information to help investors in 
making appropriate investment decisions. Managers of firms providing better earnings 
quality will be keen on complementing earnings information with additional segment 
disclosure to additionally decrease information asymmetries and increase firm value. 
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 However, the provision of this information might bear some costs, as it could 
compromise the firms’ competitive position by providing strategic information to 
potential competitors (Harris, 1998; Hayes and Lundholm, 1996). Thus, incentives to 
voluntarily provide segment information will be limited by the existence of proprietary 
costs (Verrecchia, 1983; Dye, 1986; Darrough and Stoughton, 1990; Wagenhofer, 
1990). However, when information quality increases, the manager has more incentives 
to disclose private information, since the market is more likely to interpret 
nondisclosure as bad news (Dye, 1985; Jung and Kwon, 1988). This is also consistent 
with our prediction of a positive relation between the quality of reported earnings and 
the quantity of segment disclosures.  
Moreover, we expect this complementary relation to hold until earnings quality 
becomes very poor. In this case the relation disappears: companies will not have 
incentives to provide comprehensive segment information because they do not want that 
other parties may infer that they have manipulated information and the way in which 
they have conducted such manipulation. This leads to the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: As the quality of earnings increases, the comprehensiveness of 
segment disclosure will increase once the quality of earnings becomes 
sufficiently good. 
2.3. RESEARCH DESIGN  
2.3.1 Creation of an index of quantity of segment disclosure (Qtt_Seg) 
To elaborate our own index for the quantity of segment disclosure (Qtt_Seg), we 
analyze disclosures on both business and geographic segments. In a first step, for every 
reported business/geographic segment in each firm, we analyze whether the segment is 
reported on a compulsory or voluntary basis. For the compulsory segments, we 
distinguish between the items reported compulsorily as they are required by SFAS 131, 
and the items reported on a voluntary basis. (See the Appendix for detailed information 
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on how we identify the mandatory vs. voluntary segments, and on which items firms 
should compulsorily report for the mandatory segments under SFAS 131). Next, we 
create the business/geographic segment score (Qtt_Seg_Bus)/(Qtt_Seg_Geo) by adding 
1 point for every voluntarily disclosed item in every mandatory segment, and 1 point for 
every item in every voluntary segment. Finally, we create the overall index of quantity 
of voluntary segment disclosure (Qtt_Seg) by adding the business and geographic 
segment scores. 
2.3.2 Determinants of segment information and creation of an index of quality of 
segment disclosure (Qlt_Seg) 
 To explore if earnings quality is a determinant factor in explaining segment 
disclosure policy, we regress a fixed effect model of quantity of segment information 
(Qtt_Seg) on earnings quality, the main determinants of segment disclosures (business 
and geographic diversification as well as information asymmetries) and controls. The 
model is as follows: 
Qtt_Segj,t = α + β1 Earnings Qualityj,t +β2 Business Diversificationj,t +  
 + β3 Geographic Diversificationj,t  + β4 Information Asymmetriesj,t-1 + 
 + β5 Sizej,t + β6 Growthj,t + β7  Leveragej,t +β8 Audit Firmj,t +         (1) 
 + β9 Listing Statusj,t + β10 Proprietary Costsj,t  + 
 + β11 New Financingj,t + β12  Profitabilityj,t + β13Agej,t + 
+Σ
 k βk Control year j,t +εj,t    
 
Hypothesis 1 predicts earnings quality will contribute to increase disclosure 
levels. Given this, we expect a positive relation between proxies for earnings quality 
and Qtt_Seg. To test whether below a given level of earnings quality the relationship is 
independent, we divide firms into high earnings quality and poor earnings quality, to 
analyze if there is any difference in segment disclosure behavior between these two 
groups of firms. We create two median clusters according to the Euclidean distance in 
earnings quality to the group of firms. In addition, we also estimate the model 
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distinguishing between voluntary business segment information and voluntary 
geographic segment information. The residuals of this model can be interpreted as a 
proxy for the quality of segment information. We will use this proxy in Chapters 3 and 
4 to analyze the relation between segment disclosure quality and cost of capital (in 
Chapter 3) and firm investment efficiency (in Chapter 4). 
We measure the variables used in Equation (1) as follows: 
A/ Earnings quality measures 
We use four different measures of earnings quality, broadly used in the 
literature. These four measures are based on the studies by Dechow and Dichev (2002), 
McNichols (2002), Jones (1991), and Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney (1995). We estimate 
them as follows: 
 
 The Dechow and Dichev (2002) measure  
Our first proxy is based on Dechow and Dichev (2002). They propose a model 
that explains current working capital accruals with lagged, current and future cash flow 
from operations. The unexplained portion of the variation in cash flows (the residuals of 
the model) is an inverse measure of accruals quality. The intuition behind this measure 
is that working capital accruals should shift or adjust the recognition of operating cash 
flows over a short period of time (t-1, t and t+1).1 We denote these residuals as DD. We 
estimate Equation (2) using data from 2000 to 2007. 
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where: TCAj,t = firm’s j total current working capital accruals is year t = ∆CAj,t -
∆CLj,t -∆Cashj,t +∆STDEBTj,t; Assetsj,t = firm’s j average total assets (Compustat #6) in 
                                                
1
 Dechow and Dichev (2002) assume that any working capital accrual that is not explained by CFO in t-1, t or t+1 is not responding 
to economic fundamentals. Thus, higher abnormal accruals (higher residuals) are indicative of lower accruals quality.  
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year t and t-1; CFOj,t = cash flow from operations in year t = NIBEj,t -TAj,t; TAj,t = firm 
j’s total accruals in year t, measured as ∆CAj,t -∆CLj,t -∆Cashj,t +∆STDEBTj,t-DEPNj,t;  
∆CAj,t= firm j’s change in current assets (Compustat #4) between year t-1 and year t; 
∆CLj,t= firm j’s change in current liabilities (Compustat #5) between year t-1 and year t; 
∆Cashj,t= firm j’s change in cash (Compustat #1) between year t-1 and year t; 
∆STDEBTj,t= firm j’s change in debt in current liabilities (Compustat #34) between year 
t-1 and year t; DEPNj,t= firm j’s depreciation and amortization expense (Compustat #14) 
in year t; NIBEj,t = firm j’s net income before extraordinary items (Compustat #18) in 
year t.  
We use the absolute values of DD, multiplied by minus one, so that larger values 
of DD correspond to better accrual quality. 
 
The McNichols (2002) measure 
Our second measure of accrual quality is the one proposed by McNichols 
(2002). She uses as a proxy for accrual quality the residuals from a model relating 
current accruals to lagged, current and future cash flow from operations, change in net 
sales in year t and gross property, plant and equipment in year t. The unexplained 
portion of the variation in working capital accruals is an inverse measure of accruals 
quality. The intuition behind this measure is the same as in Dechow and Dichev (2002), 
but McNichols (2002) also takes into account that working capital accruals are also a 
function of changes in revenues and PPE (Jones, 1991). We denote these residuals as 
McN. We estimate Equation (3) using data from 2000 to 2007. 
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where: TCAj,t and CFOj,t are defined as in the Dechow Dichev Measure; 
∆REVj,t= firm’s j change in revenues (Compustat #12) between year t-1 and t; PPEj,t = 
firm’s j gross property, plant and equipment (Compustat #7) in year t.  
We use the absolute values of McN, multiplied by minus one, so that large 
values of McN correspond to good accrual quality.  
 
Jones and Jones Modified Measures 
Our last measures are based on the Jones (1991) model, and its modified version 
as defined by Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney (1995). We denote them as J and JM, 
respectively. The intuition behind these models is that accruals are explained with 
changes in revenues (both changes in receivables and payables, and changes in 
inventory, are a function of change in revenues) and the level of PPE in the firm 
(depreciation is a function of PPE). One implicit assumption of the Jones (1991) model 
is that revenues are nondiscretionary. Dechow et al. (1995) relax this assuming that 
discretion could be exercised over revenues. Both models assume that the accrual 
generating process is similar within each industry. We estimate Equation (4) using data 
from 2000 to 2006 for each 2-digit SIC industry groups. 
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where: TAj,t is firm j’s total accruals in year t, Assetsj,t is firm’s j total assets 
(Compustat #6) at the beginning of year t; ∆REVj,t is firm’s j change in revenues 
(Compustat #12) between year t-1 and t; PPEj,t is firm’s j gross property, plant and 
equipment (Compustat #7) in year t. 
Next, for each firm j, we calculate its discretionary accruals as: 
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 where: γβα ˆ,ˆ,ˆ  = the fitted coefficients from model (4); ∆ARj,t= the change in 
account receivables for firm j (Compustat #2) in year t. 
 We use the absolute values of J and JM, multiplied by minus one. Large values 
correspond to good accrual quality, that is, less discretionary accruals. 
B/ Business diversification 
We include business diversification as a determinant of segment disclosure as 
more diversified/complex firms are expected to report information on a larger number 
of business segments than less diversified ones. To create an index of business 
diversification we use the primary and secondary SIC codes that Compustat assigns to 
each firm.  For every firm, we create the business diversification score by assigning 1 
point for every different 2-digit SIC code assigned by Compustat to the firm as forming 
part of its primary or secondary activities. 
C/ Geographic diversification 
We include geographic diversification as a determinant of segment disclosure. 
We define our geographic diversification index as the number of different countries 
where the firm has subsidiaries.2 For example: if a given company X has four 
subsidiaries, one in Spain, one in Italy and two in Croatia, we assign to this company a 
geographic diversification score of 3, as there are three different countries in which it 
has subsidiaries. 
                                                
2
 We use subsidiaries information from Osiris. We take into account subsidiaries with a minimum of 25.01% of control by the 
company under analysis. 
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D/ Information asymmetries 
Healy and Palepu (2001) suggest that the demand for disclosure arises from 
information asymmetries and agency conflicts between managers and outside investors. 
Managers disclose information to reduce information asymmetries. Given this, we 
include a proxy for information asymmetries, the bid-ask spread, as a determinant of 
segment disclosure. We measure the bid-ask spread as: 
2/)(
||
,,
,,
,
tjtj
tjtj
tj
askbid
askbid
Spread
+
−
=
                                             (7) 
where: bidj,t is the firm’s j annual mean of the monthly bid prices for year t, and 
askj,t  is the firm’s j annual mean of the monthly ask prices for year t. 
E/ Controls 
 Size: Previous literature finds that corporate size is significantly and positively 
associated with disclosure levels. That is, larger companies disclose more (Buzby, 1975; 
Diamond and Verrecchia, 1991). This relation also holds for segment disclosure levels 
(Leuz, 2004). We measure firm size as the natural logarithm of firm’s market value, 
measured at the beginning of the fiscal year. 
  Growth: We measure firm’s growth as the logarithm of the firm’s book to 
market ratio at the beginning of the fiscal year (Nagar, Nanda and Wysocki, 2003). 
 Leverage: prior studies analyzing its relation with disclosure levels find mixed 
results (Chow and Wong-Boren, 1987; Wallace, Naser and Mora, 1994; Leuz and 
Verrecchia, 2000). Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that leveraged firms incur in 
larger monitoring costs. To reduce these costs they are expected to increase disclosure. 
We measure Leverage as the ratio of total debt to total assets. 
 Audit firm: We include an auditor dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the 
auditor is a Big Four firm, and 0 otherwise. Such dummy captures the effect on a firm’s 
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disclosure of being audited by one of the Big Four auditing firms (Wallace et al., 1994, 
Hope, 2003). Large and well-known audit firms pressure their clients for better 
disclosure. 
 Stock exchange status: This is measured by a dummy variable taking the value 
of 1 if the firm is listed in the NYSE or in NASDAQ, and 0 otherwise. Wallace et al. 
(1994) and Leuz and Verrecchia (2000) find a significant relation between disclosure 
and the listing status of the firm. 
Proprietary costs: Such costs influence segmental disclosures (Botosan and 
Stanford, 2005). Disclosure is less likely as proprietary costs increase (Dye, 1985, 1986; 
Verrecchia, 1983, 1990; Darrough and Stoughton, 1990; Wagenhofer, 1990; Hayes and 
Lundholm, 1996). Proprietary costs are essentially third party constraints, firms could 
have competitive disadvantages if they disclose information to their competitors and to 
regulators, they could also bear disadvantages with both suppliers and consumers, and 
also, litigation risk increases when firms disclose more. One way to capture proprietary 
costs is measuring the industry concentration. Higher industry concentration implies 
higher proprietary costs since current competitors might adversely use the information 
provided (Verrecchia, 1983). We calculate the industry concentration using the 
following Herfindhal index: 
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Herf                                           (8) 
where Sij = Business i’s sales (segment i’s sales) in industry j, as defined by the 
two-digit SIC code; Sj = The sum of sales for all businesses in the industry; Sij/Sj = 
Business i’s share in industry j; N = The number of businesses in industry j. 
The greater Herfj, the higher the current level of industry concentration 
(competition) for industry j. 
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 New financing: We include a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the firm 
raised new capital funds or increased debt in a given year, and 0 otherwise. We expect 
that if the firm is looking for additional capital funds managers will be more likely to 
provide additional disclosure in an attempt to reduce the costs of these new finance 
sources (Barry and Brown, 1984, 1985, 1986; Sengupta, 1998; Healy, Hutton and 
Palepu, 1999, Ahmed, Billings, Morton and Stanford-Harris, 2002; Easley and O’Hara, 
2004; Gietzmann and Ireland, 2005).  
 Profitability: We approach this variable through the return on assets (ROA) 
defined as the ratio of earnings before interests and taxes (EBIT) to the total assets. 
Previous literature provides mixed results. Some studies find a significant positive 
relationship (Singhvi and Desai, 1971; Wallace et al., 1994), others find no relationship 
(Raffournier, 1995) whilst others find a significant negative association (Wallace and 
Naser, 1995). 
 Age: Such variable is measured by the difference between the current year and 
the year that the firm appeared in CRSP. 
2.3.3 Sample selection  
 We extract a sample of non financial and non regulated firms from the 
Compustat annual files, for the period 2001 to 2006, with the necessary data to calculate 
the earnings quality measures and all variables needed for our disclosure tests. The 
number of subsidiaries, used to calculate our proxy for geographic diversification, is 
extracted from BvD Osiris.3 Our final sample comprises 10,002 firm-year observations 
with data on all variables to run all of our tests. We exclude observations with missing 
                                                
3
 We assume the number of subsidiaries does not change if the data is not available for one year. (i.e., if a firm has no data for 2004, 
we assume that the number of subsidiaries is equal to that of 2005)  Results are robust to the use of a smaller sample in which we 
drop firms with no available data on the number of subsidiaries in all the years of the sample. 
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data from any of the variables needed. To mitigate the undesirable effect of outliers, we 
delete the top and bottom percentile of the distributions of all variables.  
[Insert Table 1 about Here] 
The mean (median) number of items reported by our sample firms is 42.25 (39), 
with a standard deviation of 20.29 (Table 1). Note that the standard deviation is high, 
but it is mainly due to the different number of reported segments among firms. The 
minimum items disclosed are 10 while the maximum are 149 (not tabulated). Data 
indicate substantial variation in voluntary segment disclosure levels across the sample 
firms. Regarding accruals quality, the mean and median values are slightly larger than 
those reported in previous studies (i.e., the mean and median abnormal discretionary 
accruals using the modified Jones model in Francis, Nanda and Olsson (2008) are, 
respectively, 0.0159 and 0.0123, while is our study they are -0.0743 and -0.0349 –
negative values because we multiplied them by -1–). Mean leverage is 20.19%, 
indicating that our sample firms are relatively low leveraged, but are issuing new debt 
or equity to finance their projects (mean value of Newfin=0.88). Also, most of our 
sample firms are audited by Big-4 firms, and are listed in NYSE or Nasdaq. 
2.4. RESULTS  
2.4.1 The relation between earnings quality and segment disclosure 
A/ Univariate analysis 
[Insert Table 2 about Here] 
In Table 2 we show the pairwise correlations between Qtt_Seg, earnings quality, 
and firm characteristics. Earnings quality is significantly and positively related to 
Qtt_Seg (22%). This provides preliminary evidence consistent with the complementary 
relation between earnings quality and quantity of voluntary disclosure, as we predict in 
Chapter 2: The Complementarity between Segment Disclosure and Earnings Quality. 
 
 30 
Hypothesis 1. Much as expected, business diversification and geographic diversification 
are very strongly correlated with Qtt_Seg (31 and 10% respectively). Also, information 
asymmetries (the bid-ask spread) is, as expected, positively correlated with Qtt_Seg 
(2.8%). 
B/ Multivariate analysis 
[Insert Table 3 about Here] 
In Table 3 we show the results of an industry fixed effect regression of Qtt_Seg, 
our proxy for the quantity of segment disclosure, on the determinants of segment 
disclosure. In the first column, we only include the controls. We find that the quantity of 
segment disclosure (Qtt_Seg), as expected, increases with firm size, the book to market 
ratio, leverage, being audited by a big-four firm, being listed in NYSE or NASDAQ, 
issuing new financing and firm age, and decreases with profitability and proprietary 
costs. All of the firm controls are significantly associated with quantity of segment 
information at conventional levels. These results corroborate that our index of voluntary 
segment information (Qtt_Seg) is a valid measure of disclosure.  
In the second, third, fourth and fifth columns of Table 3 we show, respectively, 
the results of estimating Equation (1), where we regress Qtt_Seg on earnings quality and 
the determinants of segment disclosure, for each of our proxies for earnings quality 
(Dechow-Dichev, McNichols, Jones and Modified-Jones). For all measures of earnings 
quality, results are as expected, as β1 is positive and significant in all cases.4 This 
confirms the complementary relation between earnings quality and segment disclosure.5 
Finally, we find that firms with higher information asymmetries provide more segment 
information. Our results are robust to the use of other earnings quality measures, and to 
                                                
4
 Our results are robust to the use of other earnings quality measures based on the standard deviation of the residuals of the Jones, 
modified Jones and  Dechow and Dichev models, calculated at the firm level using rolling five year windows, as in Francis et al. 
(2004). The results are also robust to the use of signed measures of accruals quality.  
5 To tackle the possible endogeneity in the relationship between segment disclosure and earnings quality, we run the model using the 
dependent variable one year ahead, and the results do not change.  
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the use of geographic and business segment quantity measures separately instead of the 
aggregate measure Qtt_Seg. Regarding the fitness of the model, the results show that 
determinants of disclosure explain a significant amount of the variation in Qtt_Seg 
(around 30%). 
[Insert Table 4 about Here] 
In the first and second column of Table 4 we show the results of forming two 
portfolios on earnings quality to test whether the relation between earnings quality and 
segment disclosure is stronger when firms provide better earnings quality. First, we 
form two portfolios based on the median of earnings quality. Firms above the median 
are classified as “good earnings quality”, whilst firms below the median are classified as 
“poor earnings quality”. Results based on JM (the other accrual quality measures lead to 
similar conclusions (not tabulated)) show that earnings quality leads to more 
pronounced increases in the levels of segment disclosure for firms with earnings quality 
above the median (the coefficient on earnings quality goes from 47.84 for “good 
earnings quality” firms, to 3.96 for “poor earnings quality” firms, difference significant 
at conventional levels). Diversification of the firm leads to higher levels of segment 
information in a similar way for both types of firms, so both business and geographic 
diversification are determinants of the level of quantity of information independently of 
earnings quality. Finally, information asymmetries contribute to increase the levels of 
segment disclosure more pronouncedly in firms with good quality earnings (the 
coefficient on information asymmetries goes from 4.18 for “good earnings quality” 
firms, to 1.48 (not significant) for “poor earnings quality” firms, difference significant 
at conventional levels). One possible reason for this difference is that companies will 
not have incentives to provide comprehensive segment information when the quality of 
the information is not reliable. Then, we create two median clusters according to the 
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Euclidean distance in earnings quality to the group of firms,6 and the results (third and 
fourth columns of Table 4) are robust. In this case, we find that for low earnings quality, 
the relationship between segment disclosure and earnings quality is independent 
(coefficient 4.3087, p-value 0.203).     
We also use an ordered logit model to study the relation between earnings 
quality and segment information.7 The results from this test show that firms providing 
better earnings quality are more likely to provide more comprehensive segment 
information, which confirms the complementary relation between segment information 
and earnings quality. The results are also robust to the estimation of Equation (1) 
applying a bootstrapped quantile regression.8 All of these results confirm the robustness 
of the complementary relationship between the quantity of segment information and 
earnings quality. Moreover, firm diversification seems to be a critical determinant of the 
quantity of segment information, as well as information asymmetries in the precedent 
year.         
2.4.2 The relation between earnings quality and business and geographic segment 
disclosure 
We replicate all the tests distinguishing between voluntary business segment 
information and voluntary geographic segment information.      
[Insert Table 5 about Here] 
In Table 5 we show the results of a fixed effect regression of Qtt_Seg_Bus, our 
proxy for the quantity of business segment disclosure, on the determinants of segment 
disclosure. In the first column, we only include the controls to test the validity of our 
                                                
6
 The results are robust to the use of different number of portfolios, and to the use of other criteria to divide the sample (i.e.: 
clustering earnings quality using different measures of distance (i.e., Squared Euclidean distance and Chebychev distance) and 
criteria (i.e., mean)). 
7
 To apply this methodology, we divide Qtt_Seg into 50 fractiles. 
8
 The regression curve gives us a brief summary for the averages of the distributions corresponding to the set of independent 
variables. With bootstapped quantile regression, we go further and compute several different regression curves corresponding to the 
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index of voluntary business segment disclosure. We find that the quantity of business 
segment disclosure (Qtt_Seg_Bus) increases with firm size, the book to market ratio, 
leverage, being audited by a big-four firm, being listed in NYSE or NASDAQ, issuing 
new financing and age, and decreases with profitability and proprietary costs. All of the 
firm controls are significantly associated with quantity of segment information at 
conventional levels.  
In the second, third, fourth and fifth columns of Table 5 we show, respectively, 
results of estimating Equation (1) for business segment disclosure. The results confirms 
that firms providing better earnings quality are also interested in providing higher levels 
of business segment information. As in the global index analysis, we find that firms 
operating in more sectors provide more comprehensive segment information and that 
firms with higher information asymmetries in the preceding year provide more business 
segment information. The results show that determinants of disclosure explain a 
significant amount of the variation in Qtt_Seg_Bus (around 27%). Results from forming 
portfolios according to earnings quality (not tabulated) also confirm that below a given 
level of earnings quality, there is no relation between business segment disclosure and 
earnings quality.    
[Insert Table 6 about Here] 
Finally, in Table 6 we show the results of a fixed effect regression of 
Qtt_Seg_Geo, our proxy for the quantity of geographic segment disclosure, on the 
determinants of segment disclosure. We find that the quantity of segment disclosure 
(Qtt_Seg_Geo) increases with firm size, being audited by a big-four firm, being listed in 
NYSE or NASDAQ, issuing new financing and age, and decreases with profitability 
and proprietary costs. All of the firm controls are significantly associated with quantity 
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of segment information at conventional levels, except age, which is weakly associated 
with quantity of geographic segment disclosure (coefficient 0.0097 and p-value 0.266).   
In the second, third, fourth  and fifth columns of Table 6 we show, respectively, 
the results of estimating Equation (1) for the geographic segment index. Our results 
again confirm a complementary relationship between segment disclosure and earnings 
quality, however, the relationship is weaker than when firms disaggregate business 
information. Results also point out that such disclosure increases with diversification. In 
this case, we find that geographic segment disclosure increases as information 
asymmetries increase, but this relation is not as strong as in the global index analysis 
and in the business segment disclosure analysis.  
As in our previous tests, we also form two portfolios on earnings quality to test 
whether the relationship between geographic segment disclosure and earnings quality 
also holds below a given level of earnings quality. The results (not tabulated) show that 
the relationship is independent for firms providing low earnings quality as the 
incentives for disaggregating accounting numbers disappear. The results also show that 
the determinants of disclosure do not explain the variation in Qtt_Seg_Geo so much as 
in the previous indexes (in this case, they only explain around 8%).  
2.5. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
In the existing disclosure literature, voluntary disclosure is mostly studied 
separately from earnings quality. This paper incorporates the relation between segment 
disclosure and earnings quality. We focus on segment disclosure as it is expected to 
improve investors’ ability to estimate firms’ cash flows. We find a significant positive 
association between segment disclosure and earnings quality: firms with better earnings 
quality have incentives to provide more comprehensive segment information, but this 
complementary relation only holds above some threshold level of earnings quality. Our 
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results hold for both business and geographic segment information. We also find that 
diversification is a crucial determinant of segment information levels, that is, firms 
operating in a higher number of sectors provide higher levels of business segment 
information as well as firms operating in a higher number of countries provide higher 
levels of geographic segment information. Moreover, our results show that information 
asymmetries in the preceding year determine the level of segment disclosure.   
Our results contribute to the literature on earnings quality and disclosure. The 
two streams of literature (earnings quality and disclosure) have developed 
independently from each other. It follows from the results of this paper that voluntary 
disclosure cannot be studied in isolation without taking into account the impact of 
earnings quality. 
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APPENDIX: Index of quantity of voluntary segment disclosure 
A.1 Distinguishing between mandatory and voluntary segment information  
 
A.1.1. Identifying reportable business segments. 
 
We consider as operating segment based on management reporting system all business 
segments available in Compustat.  
 
To identify which segments are reportable segments to be disclosed, we begin by 
investigating if segments meet the quantitative thresholds, according to paragraph 18 of 
SFAS 131: 
 
“a. Its reported revenue, including both sales to external customers and 
intersegment sales or transfers, is 10 percent or more of the combined revenue, internal 
and external, of all operating segments. 
b. The absolute amount of its reported profit or loss is 10 percent or more of the 
greater, in absolute amount, of (1) the combined reported profit of all operating 
segments that did not report a loss or (2) the combined reported loss of all operating 
segments that did report a loss. 
c. Its assets are 10 percent or more of the combined assets of all operating 
segments.” 
 
If they meet these thresholds we consider directly these segments as reportable 
segments to be disclosed.   
 
The next step is to sum the revenue of the segments that meet the quantitative 
thresholds, to know if they account for 75% of consolidated revenue, if they do not, we 
take additional segments until they account for 75% of consolidated revenue, and we 
consider these as reportable segments to be disclosed. 
 
Another requirement is, according to the paragraphs 22 and 23 of SFAS 131, to 
consider reportable segments in a given year those segments considered as reportable in 
the previous or in the next year (we only meet this requirement if it is possible to do it 
with data that we have).  
 
Finally, we take into account every year that the maximum number of reportable 
segments is ten, so we consider only a maximum of ten reportable segments each year 
(those identified in Compustat in line of business, because there is an item identifying 
these ten business segments (Business segments-Actual Number)), considering as 
prevalent paragraph 18 over 22-23 in case that the number of business segments 
exceeds ten. 
 
 
A.1.2. Mandatory business segment information for reportable segments 
 
Once we have identified reportable segments to be disclosed, we identify the items to be 
disclosed according to SFAS 131: 
 
“a. General information as described in paragraph 26 
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b. Information about reported segment profit or loss, including certain revenues 
and expenses included in reported segment profit or loss, segment assets, and the basis 
of measurement, as described in paragraphs 27-31” 
 
Taking into account the information we have available, mandatory items for 
each reportable segment, as SFAS 131 state in paragraph 26-31, are the following:  
 
1. Business Segment Name (as the general information required in paragraph 26)  
2. Depreciation, depletion and amortization per segment. 
3. Equity in earnings per segment. 
4. Operating profit per segment. 
5. Sales to Principal Customer per segment.  
6. Sales of Principle Product per segment. 
7. Customer Name per segment. 
8. Investment at equity per segment (2-8 as the requirements of paragraph 27-
28). 
 
A.1.2. Voluntary business segment information  
 
We consider as voluntary business segment information the other items for reportable 
segments, and all items for non-reportable segments. We also consider as voluntary 
business segment information all available information for those business segments that 
exceed ten for each firm. 
 
A.1.3. Mandatory geographic segment information. 
 
We consider as geographic areas all geographic segments available in Compustat.  
 
SFAS 131, paragraph 38 states “An enterprise shall report the following 
geographic information unless it is impracticable to do so:  
 
a. Revenues from external customers (1) attributed to the enterprise’s country of 
domicile and (2) attributed to all foreign countries in total from which the enterprise 
derives revenues. If revenues from external customers attributed to an individual foreign 
country are material, those revenues shall be disclosed separately. An enterprise shall 
disclose the basis for attributing revenues from external customers to individual 
countries. 
b. Long-lived assets other than financial instruments, long-term customer 
relationships of a financial institution, mortgage and other servicing rights, deferred 
policy acquisition costs, and deferred tax assets (1) located in the enterprise’s country of 
domicile and (2) located in all foreign countries in total in which the enterprise holds 
assets. If assets in an individual foreign country are material, those assets shall be 
disclosed separately.” 
 
Taking into account the information we have available, mandatory items for 
each reportable segment, as SFAS 131 state in paragraph 38, are the following:  
 
1. Sales net per segment (as required in paragraph 38-a). 
2. Identifiable assets per segment (as required in paragraph 38-b). 
 
Chapter 2: The Complementarity between Segment Disclosure and Earnings Quality. 
 
 42 
A.1.4. Voluntary geographic segment information 
 
We consider as voluntary geographic segment information the other available items. 
 
A.2. Procedure for elaborating the segment disclosure score 
 
To elaborate our own index for the quantity of segment disclosure (Qtt_Seg), we 
analyze disclosures on both business and geographic segments. In a first step, for every 
reported business/geographic segment in each firm, we analyze whether the segment is 
reported on a compulsory or voluntary basis. For the compulsory segments, we 
distinguish between the items reported compulsorily as they are required by SFAS 131, 
and the items reported on a voluntary basis. Next, we create the business/geographic 
segment score (Qtt_Seg_Bus)/(Qtt_Seg_Geo) by adding 1 point for every voluntarily 
disclosed item in every mandatory segment, and 1 point for every item in the voluntary 
segment. Finally, we create the overall index of quantity of voluntary segment 
disclosure (Qtt_Seg) by adding the business and geographic segment scores. 
 
A.3. Available Information 
 
For each business segment we consider whether the firm provides information about the 
following items: 
 
1. Business segment availability code. This code indicates the status of a 
business for a company.  
2. Business segment ID. This code identifies the segment for a company or 
industry for a country.  
3. Business Segment Name. 
4. Capital expenditure per business segment. 
5. Capital expenditure note per business segment. This item represents the 
funds used for additions to the industry segment's property, plant and 
equipment, excluding amounts arising from acquisitions (for example, 
fixed assets of purchased companies). 
6. Customer Name per segment. This item is a four-element group item 
containing the names of up to four principal customers to which the 
company sold goods or services from this industry segment during the 
year. 
7. Depreciation, depletion and amortization per segment. This item 
represents non-cash charges for obsolescence and wear and tear on 
property, allocation of the current portion of capitalized expenditures and 
depletion charges for the industry segment. 
8. Employees per business segment. This item represents the actual number 
of people employed by the identified industry segments reported by the 
company. 
9. Employees per business segment note. 
10. Equity in earnings per segment. This item represents the consolidated 
company's equity in the net income of unconsolidated subsidiaries and 
affiliates, carried at equity in the consolidated financial statements, 
whose operations are vertically integrated with the reported industry 
segment. 
11. Equity in earnings per segment note. 
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12. Foreign governments per segment. This is the name(s) of the foreign 
government(s) to which the company has sold products or services in the 
past year.  
13. Identifiable assets per segment. Identifiable Assets are the tangible and 
intangible assets that are used by, or directly associated with, each 
business segment. 
14. Investment at equity per segment. This item represents the consolidated 
company's ownership interest in the net assets of unconsolidated 
subsidiaries and affiliates, carried at equity in the consolidated financial 
statements, whose operations are integral to the reported industry 
segment. 
15. Operating profit per segment. Operating Profit is sales of the identified 
industry segment minus its allocated share of operating costs and 
expenses (such as, cost of goods sold, selling, general, and administrative 
expenses and depreciation, depletion and amortization). 
16. Operating profit note per segment. 
17. Order Backlog per segment. Order Backlog is the dollar amount of 
orders believed to be firm for the industry segment as of the company's 
fiscal yearend. 
18. Principal Product Name per segment. This four-element group item 
contains up to four 20-character names which identify the principal 
products of the industry segment, with any unused elements being blank. 
If a company derives 10 percent or more of consolidated revenue (15 
percent or more if revenue did not exceed $50,000,000 during the fiscal 
year) from any class of similar products or services in an industry 
segment, this data must be reported by the company. 
19. Principle Product SIC per segment. This item represents the Standard 
Industrial Classification (SIC) Code which best describes the 
corresponding principal product of the industry segment. 
20. R&D - Company Sponsored per segment. This item represents the 
estimated costs incurred during the year, by the industry segment, for the 
development of new products or services which were paid by the 
company and were not reimbursed by a customer. 
21. R&D - Company Sponsored per segment note. 
22. R&D - Customer Sponsored per segment. This item represents the 
estimated costs incurred during the year, by the industry segment, for the 
development of new products or services, which were subsequently paid 
by a customer or a government agency. 
23. Sales to Principal Customer per segment. This four-element group item 
identifies up to four principal customers for each industry segment. 
24. Sales of Principle Product per segment. This item represents the 
contribution of the identified principal products to the industry segment's 
revenue.   
25. Sales to Domestic Government per segment. This item represents the 
amount of revenue derived from sales to the domestic government of the 
company. 
26. Sales to Foreign Government per segment. This item represents the 
amount of revenue derived from sales to individual foreign government 
agencies.   
27. Sales to principal customer per segment. 
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28. Sales net per segment. This item consists of the industry segment's gross 
sales (the amount of actual billings to customers for regular sales 
completed during the period) reduced by cash discounts, trade discounts, 
and returned sales and allowances for which credit is given to customers. 
29. Sales net per segment note. 
30. SIC Codes per Business Segment (Primary and Secondary). This two-
element group item presents the two SIC codes assigned to each business 
segment.   
 
For each geographic segment we analyze whether the firm provides information on the 
following items: 
1.  Capital Expenditures per segment. This item represents the funds used 
for additions to the geographic segment's property, plant and equipment, 
excluding amounts arising from acquisitions (for example, fixed assets of 
purchased companies). 
2.  Capital expenditures per segment note. 
3.  Depreciation, Depletion, and Amortization per segment. This item 
represents non-cash charges for obsolescence and wear and tear on 
property, allocation of the current portion of capitalized expenditures, 
and depletion charges for the geographic segment. 
4.  Geographic segment area code. This five-element group item contains 
up to five geographic area codes for each of up to five geographic 
segments for any year. 
5.  Availability code per segment. This code indicates the status of a 
geographic segment for a company. 
6.  Identification code per segment. This code identifies the company or 
industry's geographic segment. 
7.  Identifiable assets per segment. Identifiable Assets are the tangible and 
intangible assets that are used by, or directly associated with, each 
geographic segment. 
8.  Operating profit per segment. Operating Profit is sales of the identified 
geographic area segment minus its allocated share of operating costs and 
expenses, such as, cost of goods sold; selling, general, and administrative 
expenses, and depreciation, depletion and amortization. 
9.  Operating profit per segment note. 
10.  Sales net per segment. This item consists of the geographic segments 
gross sales (the amount of actual billings to customers for regular sales 
completed during the period) reduced by cash discounts, trade discounts, 
and returned sales and allowances for which credit is given to customers. 
11.  Sales net per segment note. 
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Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
 
Variable 
 
 
N 
 
Mean 
 
Std. Dev. 
 
10% 
 
25% 
 
Median 
 
75% 
 
90% 
Qtt_Seg 10,002 42.2542 20.2906 20 27 39 53 69 
Qtt_Seg_Bus 10,002 23.3837 17.4141 8 9 18 33 47 
Qtt_Seg_Geo 10,002 18.8705 9.0299 11 11 17 24 31 
DD 10,002 -0.0645 0.0839 -0.1459 -0.0781 -0.0291 -0.0247 -0.0131 
McN 10,002 -0.0642 0.0839 -0.1460 -0.0783 -0.0292 -0.0248 -0.0131 
J 10,002 -0.0927 0.1216 -0.2474 -0.1292 -0.0530 -0.0056 -0.0000 
JM 10,002 -0.0743 0.1118 -0.2097 -0.0970 -0.0349 -0.0000 -0.0000 
BusDiversif 10,002 1.9679 1.1461 1 1 2 2 3 
GeoDiversif 10,002 3.0755 4.2204 1 2 2 3 5 
Spread 10,002 0.1504 0.1475 0.0225 0.0458 0.1041 0.2076 0.3416 
Mve 10,002 4,771 11,669 121 317 923 3,162 11,670 
Bm 10,002 0.5211 0.4632 0.162 0.262 0.419 0.635 0.943 
Leverage 10,002 20.1953 18.8044 0 1.633 17.971 31.9905 45.5055 
Auditor 10,002 0.9153 0.2784 1 1 1 1 1 
StockExch 10,002 0.9696 0.1716 1 1 1 1 1 
Herf 10,002 10.4644 9.5428 4.0059 4.9259 7.8234 11.1554 20.8409 
Newfin 10,002 0.8802 0.3247 0 1 1 1 1 
Roa 10,002 0.0140 0.1497 -0.1346 -0.0042 0.0444 0.0846 0.1284 
Age 10,002 13.5585 10.2824 4 6 10 18 32 
 
The sample consists of 10,002 firm-year observations for the period 2001-2006. Qtt_Seg = the number of voluntary disclosure 
elements found in the sample firms’ for segment disclosure; Qtt_Seg_Bus = the number of voluntary disclosure elements found 
in the sample firms’ for business segment disclosure; Qtt_Seg_Geo = the number of voluntary disclosure elements found in the 
sample firms’ for geographic segment disclosure; DD = The absolute value, multiplied by minus one, of the residual of a 
regression of the firm’s year t working capital accruals on year t, t−1, and t+1 cash flows from operations, (all variables scaled 
by total assets), where the regression is estimated using data from t = 2000–2007 (It is the Dechow Dichev Model); McN The 
absolute value, multiplied by minus one, of the residual of a regression of the firm’s year t working capital accruals on year t, 
t−1, and t+1 cash flows from operations, as well as the year t change in revenues and year t property, plant, and equipment 
(PP&E) (all variables scaled by total assets), where the regression is estimated using data from t = 2000–2007 (It is the 
McNichols model);  J = The absolute value, multiplied by minus one, of discretionary accruals calculated as the residual of the 
Jones (1991) accruals model as applied to total accruals; JM = The absolute value, multiplied by minus one, of discretionary 
accruals calculated as the residual of the modified version of the Jones (1991) accruals model (Dechow et al. 1995), as applied 
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to total accruals; BusDiversif = number of the different sectors in which the firm operates. GeoDiversif = number of the 
different countries where the firm operates. Spread = bid-ask spread, calculated as 
2/)(
||
askbid
askbid
+
−
 measured in t-1. MVE = the 
firm’s market value of equity measured at the beginning of fiscal year for 2001-2006; BM = the firm’s book-to-market ratio 
measured at the beginning of fiscal year 2001-2006; Leverage = debt to total assets ratio in percentage. Auditor = 1 if auditor 
firm is a Big-Four and 0 otherwise. StockExch = 1 if firm is listed in NYSE or NASDAQ and 0 otherwise. Herf = Herfindahl 
index in percentage, calculated as 
2
1
∑
=








=
N
i j
ij
j S
S
Herf . NewFin= 1 if the firm has issued new debt or equity and 0 otherwise. Roa 
= return on assets. Age = the difference between the first year when the firm appears in CRSP and the current year.  
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Table 2 
Pairwise correlations between Qtt_Seg, Earnings Quality, diversification,  
information asymmetries and control variables (p=0.05) 
 
Variable Qtt_Seg DD McN J JM BusDiversif GeoDiversif Spread Ln mve Ln bm leverage auditor StockExch Herf NewFin Roa 
Qtt_Seg 
                
DD 0.1670                
McN 0.1664 0.9997               
J 0.1809 0.2590 0.2588              
JM 0.2178 0.3265 0.3263 0.7480             
BusDiversif 0.3122 0.1283 0.1282 0.1106 0.1299            
GeoDiversif 0.1053 0.0224 0.0220 0.0312 0.0488 0.0536           
Spread 0.0283 0.0200 0.0203 0.0249 0.0221 -0.0038 0.0172          
Ln mve 0.3399 0.1833 0.1843 0.2469 0.2932 0.2234 0.0269 -0.0183         
Ln bm 0.0482 0.0692 0.0699 0.0738 0.0703 0.0625 0.0147 0.0212 -0.2792        
Leverage 0.1178 0.1042 0.1075 0.1493 0.1494 0.1368 0.0419 0.0525 0.1125 0.0082       
Auditor 0.1318 0.0475 0.0471 0.0726 0.0659 0.0708 0.0049 0.0172 0.1903 -0.0170 0.0287      
StockExch 0.1180 0.1422 0.1420 0.2811 0.2703 0.0464 0.0207 0.0195 0.1131 -0.0232 0.0199 0.0382     
Herf -0.0674       0.1011   0.0997      0.1173 0.0869 0.0807 0.0010 -0.0012 -0.0080 0.0843 0.0993 0.0101 0.0403    
NewFin 0.1096 0.1155 0.1156 0.0958 0.1080 0.0786 0.0221 0.0094 0.1918 -0.0861 0.1344 0.0548 0.0262 0.0453   
Roa 0.0504 0.1521 0.1512 0.1137 0.1350 0.0232 0.0092 -0.0184 0.3834 -0.3257 -0.1637 0.0240 0.0569 0.0670 0.3164  
Age 0.1943 0.1166 0.1155 0.1328 0.1597 0.1821 0.0152 -0.0190 0.2420 0.0002 0.0697 0.0521 -0.0228 0.0080 0.0785 0.1472 
Bold numbers are significant at p-value 0.05.  
The sample consists of 10,002 firm-year observations for the period 2001-2006. Qtt_Seg = the number of voluntary disclosure elements found in the sample firms’ for segment 
disclosure; DD = The absolute value, multiplied by minus one, of the residual of a regression of the firm’s year t working capital accruals on year t, t−1, and t+1 cash flows from 
operations, (all variables scaled by total assets), where the regression is estimated using data from t = 2000–2007 (It is the Dechow Dichev Model); McN The absolute value, multiplied 
by minus one, of the residual of a regression of the firm’s year t working capital accruals on year t, t−1, and t+1 cash flows from operations, as well as the year t change in revenues and 
year t property, plant, and equipment (PP&E) (all variables scaled by total assets), where the regression is estimated using data from t = 2000–2007 (It is the McNichols model);  J = 
The absolute value, multiplied by minus one, of discretionary accruals calculated as the residual of the Jones (1991) accruals model as applied to total accruals; JM = The absolute 
value, multiplied by minus one, of discretionary accruals calculated as the residual of the modified version of the Jones (1991) accruals model (Dechow et al. 1995), as applied to total 
accruals; BusDiversif = number of the different sectors in which the firm operates. GeoDiversif = number of the different countries where the firm operates. Spread = bid-ask spread, 
calculated as 
2/)(
||
askbid
askbid
+
−
 measured in t-1. MVE = the firm’s market value of equity measured at the beginning of fiscal year for 2001-2006; BM = the firm’s book-to-market ratio 
measured at the beginning of fiscal year 2001-2006; Leverage = debt to total assets ratio in percentage. Auditor = 1 if auditor firm is a Big-Four and 0 otherwise. StockExch = 1 if firm 
is listed in NYSE or NASDAQ and 0 otherwise. Herf = Herfindahl index in percentage, calculated as 
2
1
∑
=








=
N
i j
ij
j S
S
Herf . NewFin= 1 if the firm has issued new debt or equity and 0 
otherwise. Roa = return on assets. Age = the difference between the first year when the firm appears in CRSP and the current year.  
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Table 3 
Fixed Effect Regression of Qtt_Seg on earnings quality, diversification, information asymmetries and control variables 
 
 
Variable 
 
Expected sign 
 
Coef. 
(p-value) 
 
Coef. 
(p-value)  
 
Coef. 
(p-value) 
 
Coef. 
(p-value) 
 
Coef. 
(p-value) 
DD +  10.7867 (0.000)   
 
McN +   10.6426 (0.000)  
 
J +    7.3726  (0.000) 
 
JM +     8.0612  (0.000) 
BusDiversif +  5.4034 (0.000) 
5.4038 
(0.000) 
5.2825 
(0.000) 
5.2727  
(0.000) 
GeoDiversif +  0.2693 (0.000) 
0.2693 
(0.000) 
0.2583 
(0.000) 
0.2532 
(0.000) 
Spread +  3.1141 (0.007) 
3.1171 
(0.007) 
2.9445 
(0.013) 
2.9581  
(0.013) 
Ln mve + 4.5303 (0.000) 
3.8769 
(0.000) 
3.8779 
(0.000) 
3.9662  
(0.000) 
3.9419  
(0.000) 
Ln bm + 4.3421 (0.000) 
3.7574 
(0.000) 
3.7598 
(0.000) 
3.9790  
(0.000) 
3.9496  
(0.000) 
Leverage + 0.1006 (0.000) 
0.0822 
(0.000) 
0.0823 
(0.000) 
0.0854 
(0.000) 
0.0844 
(0.000) 
Auditor + 2.7050 (0.000) 
2.3803 
(0.000) 
2.3813 
(0.000) 
2.3905  
(0.000) 
2.3874  
(0.000) 
StockExch + 8.4118 (0.000) 
7.5772 
(0.000) 
7.5845 
(0.000) 
6.3565  
(0.000) 
6.4297  
(0.000) 
Herf - -0.6394 (0.000) 
-0.6138 
(0.000) 
-0.6137 
(0.000) 
-0.4777 
(0.000) 
-0.4776 
(0.000) 
Newfin + 2.1688 (0.000) 
1.3351 
(0.026) 
1.3366 
(0.000) 
1.6655  
(0.006) 
1.6418 
(0.000) 
Roa +/- -0.0373 (0.000) 
-0.0276 
(0.001) 
-0.0275 
(0.001) 
-0.0292 
(0.000) 
-0.0301 
(0.000) 
Age + 0.1941 (0.000) 
0.1137 
(0.000) 
0.1138 
(0.000) 
0.1181 
(0.000) 
0.1173 
(0.000) 
Cons 
 
 
7.2229 
(0.000) 
2.7340 
(0.105) 
2.7008 
(0.109) 
2.2695  
(0.195) 
2.4034  
(0.173) 
R2 
 
0.1700 0.2788 0.2787 0.2959 0.2958 
      
Chapter 2: The Complementarity between Segment Disclosure and Earnings Quality. 
 
 49
The sample consists of 10,002 firm-year observations for the period 2001-2006. Qtt_Seg = the number of voluntary disclosure 
elements found in the sample firms’ for segment disclosure; DD = The absolute value, multiplied by minus one, of the residual 
of a regression of the firm’s year t working capital accruals on year t, t−1, and t+1 cash flows from operations, (all variables 
scaled by total assets), where the regression is estimated using data from t = 2000–2007 (It is the Dechow Dichev Model); McN 
The absolute value, multiplied by minus one, of the residual of a regression of the firm’s year t working capital accruals on year 
t, t−1, and t+1 cash flows from operations, as well as the year t change in revenues and year t property, plant, and equipment 
(PP&E) (all variables scaled by total assets), where the regression is estimated using data from t = 2000–2007 (It is the 
McNichols model);  J = The absolute value, multiplied by minus one, of discretionary accruals calculated as the residual of the 
Jones (1991) accruals model as applied to total accruals; JM = The absolute value, multiplied by minus one, of discretionary 
accruals calculated as the residual of the modified version of the Jones (1991) accruals model (Dechow et al. 1995), as applied 
to total accruals; BusDiversif = number of the different sectors in which the firm operates. GeoDiversif = number of the 
different countries where the firm operates. Spread = bid-ask spread, calculated as 
2/)(
||
askbid
askbid
+
−
 measured in t-1. MVE = the 
firm’s market value of equity measured at the beginning of fiscal year for 2001-2006; BM = the firm’s book-to-market ratio 
measured at the beginning of fiscal year 2001-2006; Leverage = debt to total assets ratio in percentage. Auditor = 1 if auditor 
firm is a Big-Four and 0 otherwise. StockExch = 1 if firm is listed in NYSE or NASDAQ and 0 otherwise. Herf = Herfindahl 
index in percentage, calculated as 
2
1
∑
=








=
N
i j
ij
j S
S
Herf . NewFin= 1 if the firm has issued new debt or equity and 0 otherwise. Roa 
= return on assets. Age = the difference between the first year when the firm appears in CRSP and the current year.  
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Table 4 
Fixed Effect Regression of Qtt_Seg on earnings quality, diversification, information asymmetries and control variables 
for two portfolios of  earnings quality 
 
  High earnings 
quality 
(criteria: median) 
Low earnings 
quality 
(criteria: median) 
High earnings 
quality 
(criteria: cluster) 
Low earnings 
quality 
(criteria: cluster) 
 
Variable 
 
Expected sign 
 
Coef. 
(p-value) 
 
Coef. 
(p-value)  
 
Coef. 
(p-value) 
 
Coef. 
(p-value) 
JM + 47.8394 (0.099) 
3.9633 
(0.055) 
18.0708 
(0.000) 
4.3087 
(0.203) 
BusDiversif + 4.7856 (0.000) 
6.1443 
(0.000) 
5.2806 
(0.000) 
5.1446 
(0.000) 
GeoDiversif + 0.2168 (0.000) 
0.2933 
(0.000) 
0.2448 
(0.000) 
0.2889 
(0.002) 
Spread + 4.1836 (0.016) 
1.4808 
(0.350) 
3.6153 
(0.005) 
-1.6332 
(0.558) 
Ln mve + 3.9260 (0.000) 
3.7787 
(0.000) 
3.9883 
(0.000) 
2.8572 
(0.000) 
Ln bm + 4.3045 (0.000) 
3.5601 
(0.000) 
4.1041 
(0.000) 
2.1544 
(0.000) 
Leverage + 0.0800 (0.000) 
0.0810 
(0.000) 
0.0772 
(0.000) 
0.0733 
(0.004) 
Auditor + 3.8493 (0.000) 
1.6914 
(0.025) 
2.9292 
(0.000) 
1.0022 
(0.402) 
StockExch + 6.8353 (0.000) 
7.0567 
(0.000) 
7.8663 
(0.000) 
4.9971 
(0.002) 
Herf - -0.5349 (0.000) 
-0.4422 
(0.000) 
-0.5050 
(0.000) 
0.1115 
(0.629) 
Newfin + 3.1793 (0.002) 
0.3825 
(0.595) 
1.9811 
(0.004) 
0.5468 
(0.611) 
Roa +/- -0.0575 (0.000) 
-0.0064 
(0.504) 
-0.0431 
(0.000) 
0.0070 
(0.631) 
Age + 0.0704 (0.007) 
0.1991 
(0.000) 
0.1124 
(0.000) 
0.1749 
(0.001) 
Cons 
 
2.8340 
(0.366) 
0.3774 
(0.864) 
1.4155 
(0.501) 
2.9162 
(0.421) 
N 
 
5,000 5,002 6,913 3,089 
R2 
 
0.2046 0.3606 0.2867 0.2751 
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The sample consists of 10,002 firm-year observations for the period 2001-2006. Qtt_Seg = the number of voluntary disclosure 
elements found in the sample firms’ for segment disclosure; DD = The absolute value, multiplied by minus one, of the residual 
of a regression of the firm’s year t working capital accruals on year t, t−1, and t+1 cash flows from operations, (all variables 
scaled by total assets), where the regression is estimated using data from t = 2000–2007 (It is the Dechow Dichev Model); McN 
The absolute value, multiplied by minus one, of the residual of a regression of the firm’s year t working capital accruals on year 
t, t−1, and t+1 cash flows from operations, as well as the year t change in revenues and year t property, plant, and equipment 
(PP&E) (all variables scaled by total assets), where the regression is estimated using data from t = 2000–2007 (It is the 
McNichols model);  J = The absolute value, multiplied by minus one, of discretionary accruals calculated as the residual of the 
Jones (1991) accruals model as applied to total accruals; JM = The absolute value, multiplied by minus one, of discretionary 
accruals calculated as the residual of the modified version of the Jones (1991) accruals model (Dechow et al. 1995), as applied 
to total accruals; BusDiversif = number of the different sectors in which the firm operates. GeoDiversif = number of the 
different countries where the firm operates. Spread = bid-ask spread, calculated as 
2/)(
||
askbid
askbid
+
−
 measured in t-1. MVE = the 
firm’s market value of equity measured at the beginning of fiscal year for 2001-2006; BM = the firm’s book-to-market ratio 
measured at the beginning of fiscal year 2001-2006; Leverage = debt to total assets ratio in percentage. Auditor = 1 if auditor 
firm is a Big-Four and 0 otherwise. StockExch = 1 if firm is listed in NYSE or NASDAQ and 0 otherwise. Herf = Herfindahl 
index in percentage, calculated as 
2
1
∑
=








=
N
i j
ij
j S
S
Herf . NewFin= 1 if the firm has issued new debt or equity and 0 otherwise. Roa 
= return on assets. Age = the difference between the first year when the firm appears in CRSP and the current year. High 
earnings quality (criteria: median): JM above the median; Low earnings quality (criteria: median): JM below the median; High 
earnings quality (criteria: cluster): The group with high earnings quality resulting from two median clusters on JM using 
Euclidean Distance; Low earnings quality (criteria: cluster): The group with low earnings quality resulting from two median 
clusters on JM using Euclidean Distance. 
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Table 5 
Fixed Effect Regression of Qtt_Seg_Bus on earnings quality, diversification, information asymmetries and control variables 
 
 
Variable 
 
Expected sign 
 
Coef. 
(p-value) 
 
Coef. 
(p-value) 
 
Coef. 
(p-value)  
 
Coef. 
(p-value) 
 
Coef. 
(p-value) 
DD +  8.3385 (0.000)    
McN +   8.2617 (0.000)   
J +    5.5197 (0.000)  
JM +     5.5324 (0.000) 
BusDiversif +  5.5363 (0.000) 
5.5366 
(0.000) 
5.4718 
(0.000) 
5.4634 
(0.000) 
Spread +  2.0133 (0.048) 
2.0151 
(0.048) 
1.8898 
(0.068) 
1.9122 
(0.065) 
Ln mve + 3.3392 (0.000) 
2.6696 
(0.000) 
2.6701 
(0.000) 
2.6994 
(0.000) 
2.6884 
(0.000) 
Ln bm + 3.3865 (0.000) 
2.8118 
(0.000) 
2.8131 
(0.000) 
2.8279 
(0.000) 
2.8164 
(0.000) 
Leverage + 0.0845 (0.000) 
0.0652 
(0.000) 
0.0653 
(0.000) 
0.0657 
(0.000) 
0.0654 
(0.000) 
Auditor + 2.0181 (0.000) 
1.6664 
(0.002) 
1.6671 
(0.002) 
1.6180 
(0.003) 
1.6170 
(0.003) 
StockExch + 5.3019 (0.000) 
4.4394 
(0.000) 
4.4432 
(0.000) 
3.2619 
(0.001) 
3.3996 
(0.000) 
Herf - -0.5463 (0.000) 
-0.5121 
(0.000) 
-0.5120 
(0.000) 
-0.3719 
(0.000) 
-.03720 
(0.000) 
Newfin + 1.5430 (0.004) 
0.9533 
(0.069) 
0.9541 
(0.069) 
1.1945 
(0.024) 
1.1781 
(0.026) 
Roa +/- -0.0261 (0.000) 
-0.0157 
(0.024) 
-0.0156 
(0.024) 
-0.0172 
(0.014) 
-0.0177 
(0.000) 
Age + 0.1843 (0.000) 
0.1109 
(0.000) 
0.1109 
(0.000) 
0.1075 
(0.000) 
0.1072 
(0.000) 
Cons 
 
-1.2237 
(0.385) 
-5.5407 
(0.000) 
-5.5592 
(0.000) 
-6.0851 
(0.000) 
-6.1860 
(0.000) 
R2 
 
0.1175 0.2590 0.2590 0.2780 0.2791 
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The sample consists of 10,002 firm-year observations for the period 2001-2006. Qtt_Seg_Bus = the number of voluntary 
disclosure elements found in the sample firms’ for business segment disclosure; DD = The absolute value, multiplied by minus 
one, of the residual of a regression of the firm’s year t working capital accruals on year t, t−1, and t+1 cash flows from 
operations, (all variables scaled by total assets), where the regression is estimated using data from t = 2000–2007 (It is the 
Dechow Dichev Model); McN The absolute value, multiplied by minus one, of the residual of a regression of the firm’s year t 
working capital accruals on year t, t−1, and t+1 cash flows from operations, as well as the year t change in revenues and year t 
property, plant, and equipment (PP&E) (all variables scaled by total assets), where the regression is estimated using data from t 
= 2000–2007 (It is the McNichols model);  J = The absolute value, multiplied by minus one, of discretionary accruals 
calculated as the residual of the Jones (1991) accruals model as applied to total accruals; JM = The absolute value, multiplied 
by minus one, of discretionary accruals calculated as the residual of the modified version of the Jones (1991) accruals model 
(Dechow et al. 1995), as applied to total accruals; BusDiversif = number of the different sectors in which the firm operates. 
GeoDiversif = number of the different countries where the firm operates. Spread = bid-ask spread, calculated as 
2/)(
||
askbid
askbid
+
−
 
measured in t-1. MVE = the firm’s market value of equity measured at the beginning of fiscal year for 2001-2006; BM = the 
firm’s book-to-market ratio measured at the beginning of fiscal year 2001-2006; Leverage = debt to total assets ratio in 
percentage. Auditor = 1 if auditor firm is a Big-Four and 0 otherwise. StockExch = 1 if firm is listed in NYSE or NASDAQ and 
0 otherwise. Herf = Herfindahl index in percentage, calculated as 
2
1
∑
=








=
N
i j
ij
j S
S
Herf . NewFin= 1 if the firm has issued new debt 
or equity and 0 otherwise. Roa = return on assets. Age = the difference between the first year when the firm appears in CRSP 
and the current year.  
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Table 6 
Fixed Effect Regression of Qtt_Seg_Geo on earnings quality, diversification, information asymmetries and control variables 
 
 
Variable 
 
Expected sign 
 
Coef. 
(p-value) 
 
Coef. 
(p-value) 
 
Coef. 
(p-value)  
 
Coef. 
(p-value) 
 
Coef. 
(p-value) 
DD +  2.5431 (0.046)    
McN +   2.4815 (0.051)   
J +    1.8775 (0.025)  
JM +     2.7109 (0.003) 
GeoDiversif +  0.1686 (0.000) 
0.1686 
(0.000) 
0.1635 
(0.000) 
0.1619 
(0.000) 
Spread +  1.0285 (0.079) 
1.0295 
(0.079) 
0.9991 
(0.096) 
0.9889 
(0.099) 
Ln mve + 1.1911 (0.000) 
1.1644 
(0.000) 
1.1648 
(0.000) 
1.2225 
(0.000) 
1.2062 
(0.000) 
Ln bm + 0.9555 (0.000) 
0.8773 
(0.000) 
0.8783 
(0.000) 
1.0751 
(0.000) 
1.0511 
(0.000) 
Leverage + 0.0161 (0.004) 
0.0149 
(0.013) 
0.0150 
(0.013) 
0.0169 
(0.006) 
0.0162 
(0.009) 
Auditor + 0.6869 (0.026) 
0.7200 
(0.022) 
0.7204 
(0.022) 
0.7721 
(0.016) 
0.7699 
(0.016) 
StockExch + 3.1099 (0.000) 
3.0359 
(0.000) 
3.0390 
(0.000) 
2.9931 
(0.000) 
2.8994 
(0.000) 
Herf - -0.0930 (0.005) 
-0.0981 
(0.007) 
-0.0981 
(0.007) 
-0.0988 
(0.008) 
-0.0988 
(0.008) 
Newfin + 0.6258 (0.027) 
0.4432 
(0.142) 
0.4437 
(0.141) 
0.5274 
(0.085) 
0.5175 
(0.091) 
Roa +/- -0.0111 (0.003) 
-0.0122 
(0.002) 
-0.0121 
(0.002) 
-0.0124 
(0.002) 
-0.0128 
(0.002) 
Age + 0.0097 (0.266) 
0.0035 
(0.700) 
0.0036 
(0.697) 
0.0109 
(0.248) 
0.0101 
(0.282) 
Cons 
 
8.4467 
(0.000) 
8.5447 
(0.000) 
8.5315 
(0.000) 
8.4429 
(0.000) 
8.7212 
(0.000) 
R2 
 
0.0592 0.0685 0.0684 0.0835 0.0847 
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The sample consists of 10,002 firm-year observations for the period 2001-2006. Qtt_Seg_Geo = the number of voluntary 
disclosure elements found in the sample firms’ for geographic segment disclosure; DD = The absolute value, multiplied by 
minus one, of the residual of a regression of the firm’s year t working capital accruals on year t, t−1, and t+1 cash flows from 
operations, (all variables scaled by total assets), where the regression is estimated using data from t = 2000–2007 (It is the 
Dechow Dichev Model); McN The absolute value, multiplied by minus one, of the residual of a regression of the firm’s year t 
working capital accruals on year t, t−1, and t+1 cash flows from operations, as well as the year t change in revenues and year t 
property, plant, and equipment (PP&E) (all variables scaled by total assets), where the regression is estimated using data from t 
= 2000–2007 (It is the McNichols model);  J = The absolute value, multiplied by minus one, of discretionary accruals 
calculated as the residual of the Jones (1991) accruals model as applied to total accruals; JM = The absolute value, multiplied 
by minus one, of discretionary accruals calculated as the residual of the modified version of the Jones (1991) accruals model 
(Dechow et al. 1995), as applied to total accruals; BusDiversif = number of the different sectors in which the firm operates. 
GeoDiversif = number of the different countries where the firm operates. Spread = bid-ask spread, calculated as 
2/)(
||
askbid
askbid
+
−
 
measured in t-1. MVE = the firm’s market value of equity measured at the beginning of fiscal year for 2001-2006; BM = the 
firm’s book-to-market ratio measured at the beginning of fiscal year 2001-2006; Leverage = debt to total assets ratio in 
percentage. Auditor = 1 if auditor firm is a Big-Four and 0 otherwise. StockExch = 1 if firm is listed in NYSE or NASDAQ and 
0 otherwise. Herf = Herfindahl index in percentage, calculated as 
2
1
∑
=








=
N
i j
ij
j S
S
Herf . NewFin= 1 if the firm has issued new debt 
or equity and 0 otherwise. Roa = return on assets. Age = the difference between the first year when the firm appears in CRSP 
and the current year.  
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Chapter 3: Segment Disclosure, Earnings Quality and Cost of 
Capital.  
3.1. INTRODUCTION 
The objective of this paper is to analyze whether firms providing better earnings 
quality and better segment information enjoy a lower cost of capital. We use the 
residuals of a regression of quantity of segment information on the determinants of 
segment disclosure (this regression was already explained in detail in Chapter 2) as a 
proxy for the quality of segment disclosure. We argue that quality (and not quantity) of 
segment disclosure will have an impact on cost of capital.  
In this study, we focus on the relation between cost of capital, earnings quality 
and quality of segment information. There is an ongoing debate on whether and how 
accounting quality decreases cost of capital. One stream of literature suggests that 
information asymmetries affect the cost of capital: accounting quality reduces these 
information asymmetries; which in turn, affects the cost of capital (Easley and O’Hara, 
2004). More recently, several studies demonstrate that information differences across 
investors affect a firm’s cost of capital through information precision, and not 
information asymmetry per se (Hughes, Liu and Liu, 2007; Lambert, Leuz and 
Verrecchia, 2007, 2008). As shown in prior research (Kinney, 1971; Collins, 1976; 
Baldwin, 1984; Balakrishnan, Harris and Sen, 1990; Ettredge, Kwon, Smith and 
Zarowin, 2005), segment reporting improves the predictive ability of accounting 
numbers. Consequently, we expect that improved segment information will facilitate the 
estimation of firms’ cash flows, which in the Lambert et al. (2007) setting will lead to 
lower cost of capital. 
Using a sample of non regulated and non financial firms for the period 2001-
2006, we find that firms providing high quality segment disclosure, contingent upon 
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good earnings quality, enjoy lower costs of equity capital. This result is robust to the use 
of asset-pricing based tests and implied cost of capital based tests. In addition, we 
provide empirical evidence that segment disclosure improves investors’ ability to 
estimate firm’s cash flows by showing that better quality segment disclosure, contingent 
upon good earnings quality, reduces analysts’ forecast errors. Also, we show that the 
provision of high quality segment information leads to a reduction in the firm’s assessed 
covariance with other firms’ returns. This is consistent with quality of segment 
disclosure reducing estimation risk. Unlike Francis, Nanda and Olsson (2008), we use a 
proxy of disclosure quality, not quantity. Our results show that it is the quality of 
disclosure, not the quantity of disclosure, which reduces the cost of capital. The quantity 
of segment disclosures is only a proxy of the activity of the firm (i.e., a firm provides 
more segment information when it is more diversified). 
Our study contributes to the ongoing debate on whether accounting quality 
decreases cost of capital by providing empirical evidence that better quality segment 
disclosure, when complementing earnings numbers of good quality, improves investors’ 
ability to estimate firm’s cash flows, which leads to a decrease in cost of capital.  
The remainder of the paper is as follows. In Section 3.2 we present the 
theoretical development on the relation between segment disclosure, earnings quality 
and cost of capital. In Section 3.3 we present the research design, describing our proxies 
for the quantity and quality of segment information and the methods used to study the 
impact of segment information quality on cost of capital. In Section 3.4 we present the 
results. Finally Section 3.5 summarizes and concludes. 
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3.2. SEGMENT DISCLOSURE, EARNINGS QUALITY AND COST OF 
CAPITAL 
There is an ongoing debate on whether better accounting information decreases 
cost of capital. Some studies suggest that information asymmetries affect the cost of 
capital. As high quality accounting reduces information asymmetries, it affects the cost 
of capital (Easley and O’Hara, 2004). More recently, several studies demonstrate that 
information differences across investors affect a firm’s cost of capital through 
information precision, and not information asymmetry per se, and once one controls for 
information precision, information asymmetries have no effect on the cost of capital 
(Hughes et al., 2007; Lambert et al., 2007, 2008). In the empirical literature the results 
are mixed. While Bhattacharya, Daouk and Welker (2003), Francis, LaFond, Olsson 
and Schipper (2004, 2005), Francis et al. (2008) and Garcia Lara, Garcia Osma and 
Penalva (2010) find a negative relation between accounting quality and cost of capital, 
others like Core, Guay and Verdi (2008) or McInnis (2010) fail to find any relation 
between several proxies of accounting quality and cost of capital. 
The provision of accurate information is the key element for predicting and 
estimating firm’s risk, which leads to better investment decisions (Lambert et al., 2007, 
2008). Given that segment information disaggregates the whole activity of the firm 
providing details of different business or geographical lines in which the firm is 
involved, this type of information is crucial for investors and analysts. Early evidence 
by Kinney (1971), Collins (1976), Baldwin (1984) and Balakrishnan et al. (1990) shows 
that segment reporting contributes to improve analysts’ ability to estimate future 
accounting numbers. Also, Greenstein and Sami (1994) find that segment reporting 
contributes to reduce information asymmetries, and Berger and Hann (2003, 2007) and 
Hope and Thomas (2008) show that segment reporting contributes to reduce agency 
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costs. All of these findings in prior literature suggest a link between segment reporting 
and cost of capital. However, we should consider not only the quantity, but the quality 
of the disclosures. The quantity of segment disclosure is only capturing the degree of 
diversification and not the quality of the disclosure itself. That is, quantity of segment 
disclosure is not a good indicator of investors being able to estimate firm’s cash flows 
more accurately. Conversely, a measure of quality of segment disclosure that controls 
for the degree of diversification (both at the industry and geographical level) would 
capture whether the firm provides more segmental information than expected given its 
degree of diversification. Such measure of quality of segment disclosure would be a 
good indicator of investor’s capability to estimate firm’s cash flows. This increase in 
investors’ capability to estimate firm’s cash flows is expected to reduce estimation risk. 
However, this reduction in estimation risk will only take place if high quality segment 
disclosure goes hand in hand with earnings numbers that provide a true and fair view of 
the situation of the firm. If this is the case, and the firm provides good quality earnings, 
we expect that high quality segment information will additionally contribute to facilitate 
the estimation of firm’s cash flows. This leads to our second hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: Firms providing better segment information, contingent upon high 
earnings quality, are expected to be rewarded with a lower cost of capital. 
 
3.3. RESEARCH DESIGN  
3.3.1 Quantity of segment disclosure (Qtt_Seg) and quality of segment disclosure 
(Qlt_Seg) 
To create a proxy for the quality of segment information, we start taking the 
proxy for the quantity of segment disclosure (Qtt_Seg) that we develop in Chapter 2.1 
                                                
1
 To elaborate this index for the quantity of segment disclosure (Qtt_Seg), we analyse disclosures on both business and geographic 
segments. In a first step, for every reported business/geographic segment in each firm, we analyse whether the segment is reported 
on a compulsory or voluntary basis. For the compulsory segments, we distinguish between the items reported compulsorily as they 
are required by SFAS 131, and the items reported on a voluntary basis. Next, we create the business/geographic segment score 
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Then, we estimate a regression of quantity of segment information (Qtt_Seg) on 
earnings quality, the main determinants of segment disclosures (business and 
geographic diversification and information asymmetries) and controls. The model is as 
follows: 
 
Qtt_ Segj,t = α + β1 Earnings Qualityj,t +β2 Business Diversificationj,t +  
 + β3 Geographic Diversificationj,t  + β4 Information Asymmetriesj,t-1 + 
 + β5 Sizej,t + β6 Growthj,t + β7  Leveragej,t +β8 Audit Firmj,t +         (1) 
 + β9 Listing Statusj,t + β10 Proprietary Costsj,t  + 
 + β11 New Financingj,t + β12  Profitabilityj,t + β13Agej,t + 
+Σ
 k βk Control year j,t +εj,t    
 
We take the residuals of Model (1) as our proxy of the quality of segment 
reporting. We expect that when firms provide more (less) information than predicted by 
the model, they will contribute to improve (reduce) investors’ ability to estimate their 
cash flows. Our final proxy for segment disclosure quality, Qlt_Seg is a discrete 
variable defined in terms of the decile ranks in which the residuals of regression (1) are 
distributed. Large values of Qlt_Seg indicate better segment information quality. 
The variables in Equation (1) are defined as follows: 
A/Earnings quality  
To estimate earnings quality, we use the modified Jones model as defined by Dechow, 
Sloan and Sweeney (1995): 
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(Qtt_Seg_Bus)/(Qtt_Seg_Geo) by adding 1 point for every voluntarily disclosed item in every mandatory segment, and 1 point for 
every item in every voluntary segment. Finally, we create the overall index of quantity of voluntary segment disclosure (Qtt_Seg) by 
adding the business and geographic segment scores. 
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where: TAj,t2 is firm j’s total accruals in year t; Assetsj,t is firm’s j total assets 
(Compustat #6) at the beginning of year t; ∆REVj,t is firm’s j change in revenues 
(Compustat #12) between year t-1 and t; PPEj,t is firm’s j gross property, plant and 
equipment (Compustat #7) in year t.  
 We estimate Equation (2) using data annually for each 2-digit SIC industry 
groups. Next, for each firm j, we calculate its discretionary accruals as: 
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(3)           
where: γβα ˆ,ˆ,ˆ  = the fitted coefficients in model (2) and ∆ARj,t is the change in account 
receivables for firm j (Compustat #2) in year t. 
 We use the absolute values of DA, multiplied by minus one, as our main proxy 
for earnings quality. Large values correspond to good accrual quality (Earnings_Qlt), 
that is, less discretionary accruals. 
B/ Business diversification 
We include business diversification as a determinant of segment disclosure as 
more diversified/complex firms are expected to report information on a larger number 
of business segments than less diversified ones. To create an index of business 
diversification we use the primary and secondary SIC codes that Compustat assigns to 
each firm.  For every firm, we create the business diversification score by assigning 1 
point for every different 2-digit SIC code assigned by Compustat to the firm as forming 
part of its primary or secondary activities. 
                                                
2
 Measured as ∆CAj,t – ∆CLj,t – ∆Cashj,t + ∆STDEBTj,t – ∆DEPNj,t;  ∆CAj,t is firm j’s change in current assets (Compustat #4) between 
year t-1 and year t; ∆CLj,t  is firm j’s change in current liabilities (Compustat #5) between year t-1 and year t; ∆Cashj,t is firm j’s 
change in cash (Compustat #1) between year t-1 and year t; ∆STDEBTj,t is firm j’s change in debt in current liabilities (Compustat 
#34) between year t-1 and year t; ∆DEPNj,t firm j’s depreciation and amortization expense (Compustat #14) in year t.  
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C/ Geographic diversification 
We include geographic diversification as a determinant of segment disclosure. 
We define our geographic diversification index as the number of different countries 
where the firm has subsidiaries.3 For example: if a given company X has four 
subsidiaries, one in Spain, one in Italy and two in Croatia, we assign to this company a 
geographic diversification score of 3, as there are three different countries in which it 
has subsidiaries. 
D/ Information asymmetries 
Healy and Palepu (2001) suggest that the demand for disclosure arises from 
information asymmetries and agency conflicts between managers and outside investors. 
Managers disclose information to reduce information asymmetries. Given this, we 
include a proxy for information asymmetries, the bid-ask spread, as a determinant of 
segment disclosure. We measure the bid-ask spread as: 
2/)(
||
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,,
,
tjtj
tjtj
tj
askbid
askbid
Spread
+
−
=
                                             (4) 
where: bidj,t is the firm’s j annual mean of the monthly bid prices for year t, and 
askj,t  is the firm’s j annual mean of the monthly ask prices for year t. 
E/ Controls 
We measure firm size as the natural logarithm of firm’s market value, measured 
at the beginning of the fiscal year. Firm’s growth is measured as the logarithm of the 
firm’s book to market ratio at the beginning of the fiscal year. We measure leverage as 
the ratio of total debt to total assets. Auditor is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if 
the auditor is a Big Four firm, and 0 otherwise. Listing Status is a dummy variable 
taking the value of 1 if the firm is listed in the NYSE or in NASDAQ, and 0 otherwise. 
                                                
3
 We use subsidiaries information from Osiris. We take into account subsidiaries with a minimum of 25.01% of control by the 
company under analysis. 
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Proprietary costs are proxy for Herfindahl index. New Financing is a dummy variable 
taking the value of 1 if the firm raised new capital funds or increased debt in a given 
year and 0 otherwise. Profitability is measured as return on assets and age is measured 
as the difference between the first year when the firm appears in CRSP and the current 
year. 
3.3.2 Testing the relation between cost of capital and the quality of segment disclosure 
 We use four different sets of tests to analyze the relation between cost of capital 
and the quality of segment information. First, we study if higher segment information 
quality facilitates predictions about firm’s future cash flows by analyzing whether such 
information reduces analysts’ forecast errors. Second, we test if higher segment 
information quality reduces the firm’s assessed covariance with sector firms’ returns, 
which in Lambert et al. (2007) setting will lead to a reduction in the cost of capital. 
Third, we use an implied cost of capital measure to study the relation between segment 
information quality and cost of capital, and finally, we investigate whether market 
participants are pricing segment information quality.      
3.3.2.1 Analysts’ forecast errors 
More comprehensive segment information is useful for analysts because it helps 
to predict more accurately earnings per share (Hopwood, Newbold and Silhan, 1982; 
Silhan, 1983; Baldwin, 1984; Balakrishnan et al., 1990; Swaminathan, 1991; Hussain, 
1997). Finger (1994) and Dechow (1994) among others, find that earnings help to 
predict firm’s cash flows. Thus, as a first initial test of Hypothesis 1, we study whether 
better quality segment disclosure that complements good quality earnings, reduces 
analysts’ forecast errors. To do so, we use the following model, estimated with industry 
fixed effects: 
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Forecast errorj,t =  α + β1 Qlt_Segj,t + β2  DummyEarnings_Qltj,t  +  
+  β3 Qlt_Segj,t *  DummyEarnings_Qltj,t  +                                     
+ β4 Number analysts j,t + β5 DesvForecast j,t +          (5) 
+ β6  Size j,t+ Σ k βk Control year j,t+ εj,t    
               
The coefficient of interest in Equation (5) is β3. A negative coefficient implies a 
reduction in forecast error when segment information quality increases and earnings 
quality is high (above the median for the sector and year). We include the number of 
analysts following the firm as a control as prior research shows that this variable is 
associated to smaller forecast errors. Consequently, we expect a negative and significant 
β4 coefficient. We also include the deviation of forecasts as a control, as prior research 
shows this is associated to higher forecast errors. This means a positive and significant 
β5 coefficient. Finally, we include firm size as prior research shows this is associated to 
lower forecast errors (negative β6 coefficient).   
3.3.2.2 Firm’s assessed covariance with other firms’ returns 
In the Lambert et al. (2007) setting, the quality of accounting information can 
influence the cost of capital. They show that higher quality disclosures reduce the firm’s 
assessed covariance with other firms’ cash flows, and that this disclosure effect is not 
diversifiable. In their framework, this leads to improved disclosure reducing cost of 
capital. To test this empirically, we use actual returns as a proxy of firm’s future cash 
flows, since returns are, by definition, the present value of expected future cash flows of 
the firm. We define the firm’s assessed covariance with returns of firms in the same 
sector as an empirical proxy for the firm’s assessed covariance with other firms’ cash 
flows. We measure it as the mean of the annual covariance between the monthly returns 
of the firm and the monthly returns of the sector in which the firm operates. With this 
test, we analyze whether better quality segment disclosure, conditional upon high 
earnings quality, reduces the firm’s assessed covariance with other firms’ returns in the 
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same sector, which in turn contributes to reduce the cost of capital. We use the 
following model, estimated with industry fixed effects: 
  
Cov(ri, rsector)j,t =  α + β1 Qlt_Segj,t + β2  DummyEarnings_Qltj,t  +  
  + β3 Qlt_Segj,t *DummyEarnings_Qltj,t  + β4 Sizej,t +  
+ β5 Booktomarket j,t + β6 Herfj,t + β7 Leveragej,t +                                (6) 
+ β8 Business Diversification j,t + β9 Geographic Diversificationj,t+          
+ β10 Listing Statusj,t + β11 Profitabilityj,t+ β12 Agej,t +                               
+ Σ
 k βk Control year j,t+ εj,t                         
 
   
 The coefficient of interest in Equation (6) is β3. A reduction in risk due to 
increases in segment information quality, contingent upon good earnings quality, 
implies a significantly negative β3. That is, if segment information quality and earnings 
quality complements each other to reduce the assessed covariance of the firm’s returns 
with the returns of the firms in the same industry, β3 will be significantly negative.  
Regarding the control variables in Equation (6), previous literature finds that 
size, industry concentration, age, listing status and diversification of the firm decrease 
firm’s beta (Subrahmanyam and Thomadakis, 1980; Caves, 1982; Kim, Hwang and 
Burgers, 1989; Lubatkin and Rogers, 1989; Harvey, 1991; Fama and French, 1992, 
1993, Kim Hwang and Burgers, 1993; Qian, 1996). In the same way, we include book-
to-market, leverage and profitability, as previous literature finds that beta increases with 
these variables (i.e., Fama and French, 1992, 1993).  
3.3.2.3 Implied cost of capital tests 
The third set of tests consists of regressing a measure of implied cost of capital 
on quality of segment disclosure, earnings quality, the interaction between quality of 
segment disclosure and earnings quality and control variables commonly used in the 
cost of capital literature: size, the book-to-market ratio, beta, leverage and 
diversification. To explore whether segment information quality reduces cost of capital 
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contingent upon high earnings quality, we estimate the following model using industry 
fixed effects: 
 
rPEG j,t = α + β1Qlt_Segj,t + β2DummyEarnings_Qltj,t +                                                                                                          
+ β3Qlt_Segj,t*DummyEarnings_Qltj,t+ β4 Sizej,t +                                               
+ β5 Booktomarketj,t +  β6  Betaj,t +  β7 Leveragej,t+           (7) 
+ β9 Business Diversification j,t + β10 Geographic Diversificationj,t+       
+ Σ
 k βk Control year j,t+ εj,t            
 
The coefficient of interest in Equation (7) is β3. A reduction in cost of capital 
related to increases in segment information quality, contingent upon good earnings 
quality, will lead to a significantly negative β3. That is, if segment information quality 
and earnings quality complement each other to reduce the cost of capital, β3 will be 
significantly negative.  
As a proxy for implied cost of capital we use the PEG ratio proposed by Easton 
(2004) as follows:  
0
45
P
epseps
rPEG
−
=
               (8) 
where: epst is earning per share in year t. We use five-year long-term growth rates from   
I/B/E/S to calculate eps4 and eps5. P0 is the market price of a firm’s stock. Pastor, Sinha 
and Swaminathan (2008) find that implied cost of capital proxies based on analysts’ 
forecasts capture well variation in cost of capital. At the same time, Botosan and 
Plumlee (2005) find that the PEG ratio is positively related to risk measures, and, 
consequently, it is a good proxy of implied cost of capital. To calculate it, Botosan and 
Plumlee (2005) use earnings per share forecasts in years 4 and 5 because this proxy 
requires positive changes in forecasted earnings and changes between years 4 and 5 in 
forecasted earnings are more likely to be positive than changes in near-term forecasts.  
Regarding the control variables in Equation (7), previous literature finds that 
increases in size lead to a decrease in the cost of capital (Fama and French, 1992, 1993; 
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Hail and Leuz, 2006). We measure size as the logarithm of market value. The market 
perceives high-growth firms as riskier, consistent with the asset pricing theory. Thus, 
we include the log of the book-to-market ratio (Fama and French, 1992, 1993; 
Gebhardt, Lee and Swaminathan, 2001; Hail and Leuz, 2006) because it is expected to 
increase the cost of capital. Also, the CAPM suggests that market beta should be 
associated with the cost of equity. Given this, we include beta, measured as the 
coefficient from firm-specific CAPM regressions of firm’s returns, using the 60 months 
preceding fiscal year t, and a value weighted NYSE/AMEX/Nasdaq as market index 
return. Additionally, we include leverage, as it drives cost of capital upwards 
(Modigliani and Miller, 1958; Fama and French, 1992, 1993). Finally, we include firm’s 
diversification, as it is associated with lower risk (Caves, 1982; Kim et al., 1989; 
Lubatkin and Rogers, 1989; Harvey, 1991, Kim et al., 1993; Qian, 1996). 
3.3.2.4 Asset pricing tests 
In addition to the implied cost of capital-based tests to study whether quality of 
both segment information and earnings are associated to lower cost of capital, we use 
the Fama and French (1992, 1993) three factor model, which has recently been applied 
in the accounting literature (Core et al., 2008; Francis et al., 2008; McInnis, 2010; 
Garcia Lara et al., 2010) to study the relation between cost of capital and proxies for the 
quality of accounting information. If segment information quality and earnings quality 
are priced risk factors, then each of them should be related to average stock returns.  
We group firms into portfolios, as realized returns employing cross-sectional 
tests are noisy at the firm level.4 We include size (SMB) and book-to-market (HML) 
portfolios as in Fama and French (1992, 1993). We also include the excess market 
                                                
4
 One criticism of cross-sectional tests is that realized returns are noisy, particularly at the firm level. That is, firm-specific news 
may include any pattern that exists in realized returns related to accounting quality. To deal with this concern, we perform portfolio 
time-series regressions in the tradition of Black, Jensen and Scholes (1972). 
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return (RMRF).5 Each month, from 1/1/2001 to 12/31/2006, we create a hedge portfolio 
based on the earnings quality measure, buying 20% of firms providing the best earnings 
quality and selling 20% of firms providing the worst earnings quality. Then we estimate 
the following time series regression for the hedge earnings quality portfolio:  
tttt
f
tjt HMLSMBRMRFRR εβββα ++++=− 321
                                        
(9) 
In this model, α represents the average excess return of the one predicted by the firm’s 
sensitivity to the risk factors in the model. If the model is properly specified (that is, if it 
includes all risk factors that affect the firm), the estimated α should be zero (Black, 
Jensen and Scholes, 1972). However, if the model omits a risk factor, then portfolios 
with greater exposure to that factor will have higher α, because they have greater 
average excess return unexplained. If earnings quality is a risk factor, and it is 
orthogonal to beta, size and book-to-market effects, then we should observe increasing 
estimates of α in Equation (9) as we move from good to poor earnings quality 
portfolios, so we expect a negative and statistically significant α of the hedge portfolio 
(long on firms providing the best accounting quality and short on those with the worst 
accounting quality). We perform the same analysis for the hedge segment information 
quality portfolio, buying 20% of firms providing good segment information and selling 
20% of firms providing poor segment information. 
Finally, we estimate the time series regressions in Equation (9) for the hedge 
accounting information quality portfolio, (Acc_Qlt) that combines earnings quality and 
segment information quality. To build this new variable, first, we create a dummy 
variable of earnings quality: we assign 1 if a firm provides earnings quality above the 
sector-year median and 0 otherwise. Second, we create a dummy variable of segment 
information quality: we assign 1 if the residuals of Equation 1 are positive and zero 
                                                
5
 Factors of Fama-French three factor model are extracted from Kenneth R. French’s webpage. 
http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html 
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otherwise. Finally we sum these two dummy variables to measure overall accounting 
information quality (Acc_Qlt). We create the hedge Acc_Qlt portfolio buying firms 
providing good segment information and good earnings quality (Acc_Qlt=2) and selling 
firms not providing neither good segment information, nor earnings quality 
(Acc_Qlt=0). As before, we expect a negative and statistically significant α of the hedge 
portfolio of both, segment information quality and accounting information quality. 
In addition, we investigate if earnings quality and segment disclosure quality, 
separately or together, have an influence over firms’ realized returns. To do this we 
create a HILOEarnings_Qlt factor, a HILOQlt_Seg factor and HILOAcc_Qlt factor. The 
HILOEarnings_Qlt factor is the return of the accruals quality factor-mimicking 
portfolio for earnings quality. We rank Earnings_Qlt into quintiles and we take a long 
position on the two quintiles with the best accrual quality and a short position in the two 
quintiles with the worst accrual quality. We perform the same analysis for the 
HILOQlt_Seg factor, taking a long position on the two quintiles with the best segment 
information –larger values of residual in Equation (1)– and a short position in the two 
quintiles with the worst segment information lower values of residual in Equation (1). 
Finally, the HILOAcc_Qlt factor is the return of the accounting information quality 
factor-mimicking portfolio for Acc_Qlt, in which we take a long position on the firms 
with the best accounting information –firms providing good segment information and 
good earnings quality– and a short position in the portfolio with the worst accounting 
information –firms not providing neither good segment information, nor earnings 
quality–. We then use a two-stage cross-sectional regression approach, where excess 
returns are regressed on risk factor betas.  
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In the first stage, we estimate multivariate betas from 25 portfolios sorted on 
B/M and Accounting Quality6 using a time-series regression of excess returns for a 
portfolio on the contemporaneous returns to the Fama–French factors, the earnings 
quality factor and the segment disclosure quality factor: 
tt
tttt
f
tpt
QltgsHILOEarnin
SegHILOQltHMLSMBRMRFRR
εβ
ββββα
++
+++++=−
 _
_
5
4321
      (10) 
where Rp,t is the return of portfolio p for month t. RMRF is the monthly excess return on 
the value-weighted NYSE/AMEX market index return from CRSP. SMB (Small minus 
Big) is the monthly return of small firms over big firms, and HML (High minus Low) is 
the monthly return of high BM firms over low BM firms. HILOQlt_Seg is the monthly 
return of good quality segment disclosure firms over poor quality segment disclosure 
firms and HILOEarnings_Qlt is the monthly return of good earnings quality firms over 
poor earnings quality firms. 
To test whether combining segment information quality and earnings quality has 
a larger impact in excess returns than earnings quality and segment information quality 
separately, we estimate multivariate betas from a single time-series regression of excess 
returns for a firm on the contemporaneous returns to the Fama–French factors and the 
factor that combines the earnings quality factor and the segment information quality 
factor: 
ttttt
f
tpt QltHILOAccHMLSMBRMRFRR εββββα +++++=− _4321    (11) 
 where all variables are the same as in Equation (10) and HILOAcc_Qlt is the 
monthly return of good accounting information quality firms over poor accounting 
information quality firms. 
                                                
6
 The portfolios are the intersections of 5 portfolios formed on the ratio of book equity to market equity and 5 portfolios formed on 
the interaction between Qlt_Seg and DummyEarnings_Qlt. 
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In the second stage, we collect the portfolio-specific loadings from (10) and 
(11), respectively, and estimate the factor premium conditional on the first stage 
loadings with cross-sectional regressions using the Fama and MacBeth (1973) 
procedure to mitigate concerns about cross-sectional dependence in the data. The model 
for the earnings quality factor and the quality of segment information factor is as 
follows: 
tQltEarnings
SegQltHMLSMBRMRF
f
tpt RR
εβδ
βδβδβδβδα
++
+++++=−
_5
_4321
       
(12) 
 Firms providing better earnings quality and better segment information quality 
should enjoy lower cost of capital, so δ4 and δ5 are expected to be negative.  
Finally, the test of whether firms providing better segment information quality 
together with better earnings quality enjoy lower cost of capital is conducted estimating 
the following model: 
tQltAccHMLSMBRMRF
f
tpt RR εβδβδβδβδα +++++=− _4321
        
(13) 
Consistent with the individual analysis of earnings quality and segment 
information quality, we expect that firms providing better overall accounting 
information quality will have smaller excess returns. Consequently, we expect a 
significantly negative δ4. This would imply that firms providing good segment 
information quality that complements good quality earnings will enjoy a lower risk 
premium, leading to a reduction in cost of capital.  
3.3.3 Sample selection  
 We extract a sample of non financial and non regulated firms from the 
Compustat annual files, for the period 2001 to 2006, with the necessary data to calculate 
the earnings quality measures and all variables needed for our disclosure tests. The 
number of subsidiaries, used to calculate our proxy for geographic diversification, is 
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extracted from BvD Osiris.7 Market data are extracted from CRSP and analysts data 
from I/B/E/S. Our final sample comprises 10,002 firm-year observations with data on 
all variables to run all of our tests. We exclude observations with missing data from any 
of the variables needed. To mitigate the undesirable effect of outliers, we delete the top 
and bottom percentile of the distributions of all variables.  
[Insert Table 1 about Here] 
The mean (median) number of items reported by our sample firms is 42.25 (39), 
with a standard deviation of 20.29 (Table 1). Note that the standard deviation is high, 
but it is mainly due to the different number of reported segments among firms. The 
minimum items disclosed are 10 while the maximum are 149 (not tabulated). Data 
indicate substantial variation in voluntary segment disclosure levels across the sample 
firms. Regarding accruals quality, the mean and median values are slightly larger than 
those reported in previous studies Mean leverage is 20.19%, indicating that our sample 
firms are relatively low leveraged. The mean number of analysts following a firm in our 
sample firms is 8. The mean beta of our sample firms is 1.17, indicating that our sample 
firms, in mean, are more risky than the market. The mean cost of capital is 13.47% for 
the implied cost of capital measure, and the mean excess monthly return is 1.3%. 
3.4. RESULTS  
3.4.1 Forecast errors and segment disclosure 
[Insert Table 2 about Here] 
In Table 2 we show the results on whether segment disclosure reduces analysts’ 
forecast errors. In the first column of the table we show the results of the regression of 
forecast errors on quantity of segment information, analysts’ following, deviation of 
                                                
7
 We assume the number of subsidiaries does not change if the data is not available for one year. (i.e., if a firm has no data for 2004, 
we assume that the number of subsidiaries is equal to that of 2005)  Results are robust to the use of a smaller sample in which we 
drop firms with no available data on the number of subsidiaries in all the years of the sample. 
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forecasts and size. As mentioned in the theoretical section, we do not expect quantity of 
segment disclosure to be a good indicator of investors being able to estimate firm’s cash 
flows more accurately. The results show a mean estimate of β1 = -0.0001 (p-value 
0.275), so, as expected, we do not find a significant relation between quantity of 
segment information and forecast errors. However, when we use segment disclosure 
quality instead of quantity (columns two and three), the results show a negative and 
significant coefficient on quality of segment disclosure (β=0.0074 and p-value=0.006 
when we do not control by earnings quality and β=0.0073, p-value=0.000 when we 
control by earnings quality). So, we find that better quality segment information reduces 
forecast errors. We also find that having earnings quality above the median also 
contributes to a decrease in forecast errors.  
Finally, in the last column of Table 2 we include in the specification the 
interaction between segment disclosure quality and earnings quality. We expect that the 
coefficient of this interaction –β3 in specification (5)– is significant and negative, 
indicating that the reduction in forecast errors as the quality of segment information 
increases, is larger when earnings quality is high. The results show a mean estimate of   
-0.0146 (p-value 0.023). Now, the coefficient of segment quality is not significant any 
more, indicating that only firms with better quality of segment information and high 
earnings quality facilitate earnings forecasting, and hence, only with better quality of 
segment information and high earnings quality, firms facilitate the predictions about 
firms’ future cash flows. In fact, when segment information is of high quality and 
earnings quality is not, the result is the opposite (positive coefficient of Qlt_Seg in 
column 4). Thus, superior levels of voluntary disclosure when accounting numbers are 
of bad quality generate more uncertainty and have damaging effects on forecasts. 
Another explanation for this result is that once we include the interaction effect, the 
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coefficient on segment reporting quality might be only capturing firms providing poor 
quality segment information that is not useful for analysts in making their forecasts.  
The F-ratio test on the R2 increment is statistically significant at p-value 0.04 
(not tabulated), so we should take into account that quality of segment information and 
earnings quality are related when we explain their effect on the forecast errors. Given 
this result, we expect firms providing high segment disclosure quality will enjoy lower 
cost of capital only when earnings quality is high.  
3.4.2 Firm’s assessed covariance with other firms’ returns and segment quality 
[Insert Table 3 about Here] 
In Table 3 we show the results on whether segment disclosure reduces firm’s 
assessed covariance between firm’ returns and returns of the firms operating in the same 
sector. In the first column of the table we show the results of the regression of the 
covariance between firm’s returns and returns of firms in the same sector, on quantity of 
segment information and controls. As before, we do not expect quantity of segment 
disclosure to reduce the information risk of the firm. The results confirm this, as the 
coefficient of Qtt_seg is not significant. When we use segment disclosure quality 
instead of quantity (columns two and three), the results show a negative and significant 
coefficient on quality of segment disclosure. So, we find that better quality segment 
information reduces the assessed covariance with sector firms’ returns. We also find 
that having earnings quality above the median also leads to a reduction in the risk of the 
firm. 
Finally, in the last column of Table 3 we include the interaction between 
segment disclosure quality and earnings quality. We expect that the coefficient of this 
variable is significant and negative, indicating that when firms have higher earnings 
quality, the quality of segment information reduces information risk to a larger extent 
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than when earnings quality is low. The results show a mean estimate of -0.0023 (p-
value 0.004). However, the coefficient of segment disclosure quality is not significant at 
conventional levels, indicating that when segment information quality and earnings 
quality does not complement each other to reduce the estimation risk, segment 
disclosure quality does not reduce it. As before, it seems that superior levels of 
voluntary disclosure when accounting numbers are of bad quality do not provide useful 
information to investors. Or alternatively, that firms providing poor earnings quality do 
not provide high quality segment information. The F-ratio test on the R2 increment is 
statistically significant at p-value 0.0002 (not tabulated), so we should take into account 
that quality of segment information and earnings quality are related when we explain 
their effect on the estimation risk. These findings suggest that firms with better quality 
of segment information provided earnings quality is high, reduce the estimation risk of 
the firm. In the Lambert et al. (2007) setting, these results are consistent with firms 
providing high quality segment disclosure, contingent upon high earnings quality, 
enjoying a lower cost of capital. 
3.4.3 Ex-ante cost of capital estimates and segment disclosure 
[Insert Table 4 about Here] 
In Table 4 we show the pairwise correlations between the main variables of 
interest for the tests where we study the relation between segment disclosure and ex-
ante estimates of firms’ cost of capital. Quantity of segment information (Qtt_Seg) is 
not related to the cost of capital (rPEG) in a significant way (-0.33%), which is a signal 
that firms providing larger quantities of segment information do not reduce their cost of 
capital. On the other hand, we find that quality of segment information (Qlt_Seg) is 
negatively and significantly associated with rPEG (12.83%), which suggests that firms 
with better quality segment disclosure enjoy a lower cost of capital, as we predict in 
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Hypothesis 1. As expected, earnings quality is negatively related with rPEG (12.36%) 
indicating that firms with good earnings quality enjoy lower cost of capital.  
[Insert Table 5 about Here] 
In Table 5 we show results of regressions of implied cost of capital on segment 
information quality, earnings quality, the interaction between segment information 
quality and earnings quality, and controls. In the first column of this table we validate 
our proxy for the ex-ante cost of capital (rPEG). We find that the cost of capital decreases 
with firm size and diversification and increases with the book to market ratio, beta and 
leverage. These results, consistent with the evidence in Botosan and Plumlee (2005), 
suggest rPEG is a valid proxy for cost of capital, as it has the expected relation with all of 
the already mentioned risk proxies. 
In this table we also show the results on whether segment disclosure reduces cost 
of capital. In the second column of the table we show the results of the regression of ex-
ante cost of capital on quantity of segment information and controls. As expected, the 
coefficient on Qtt_Seg is not significant (-0.0002, p-value 0.264), so we fail to find any 
significant relation between quantity of segment information and cost of capital. When 
we use segment disclosure quality instead of quantity (columns three and four), the 
results show a negative and significant coefficient on quality of segment disclosure. So, 
we find that better quality segment information reduces cost of capital. In addition, we 
find a negative coefficient on earnings quality (-0.0139), and significant (p-value 
0.000). The inclusion of earnings quality in the model does not eliminate the impact of 
segment disclosure quality in reducing the cost of capital (the coefficient on Qlt_Seg is 
still negative and significant at conventional levels).  
Finally, in the last column of Table 5 we include in the estimation the interaction 
between segment disclosure quality and earnings quality. The results show that the 
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coefficient of this interaction term is negative -0.0032 and significant (p-value 0.000). 
Also, consistently with the previous tests on firm’s risk, the coefficient on segment 
disclosure quality when accounting quality is not high becomes not significant. The F-
ratio test on the R2 increment is statistically significant at p-value 0.000 (not tabulated), 
so we should take into account that quality of segment information and earnings quality 
are related when we explain their effect on the cost of capital. This result suggests that 
only firms with better quality segment information and high earnings quality enjoy a 
lower cost of capital. 
3.4.4 Asset-pricing-based tests of the relation between segment disclosure and cost of 
capital 
[Insert Table 6 about Here] 
In Table 6, Panel A we show the descriptive statistics for the variables used in 
the asset pricing tests. We can see that the excess market return is positive in our 
sample, and that smaller and high book-to-market firms have higher returns than larger 
and low book-to-market firms. Firms presenting better accounting quality have lower 
returns (cost of equity capital) than firms presenting lower accounting quality. This 
result is consistent with that on size given the high correlation between size and 
accounting quality. In Panel B we show the pairwise correlations between the factors of 
the model. We also find a positive relation between returns of earnings quality and 
quality of segment information (39%).  
In Table 7 we explore whether accounting quality (measured as earnings quality 
–Earnings_Qlt–, segment information quality –Qlt_Seg–, and overall accounting quality 
–Acc_Qlt–) is a risk factor and whether it decreases the cost of capital.  If accounting 
quality is a risk factor we should observe a negative and statistically significant α of the 
hedge portfolio (long on firms providing good accounting quality and short on those 
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providing poor accounting quality). In column three of this table, the results show an α= 
-0.00052 (p-value 0.000). This is consistent with accounting quality being an omitted 
factor in the Fama-French three factor model, as firms providing poor accounting 
quality have greater average excess returns unexplained. 
In Table 8, we show the results on whether segment disclosure reduces cost of 
capital using asset pricing tests. We find that the sensitivity of portfolios’ returns to 
segment information quality is negative. However, when we include earnings quality (in 
Table 8, column 9), the sensitivity of portfolios’ returns to this factor is not significant 
(p-value=0.120), while the sensitivity of portfolios’ returns to the segment information 
quality factor remains significant (p-value=0.067). Unlike the results in Francis et al. 
(2008), we find that the effect of segment information quality on cost of capital is robust 
to the inclusion of earnings quality. Finally, in the last column of Table 8 we explore 
whether overall accounting quality reduces cost of capital and results show that this 
factor is significant (p-value=0.058). In fact, the added reduction in the mean cost of 
capital when segment information quality and earnings quality are complementary, for 
25 portfolios sorted on book-to-market and accounting quality, is of -0.0007121 (not 
tabulated), which is consistent with the results in Table 5. Our results are robust to the 
use of the CAPM, and to the inclusion of excess market return, size and book to market 
factors (the three factor model).  
In Table 9 we present the results of the two-stage regression to obtain the risk 
premium factors. We find that quality of the segment information risk premium is 
negative (δ4 =-0.0187; p-value 0.003), that is, firms providing better quality segment 
information enjoy lower excess realized returns. However, earnings quality bears no 
risk premium anymore (δ4 =-0.0150; p-value 0.180) when we include the three factors 
as proposed by Fama and French (1992, 1993), and the quality of segment information 
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factor. This indicates that earnings quality, as we measure it, is not a priced factor. This 
is consistent with the evidence in Core et al. (2008). We show that the coefficients of 
market risk premium, size premium and book-to-market premium are consistent with 
previous empirical evidence. In the last column of this table we show the results for the 
accounting quality factor –estimation of Equation (13)–. We find that when earnings 
quality and segment quality information are complementary, this accounting quality 
factor is, as expected, a priced risk factor (δ4 =-0.0148; p-value 0.014). These findings 
suggest that firms with better quality segment information that complements high 
quality earnings, enjoy a lower cost of capital. As in the first stage, these results are 
robust to the use of the CAPM, and to the use of the Fama and French (1992, 1993) 
three-factor model. 
3.4.5  Additional sensitivity tests 
In this section we describe untabulated additional sensitivity tests. The results of 
the estimation of Equations (5), (6) and (7), about the effect of segment disclosure on a) 
forecast errors, b) the covariance of the firm’s cash flows with other firms’ cash flows, 
and c) implied cost of capital estimates, are robust to the interaction between Qlt_Seg 
and Earnings_Qlt using the values of earnings quality instead of a dummy variable for 
high/low earnings quality firms. We divided the sample in observations with poor 
Qlt_Seg (negative residuals from Equation (1)) and observations with good Qlt_Seg 
(positive residuals from Equation (1)). We do this as the interaction variable is non-
linear. We run Equations (5), (6) and (7) for each group, and inferences remain 
unchanged. Our results are also robust to using our overall accounting quality measure 
(Acc_Qlt). Finally, we also run Equations (5), (6) and (7) including Good_Comp (when 
earnings quality is above the median and residuals of Equation (1) are positive), 
Non_Comp (when earnings quality is above the median and residuals of Equation (1) 
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are negative) and Bad_Comp (earnings quality is below the median and residuals of 
Equation (1) are negative) and the results are qualitatively similar. 
Our results are robust to the use of the absolute values of the residuals of the 
Jones (1991), Dechow and Dichev (2002) and McNichols (2002) models, and of the 
standard deviation of the residuals of the Jones, modified Jones, Dechow and Dichev, 
and McNichols models, calculated at the firm level using rolling windows of five years 
as in Francis et al. (2004).   
In our main tests we use industry-year fixed effects models to control for 
industry and year specific shocks to quantity of segment reported information, analysts’ 
forecast errors, systematic risk and cost of equity capital. We check the robustness of 
our results calculating standard errors clustered by industry,8 and we find that results are 
robust.  
Finally, we replicate all the tests distinguishing between voluntary business 
segment information and voluntary geographic segment information. Our results are 
robust to the separate use of business segment information quality and geographic 
segment information quality. These results are especially significant given the debate on 
the reduction of geographic segment information requirements introduced by SFAS 
131. 
3.5. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper we analyze the effects of improved segment disclosure and 
earnings quality on cost of capital. We focus on segment disclosure as it is expected to 
improve investors’ ability to estimate firms’ cash flows, and, consequently, to decrease 
cost of capital. We provide empirical evidence supporting the claim that through high 
segment disclosure quality, when earnings quality is high, investors are better able to 
                                                
8
 Following Petersen (2009, pp 475-476), we estimate robust standard errors clustered by industry. It is not necessary to estimate 
robust standard error two-way clustered (industry-year) since our models contain year fixed effects.  
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estimate firm’s cash flows more accurately, and, as a result, demand lower returns, 
which leads to a lower cost of capital for the firm. Our results regarding the negative 
relation between segment disclosure and cost of capital are robust to the use of asset 
pricing based tests and implied cost of capital based tests. We also find that analysts’ 
forecast errors are smaller for firms providing better segment disclosure. In addition, we 
provide empirical evidence supporting that firms providing better segment disclosure 
reduce the assessed covariance between firm’s returns, and the returns of the firms in 
the same industry. 
Our results contribute to the current debate, started after the passage of SFAS 
131, on whether it is advisable to reduce the amount of geographic segment information 
that firms are obliged to present, and add to prior evidence showing that permitting 
firms to reduce the amount of segment information may have undesirable economic 
consequences (Hope and Thomas, 2008). In particular, we show that improved segment 
reporting helps estimating firms’ future cash flows and contributes to decrease firms’ 
cost of capital. We also show that this effect also holds if we consider only the quality 
of geographic disclosures. 
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Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
 
Variable 
 
 
N 
 
Mean 
 
Std. Dev. 
 
10% 
 
25% 
 
Median 
 
75% 
 
90% 
Qtt_Seg 10,002 42.2542 20.2906 20 27 39 53 69 
Qlt_Seg 10,002 0.0000 15.1765 -17.5237 -10.2192 -1.8707 8.6758 19.1472 
Qtt_Seg_Bus 10,002 23.3837 17.4141 8 9 18 33 47 
Qlt_Seg_Bus 10,002 0.0000 13.3659 -14.0958 -9.1850 -2.5236 6.7440 17.6357 
Qtt_Seg_Geo 10,002 18.8705 9.0299 11 11 17 24 31 
Qlt_Seg_Geo 10,002 0.0000 7.6832 -8.8721 -5.3393 -0.7478 4.1548 10.1924 
Earnings_Qlt 10,002 -0.0743 0.1118 -0.2097 -0.0970 -0.0349 -0.0000 -0.0000 
BusDiversif 10,002 1.9679 1.1461 1 1 2 2 3 
GeoDiversif 10,002 3.0755 4.2204 1 2 2 3 5 
Spread 10,002 0.1504 0.1475 0.0225 0.0458 0.1041 0.2076 0.3416 
Mve 10,002 4,771 11,669 121 317 923 3,162 11,670 
Bm 10,002 0.5211 0.4632 0.162 0.262 0.419 0.635 0.943 
Leverage 10,002 20.1953 18.8044 0 1.633 17.971 31.9905 45.5055 
Auditor 10,002 0.9153 0.2784 1 1 1 1 1 
StockExch 10,002 0.9696 0.1716 1 1 1 1 1 
Herf 10,002 10.4644 9.5428 4.0059 4.9259 7.8234 11.1554 20.8409 
Newfin 10,002 0.8802 0.3247 0 1 1 1 1 
Roa 10,002 0.0140 0.1497 -0.1346 -0.0042 0.0444 0.0846 0.1284 
Age 10,002 13.5585 10.2824 4 6 10 18 32 
Forecast error 10,002 0.1270 0.8513 -0.1724 -0.0592 -0.0058 0.0833 0.4444 
Dev. Forecast error 10,002 0.0690 0.1297 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.07 0.15 
Number analysts 10,002 8.4469 6.2905 3 4 6 11 18 
rpeg 10,002 0.1347 0.0443 0.1002 0.1067 0.1180 0.1665 0.1941 
Beta 10,002 1.1765 0.9368 0.3599 0.9133 1.0462 1.3680 2.2228 
Cov (ri, rsector) 10,002 0.0161 0.1668 -0.0513 -0.0137 0.0000 0.0192 0.0739 
Realized Returns 102,024 0.0161 0.2394 -0.2022 -0.0814 0.0017 0.0806 0.2145 
Excess Realized  Returns 102,024 0.0133 0.2394 -0.2052 -0.0841 -0.0008 0.0780 0.2117 
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The sample consists of 10,002 firm-year observations for the period 2001-2006. Qtt_Seg = the number of voluntary disclosure 
elements found in the sample firms’ for segment disclosure; Qlt_Seg = the regression residuals obtained from a regression of 
the firm’s year t Qtt_Seg on controls and determinants of segment disclosure. Qtt_Seg_Bus = the number of voluntary 
disclosure elements found in the sample firms’ for business segment disclosure; Qlt_Seg_Bus = the regression residuals 
obtained from a regression of the firm’s year t Qtt_Seg_Bus on control and determinants of segment disclosure. Qtt_Seg_Geo = 
the number of voluntary disclosure elements found in the sample firms’ for geographic segment disclosure; Qlt_Seg_Geo = the 
regression residuals obtained from a regression of the firm’s year t Qtt_Seg_Geo on controls and determinants of segment 
disclosure; Earnings_Qlt = The absolute value, multiplied by minus one, of discretionary accruals calculated as the residual of 
the modified version of the Jones (1991) accruals model (Dechow et al. 1995), as applied to total accruals; BusDiversif = 
number of the different sectors in which the firm operates. GeoDiversif = number of the different countries where the firm 
operates. Spread = bid-ask spread, calculated as 
2/)(
||
askbid
askbid
+
−
 measured in t-1. MVE = the firm’s market value of equity 
measured at the beginning of fiscal year for 2001-2006; BM = the firm’s book-to-market ratio measured at the beginning of 
fiscal year 2001-2006; Leverage = debt to total assets ratio in percentage. Auditor = 1 if auditor firm is a Big-Four and 0 
otherwise. StockExch = 1 if firm is listed in NYSE or NASDAQ and 0 otherwise. Herf = Herfindahl index in percentage, 
calculated as 
2
1
∑
=
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Herf . NewFin= 1 if the firm has issued new debt or equity and 0 otherwise. Roa = return on assets. 
Age = the difference between the first year when the firm appears in CRSP and the current year. Forecast error= Analysts’ 
forecast errors. It is calculated as forecasted eps for the year t – eps of the year t, scaled by the absolute value of eps in the year 
t.   Dev. Forecast error= Deviation of analysts’ forecasts. It is calculated as the standard deviation of analysts’ forecasts of eps 
for the year t. Number of analysts = number of eps forecasts of the firm in the year t. rpeg = implied cost of equity estimate, 
derived from I/B/E/S eps forecasts and price target data. Beta = coefficient from firm-specific CAPM regression using the 60 
months preceding fiscal year 2001-2006. Cov (ri, rsector) = mean annual covariance of the monthly return of a firm with the 
monthly return of the sector in which the firm belongs. Realized returns = monthly realized returns. Excess realized returns = 
monthly excess realized returns over the risk free rate. 
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Table 2 
Fixed Effect Regressions of analysts’ forecast errors on Quantity and Quality of segment disclosure and number of analysts following the 
firm 
 
 Expected 
sign 
Coef. 
(p-value) 
Coef. 
(p-value) 
Coef. 
(p-value) 
Coef. 
(p-value) 
 
 
                    
Qtt_Seg ? -0.0001 (0.275)    
Qlt_Seg 
- 
 
-0.0074 
(0.006) 
-0.0073 
(0.000) 
0.0111 
(0.019) 
DummyEarnings_Qlt 
- 
  
-0.0507 
(0.003) 
0.0023 
(0.953) 
       Qlt_Seg*DummyEarnings_Qlt 
- 
   
-0.0146 
(0.023) 
Number analysts 
- 
-0.0021 
(0.118) 
-0.0017 
(0.285) 
-0.0017 
(0.293) 
-0.0015 
(0.440) 
Dev. Forecast error + 0.4816 (0.000) 
0.5968 
(0.000) 
0.5945 
(0.000) 
0.5613 
(0.000) 
Ln_mve 
- 
-0.0637 
(0.000) 
-0.0687 
(0.000) 
-0.0637 
(0.000) 
-0.0784 
(0.000) 
Cons  0.6957 (0.000) 
0.7549 
(0.000) 
0.7468 
(0.000) 
0.7948 
(0.000) 
R2  
 0.0342 0.0368 0.0381 0.0385 
 
The sample consists of 10,002 firm-year observations for the period 2001-2006. AbsForecast error= Analysts’ forecast errors. 
It is calculated as the absolute value of forecasted eps for the year t – eps of the year t, scaled by eps in the year t. Qtt_Seg = 
the number of voluntary disclosure elements found in the sample firms’ for segment disclosure; Qlt_Seg = the regression 
residuals obtained from a regression of the firm’s year t Qtt_Seg on controls and determinants of segment disclosure. We then 
rank the residuals from this model into deciles. DummyEarnings_Qlt = it is dummy variable which takes value of 1 if 
Earnings_Qlt is above median, and zero otherwise, where Earnings_Qlt is the absolute value, multiplied by minus one, of 
discretionary accruals calculated as the residual of the modified version of the Jones (1991) accruals model (Dechow et al. 
1995), as applied to total accruals. Number of analysts = number of eps forecasts of the firm in the year t. Dev. Forecast error= 
Deviation of analysts’ forecasts. It is calculated as the standard deviation of analyst forecasts of eps for the year t. Ln mve = 
the logarithm of firm’s market value of equity measured at the beginning of fiscal year for 2001-2006. 
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Table 3 
Fixed Effect Regressions of assessed covariance with sector firms’ return on Quantity and Quality of segment disclosure and controls 
 
 Expected 
sign 
Coef. 
(p-value) 
Coef. 
(p-value) 
Coef. 
(p-value) 
Coef. 
(p-value) 
 
 
                    
Qtt_Seg ? -0.0006 (0.184)    
Qlt_Seg 
- 
 
-0.0010 
(0.000) 
-0.0010 
(0.007) 
0.0002 
(0.719) 
DummyEarnings_Qlt 
- 
  
-0.0061 
(0.016) 
0.0066 
(0.194) 
       Qlt_Seg*DummyEarnings_Qlt 
- 
   
-0.0023 
(0.004) 
Ln mve 
- 
-0.0024 
(0.008) 
-0.0032 
(0.000) 
-0.0026 
(0.003) 
-0.0024 
(0.006) 
Ln bm + 0.0148 (0.000) 
0.0140 
(0.000) 
0.0146 
(0.000) 
0.0148 
(0.000) 
Herf 
- 
-0.0940 
(0.055) 
-0.0825 
(0.091) 
-0.0821 
(0.093) 
-0.0839 
(0.086) 
Leverage + 0.0001 (0.028) 
0.0001 
(0.048) 
0.0001 
(0.026) 
0.0001 
(0.024) 
BusDiversif 
- 
-0.0006 
(0.587) 
-0.0016 
(0.160) 
-0.0016 
(0.159) 
-0.0016 
(0.168) 
GeoDiversif 
- 
-0.0001 
(0.579) 
-0.0002 
(0.474) 
-0.0001 
(0.480) 
-0.0001 
(0.489) 
StockExch 
- 
-0.0133 
(0.005) 
-0.0152 
(0.027) 
-0.0142 
(0.039) 
-0.0139 
(0.043) 
Roa + 0.0001 (0.006) 
0.0001 
(0.005) 
0.0001 
(0.004) 
0.0001 
(0.005) 
Age 
- 
-0.0002 
(0.089) 
-0.0002 
(0.067) 
-0.0002 
(0.089) 
-0.0002 
(0.067) 
Cons  0.1067 (0.000) 
0.1133 
(0.000) 
0.1110 
(0.000) 
0.1034 
(0.000) 
R2  
 0.0271 0.0272 0.0280 0.0294 
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The sample consists of 10,002 firm-year observations for the period 2001-2006. Cov (ri, rsector) = mean annual covariance of the monthly return of a firm with the 
monthly return of the sector in which the firm belongs, expressed in percentage and in absolute values. Qtt_Seg = the number of voluntary disclosure elements found in 
the sample firms’ for segment disclosure; Qlt_Seg = the regression residuals obtained from a regression of the firm’s year t Qtt_Seg on controls and determinants of 
segment disclosure. We then rank the residuals from this model into deciles. DummyEarnings_Qlt = it is dummy variable which takes value of 1 if Earnings_Qlt is 
above median, and zero otherwise, where Earnings_Qlt is the absolute value, multiplied by minus one, of discretionary accruals calculated as the residual of the 
modified version of the Jones (1991) accruals model (Dechow et al. 1995), as applied to total accruals.. Ln mve = the logarithm of firm’s market value of equity 
measured at the beginning of fiscal year for 2001-2006; Ln bm = the logarithm of firm’s book-to-market ratio measured at the beginning of fiscal year 2001-2006. Herf 
= Herfindahl index in percentage, calculated as 
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Herf .  Leverage = debt to total assets ratio in percentage. BusDiversif = number of the different sectors in 
which the firm operates. GeoDiversif = number of the different countries where the firm operates. Roa = percentile rank of return on assets. Age = the difference 
between the first year when the firm appears in CRSP and the current year. 
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Table 4 
Pairwise correlations between rPEG, Qtt_Seg and Qlt_Seg, Earnings Quality and control variables (p=0.05) 
 
Variable rPEG Qtt_Seg Qlt_Seg DumEarQlt Ln mve 
 
Ln bm 
 
Beta 
 
Leverage 
 
BusDiversif 
 
GeoDiversif 
 
rPEG 
 
1          
Qtt_Seg -0.0033 1         
Qlt_Seg -0.1283 0.7087 1        
DummyEarnings_Qlt -0.1236 0.2207 -0.0039 1       
Ln mve -0.1888 0.3399 -0.0032 0.2936 1      
Ln bm 0.1813 0.0482 0.0047 0.0218 -0.2792 1     
Beta 0.0921 0.0090 0.0004 0.0095 -0.0413 0.0320 1    
Leverage 0.1222 0.1178 -0.0071 0.0995 0.1125 0.0082 0.0149 1   
BusDiversif -0.0852 0.3122 -0.0094 0.1231 0.2234 0.0625 -0.0137 0.1368 1  
GeoDiversif -0.0600 0.1053 0.0002 0.0413 0.0269 0.0147 0.0342 0.0419 0.0536 1 
          Bold numbers are significant at p-value 0.05 
The sample consists of 10,002 firm-year observations for the period 2001-2006. rpeg = implied cost of equity estimate, derived from I/B/E/S eps forecasts and 
price target data; Qtt_Seg = the number of voluntary disclosure elements found in the sample firms’ for segment disclosure; Qlt_Seg = the regression residuals 
obtained from a regression of the firm’s year t Qtt_Seg on controls and determinants of segment disclosure. We then rank the residuals from this model into 
deciles. DummyEarnings_Qlt = it is dummy variable which takes value of 1 if Earnings_Qlt is above median, and zero otherwise, where Earnings_Qlt is the 
absolute value, multiplied by minus one, of discretionary accruals calculated as the residual of the modified version of the Jones (1991) accruals model 
(Dechow et al. 1995), as applied to total accruals. Ln mve = the logarithm of firm’s market value of equity measured at the beginning of fiscal year for 2001-
2006; Ln bm = the logarithm of firm’s book-to-market ratio measured at the beginning of fiscal year 2001-2006.  Beta = coefficient from firm-specific CAPM 
regression using the 60 months preceding fiscal year 2001-2006. Leverage = debt to total assets ratio in percentage. BusDiversif = number of the different 
sectors in which the firm operates. GeoDiversif = number of the different countries where the firm operates. 
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Table 5 
Fixed Effect Regression of implied cost of capital (rPEG) on earnings quality, quality of segment disclosure (Qlt_Seg) and control variables 
 
Variable Expected sign Coef. 
(p-value) 
 Coef. 
(p-value) 
 Coef. 
(p-value) 
 Coef. 
(p-value) 
 Coef. 
(p-value) 
           
Qtt_Seg ?   -0.0002 (0.264)       
Qlt_Seg 
- 
    
-0.0021 
(0.000)  
-0.0021 
(0.000)  
-0.0003 
(0.115) 
DummyEarnings_Qlt 
- 
      
-0.0139 
(0.000)  
0.0035 
(0.100) 
       Qlt_Seg*DummyEarnings_Qlt 
- 
        
-0.0032 
(0.000) 
Ln mve 
- 
-0.0035 
(0.000)  
-0.0032 
(0.000)  
-0.0036 
(0.000)  
-0.0021 
(0.000)  
-0.0019 
(0.000) 
Ln bm + 0.0080 (0.000)  
0.0078 
(0.000)  
0.0080 
(0.000)  
0.0093 
(0.000)  
0.0096 
(0.000) 
Beta +/- 0.0052 (0.000)  
0.0055 
(0.000)  
0.0053 
(0.000)  
  0.0051 
(0.000)  
0.0051 
(0.000) 
Leverage + 0.0001 (0.000)  
0.0001 
(0.000)  
0.0001 
(0.000)  
0.0001 
(0.000)  
0.0001 
(0.000) 
BusDiversif 
- 
-0.0015 
(0.000)  
-0.0010 
(0.197)  
-0.0015 
(0.003)  
-0.0015 
(0.003)  
-0.0014 
(0.005) 
GeoDiversif 
- 
-0.0007 
(0.000)  
-0.0007 
(0.000)  
-.0007 
(0.000)  
-0.0007 
(0.000)  
-0.0007 
(0.000) 
Cons 
 
0.1699 
(0.000)  
0.1752 
(0.000)  
0.1826 
(0.000)  
0.1796 
(0.000)  
0.1693 
(0.000) 
R2  0.0716  0.0720  0.0895  0.1046  0.1134 
 
The sample consists of 10,002 firm-year observations for the period 2001-2006. rpeg = implied cost of equity estimate, derived from I/B/E/S eps forecasts and price target data; 
Qtt_Seg = the number of voluntary disclosure elements found in the sample firms’ for segment disclosure; Qlt_Seg = the regression residuals obtained from a regression of the 
firm’s year t Qtt_Seg on controls and determinants of segment disclosure. We then rank the residuals from this model into deciles. DummyEarnings_Qlt = it is dummy 
variable which takes value of 1 if Earnings_Qlt is above median, and zero otherwise, where Earnings_Qlt is equal to the absolute value, multiplied by minus one, of 
discretionary accruals calculated as the residual of the modified version of the Jones (1991) accruals model (Dechow et al. 1995), as applied to total accruals. Ln mve = the 
logarithm of firm’s market value of equity measured at the beginning of fiscal year for 2001-2006; Ln bm = the logarithm of firm’s book-to-market ratio measured at the 
beginning of fiscal year 2001-2006.  Beta = coefficient from firm-specific CAPM regression using the 60 months preceding fiscal year 2001-2006. Leverage = debt to total 
assets ratio in percentage. BusDiversif = number of the different sectors in which the firm operates. GeoDiversif = number of the different countries where the firm operates.  
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Table 6 
Tests of the Relation between Realized Cost of Capital and Voluntary Segment Disclosure: Descriptive data 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics  
Variable Mean Std.Dev. Annualized return 
RMRF 0.0026 0.0411 3.1650% 
SMB 0.0068 0.0292 8.4722% 
HML 0.0082 0.0291 10.2961% 
HILOQlt_Seg -0.0051 0.0218 6.2946% 
HILOEarnings_Qlt -0.0025 0.0421 3.0415% 
HILOAcc_Qlt -0.0071 0.0610 8.7310% 
 
Panel B: Correlation Matrix  
Variable RMRF SMB HML HILOQlt_Seg HILOAQ HILOAcc_Qlt 
RMRF 1      
SMB 0.3308 
 
1 
 
    
HML -0.4618 
 
-0.2407 
 
1    
HILOQlt_Seg 0.0324 
 
-0.2163 
 
0.4018 
 
1 
 
  
HILOEarnings_Qlt 0.0624 
 
-0.2421 
 
0.5009 
 
0.3925 
 
1 
 
 
HILOAcc_Qlt 0.0435 
 
-0.3651 
 
0.3069 
 
0.4009 
 
0.6927 
 
1 
 
   Bold numbers are significant at p-value 0.05 
 
 
The sample consists of 102,024 firm-month observations for the period 2001-2006. RMRF is the excess return on the market portfolio. SMB is the return 
to size factor-mimicking portfolio. HML is the return to book-to-market factor-mimicking portfolio. HILOEarnings_Qlt is the portfolio that results on 
hedge earnings quality portfolio, buying 20% of firms providing good earnings quality and selling 20% of firms providing poor earnings quality. HEDGE 
Qlt_Seg is the portfolio that results on hedge segment information quality portfolio, buying 20% of firms providing good segment quality information and 
selling 20% of firms providing poor segment quality information. HEDGE Acc_Qlt is the portfolio that results on hedge accounting information quality 
portfolio, buying firms providing good segment quality information and selling firms providing poor segment quality information. 
 
Chapter 3: Segment Disclosure, Earnings Quality and Cost of Capital. 
 
 
93
Table 7 
Firm-specific time-series regressions of contemporaneous excess returns on the Fama –French 3 factors 
 
 
 
HEDGE Earnings_Qlt 
 
 
HEDGE Qlt_Seg 
 
HEDGE Acc_Qlt 
 
Variable Coef. (p-value) 
Coef. 
(p-value) 
Coef. 
(p-value) 
RMRF 0.00043  (0.000) 
0.00017 
(0.000) 
0.00108 
(0.000) 
SMB -0.00032 (0.000) 
-0.00015 
(0.000) 
-0.00011 
(0.000) 
HML 0.00090  (0.000) 
0.00037 
(0.000) 
0.00131 
(0.000) 
cons 
-0.00006 
(0.000) 
-0.00030 
(0.000) 
-0.00052 
(0.000) 
R2 0.4076 0.2588 0.5201 
 
                
The sample consists of 102,024 firm-month observations for the period 2001-2006. RMRF is the excess return on the market portfolio. SMB is the return to 
size factor-mimicking portfolio. HML is the return to book-to-market factor-mimicking portfolio. HEDGE Earnings_Qlt is the portfolio that results on hedge 
earnings quality portfolio, buying 20% of firms providing good earnings quality and selling 20% of firms providing poor earnings quality. HEDGE Qlt_Seg is 
the portfolio that results on hedge segment information quality portfolio, buying 20% of firms providing good segment quality information and selling 20% of 
firms providing poor segment quality information. HEDGE Acc_Qlt is the portfolio that results on hedge accounting information quality portfolio, buying 
firms providing good segment quality information and selling firms providing poor segment quality information. 
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Table 8 
Average factor loadings across 25 portfolios sorted on B/M and Accounting Quality 
 
 
Variable  
 CAPM 
Coef. 
(p-value) 
                                    FF 3 FACTOR MODEL 
                                   Coef. 
                                  (p-value) 
 
 
  
      
 
              
 
SMB       0.8552 (0.000) 
0.8583 
(0.000) 
0.7951 
(0.000) 
0.8532 
(0.000) 
HML       0.0993 (0.064) 
0.0765 
(0.097) 
0.2126 
(0.037) 
0.1225 
(0.098) 
RMRF   1.3811 (0.000) 
1.3811 
(0.000) 
1.2640 
(0.000) 
1.4032 
(0.000) 
1.2127 
(0.000) 
1.2062 
(0.000) 
1.2035 
(0.000) 
1.2318 
(0.000) 
HILOQlt_Seg -0.8118 (0.000) 
-0.6590 
(0.000)  
-0.7269 
(0.031) 
-0.4287 
(0.009)   
-0.4761 
(0.087) 
-0.2098 
(0.067)  
HILOEarnings_Qlt  -0.3894 (0.000)   
-0.0131 
(0.096)    
-0.0683 
(0.120)  
HILOAcc_Qlt      -0.3538 (0.049)    
-0.3764 
(0.058) 
cons 
0.1679 
(0.055) 
0.1786 
(0.036) 
0.1330 
(0.003) 
0.1330 
(0.002) 
0.1362 
(0.003) 
0.1351 
(0.006) 
0.0761 
(0.001) 
0.0763 
(0.005) 
0.0727 
(0.001) 
0.0754 
(0.002) 
R2  0.0055 0.2630 0.7539 0.7579 0.7924 0.7648 0.8903 0.8946 0.9065 0.8958 
GRS test cons = 0 5.71 5.75 13.37 13.70 13.70 13.55 13.02 12.54 12.15 12.66 
p-value GRS test  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
GRS test on all factors = 0 9.36 32.64 54.36 31.41 39.84 32.91 50.81 39.65 42.03 39.86 
p-value GRS test  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
                
The sample consists of 102,024 firm-month observations for the period 2001-2006. We form 25 portfolios sorting stocks into quintiles based on B/M and Acc_Qlt each 
month. RMRF is the excess return on the market portfolio. SMB is the return to size factor-mimicking portfolio. HML is the return to book-to-market factor-mimicking 
portfolio. HILOQlt_Seg factor is the return to the segment quality factor-mimicking portfolio for Qlt_Seg. HILOEarnings_Qlt factor is the return to the earnings quality 
factor-mimicking portfolio for Earnings_Qlt. HILOAcc_Qlt factor is the return to the accounting quality factor-mimicking portfolio for Acc_Qlt.  
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Table 9 
Two-stage regressions, based on realized returns of 25 portfolios sorted on B/M and Accounting Quality 
 
Variable   
CAPM 
Coef. 
(p-value) 
 
                                     FF 3 FACTOR MODEL 
                                     Coef. 
                                     (p-value) 
 
 
  
                      
SMB       -0.1481 (0.006) 
-0.0680 
(0.179) 
-0.1027 
(0.057) 
-0.1517 
(0.003) 
HML       -0.0300 (0.624) 
-0.0938 
(0.065) 
-0.1112 
(0.007) 
-0.0533 
(0.288) 
RMRF   0.2061 (0.028) 
0.1922 
(0.014) 
0.1883 
(0.000) 
0.1316 
(0.203) 
0.2393 
(0.004) 
0.2767 
(0.000) 
0.1552 
(0.138) 
0.1387 
(0.121) 
HILOQlt_Seg -0.0198 (0.000) 
-0.0179 
(0.000)  
-0.0187 
(0.002) 
-0.0186 
(0.003)   
-0.0187 
(0.003) 
-0.0163 
(0.006)  
HILOEarnings_Qlt 
 
 
-0.0127 
(0.074)   
-0.0004 
(0.968)    
-0.0150 
(0.180)  
HILOAcc_Qlt      -0.0091 (0.416)    
-0.0148 
(0.014) 
cons 
1.9404 
(0.000) 
1.8493 
(0.000) 
-0.5824 
(0.577) 
-0.3754 
(0.665) 
-0.0005 
(0.000) 
0.2978 
(0.808) 
0.2603 
(0.772) 
-0.6522 
(0.395) 
1.0148 
(0.464) 
1.5227 
(0.139) 
R2  0.2473 0.3552 0.2004 0.4207 0.5201 0.2231 0.4076 0.5620 0.6065 0.4624 
 
The sample consists of 102,024 firm-month observations for the period 2001-2006. We form 25 portfolios sorting stocks into quintiles based on B/M and Acc_Qlt each 
month. RMRF is the excess return on the market portfolio. SMB is the return to size factor-mimicking portfolio. HML is the return to book-to-market factor-mimicking 
portfolio. HILOQlt_Seg factor is the return to the segment quality factor-mimicking portfolio for Qlt_Seg. HILOEarnings_Qlt factor is the return to the earnings quality 
factor-mimicking portfolio for Earnings_Qlt. HILOAcc_Qlt factor is the return to the accounting quality factor-mimicking portfolio for Acc_Qlt.  
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Chapter 4: The Role of Segment Disclosure in Corporate 
Governance and its Effect on Firm Investment Efficiency 
4.1. INTRODUCTION 
Prior literature finds that better segment disclosure improves the information 
environment of the firm, reducing information asymmetries (Berger and Hann, 2003), and 
facilitating the monitoring over managers decisions. Regarding this monitoring role of 
segment reporting, Berger and Hann (2007) show that managers tend to hide information 
about poorly performing segments, and that firms that withhold information about their 
foreign investments invest more abroad and obtain lower profitability out of these 
investments (Hope and Thomas, 2008). Overall, these findings suggest a link between the 
quality of segment information and firm investment efficiency. We further explore this 
issue by showing (1) that the sensitivity of firms’ investments to the availability of internal 
cash flows is reduced in firms providing better segment disclosure, and (2) that better 
quality segment disclosure contributes to reduce both over and underinvestment problems. 
Our first objective is to test whether firms providing better segment disclosure 
present a lower sensitivity of investments to cash flows. Firms disclosing higher quality 
segment information provide shareholders with more accurate information about their 
business activities, so we expect that investments decisions in these firms will be less 
sensitive to cash holdings. This is mainly because without good quality segment 
information it is more difficult to detect and deter investment decisions that decrease firm 
value (Hope and Thomas, 2008). Therefore, when firms do not reveal precise information, 
as monitoring manager’s investment decisions becomes more difficult, investors will 
demand higher returns as the likelihood of expropriation increases. This leads to a higher 
cost of capital for the firm (Easley and O’Hara, 2004; Hughes, Liu and Liu, 2007; Lambert, 
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Leuz and Verrecchia, 2007, 2008; Garcia Lara, Garcia Osma and Penalva, 2010a). 
Consequently, holding everything else constant, firms providing poor segment disclosure 
are more likely to finance their projects with internally generated cash flows. This is so 
because this financial alternative is cheaper (Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen, 1988; 
Allayannis and Mozumdar, 2004). 
The second objective of the paper is to test whether high quality segment reporting 
mitigates under-investment or over-investment problems. On the one hand, we expect that 
firms providing better segment disclosure quality will be less likely to underinvest. The 
reason is that, as previously explained, firms with stronger corporate governance 
mechanisms and higher accounting quality enjoy a lower cost of capital. This lower cost of 
capital will provide firms with more alternatives to finance externally their projects, as well 
as with a larger span of projects that generate value. The result is a decrease in under-
investment due to firms having less financial constraints. On the other hand, we also expect 
firms providing better segment disclosure quality to be less likely to over-invest. The 
reason is that shareholders of firms providing better segment information will be more able 
to detect and deter those investment decisions that are not in their best interests (Hope and 
Thomas, 2008). The result is that managers will not implement investment projects that 
reduce the value of the firm, leading to fewer situations of overinvestment due to 
deficiencies in the monitoring process.  
Using a sample of non regulated and non financial US firms for the period 2001-
2006, we find that segment disclosure leads to lower cost differences between internal and 
external financing, which in turn leads to lower investment cash flow sensitivity after 
controlling for growth opportunities. This is consistent with quality of segment disclosure 
reducing firm investment inefficiency. Additionally, we provide empirical evidence on 
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firms providing better segment disclosure reducing under- and over-investing problems. 
However, under too tight monitoring, managers might deviate from the optimal investment 
policies (Hermalin and Weisbach, 2009; Bargeron, Lehn and Zutter, 2010), exacerbating 
under-investment and over-investment problems. In this context, high quality segment 
information plays a crucial role to avoid investment inefficiencies under excessive 
monitoring.   
Our study contributes to the recent stream of literature on the effects of higher 
accounting quality and other corporate governance mechanisms on investment inefficiency 
(Biddle and Hilary, 2006; Biddle, Hilary and Verdi, 2009; Beatty, Liao and Weber, 2010), 
and particularly, on how segment reporting quality influences investment decisions (Berger 
and Hann, 2003, 2007; Hope and Thomas, 2008). We find a non-linear relationship 
between corporate governance mechanisms and investment efficiency, consistent with 
recent research pointing at negative economic consequences of excess monitoring 
(Hermalin and Weisbach, 2009; Bargeron et al., 2010). We also show that segment 
disclosure and other corporate governance mechanisms complement each other in 
enhancing firm’s investment efficiency. Our findings suggest that segment reporting leads 
to more investment efficiency. Thus, withholding information about firms’ earnings on 
foreign investments could have undesirable economic consequences.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 4.2 we present the 
theoretical development on the relation between segment disclosure and investment 
efficiency. In Section 4.3 we present the research design, describing the methods we use to 
analyze the relation between segment information and cash flow sensitivity and to study 
how segment reporting impacts the likelihood of under- or over-investing. In this section 
we also describe our proxies for the optimal level of investment and for the quality of 
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segment information. In Section 4.4 we present the results. Finally Section 4.5 summarizes 
and concludes. 
4.2. SEGMENT DISCLOSURE QUALITY AND INVESTMENT EFFICIENCY 
Agency theory predicts that managers have more information about the expected 
profitability and financial condition of the firm. In this context, when managers are not 
monitored by shareholders they can make decisions that maximize their own wealth instead 
of firm’s value (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). The role of financial accounting is to reduce 
these information asymmetries providing details about firms’ profitability and financial 
condition (Healy and Palepu, 2001). Thus, accounting information is expected to be used 
by shareholders as an additional governance tool to monitor managers, dissuading them 
from taking investment decisions that are not in the best shareholders’ interests (Bushman 
and Smith, 2001; Garcia Lara, Garcia Osma and Penalva, 2009). Consistent with this role 
of accounting information, previous literature finds that firms providing better quality 
accounting information show lower investment-cash flow sensitivity (Biddle and Hilary, 
2006; Beatty et al. 2010). Also, the likelihood of firms over or under investing is lower for 
firms providing improved accounting numbers (Biddle, et al., 2009; Garcia Lara, Garcia 
Osma and Penalva, 2010b). In the same vein, previous literature finds that firms providing 
higher levels of disclosure make more efficient investment decisions (Khurana, Pereira and 
Martin, 2006; Hope and Thomas, 2008). 
Regarding the specific role of segment reporting, in a framework where firms are 
increasingly international and increasingly diversified, segment information becomes 
crucial. The valuation of an international or a diversified firm requires information not only 
about overall firm activity, but also about segments of the firm because performance, risk 
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and potential growth of different business or geographical lines vary appreciably (SFAS 
131; Ernst and Young, 2005; Palepu, Healy and Bernard, 2004). Investors and analysts 
need segment information as they require information to help them in predicting firm’s 
future cash flows. Without this disaggregation in segments, predicting future cash flows of 
the firm becomes more difficult (AIMR, 1993). As a response to users requests, regulators 
require segment disclosure with the objective of providing “information about the different 
types of business activities in which a firm engages and the different economic 
environments in which it operates helps users of financial statements to: a. Better 
understand the enterprise’s performance, b. Better assess its prospects for future net cash 
flows and c. Make more informed judgments about the enterprise as a whole.” (SFAS 131, 
paragraph 3).  
A wealth of academic research shows the importance of providing segment 
information to shareholders. Previous literature finds that different segments have different 
investment opportunities, so disaggregating information helps current and potential 
investors to improve their capital allocation decisions (Foster, 1975; Tse, 1989; Wysocki, 
1998; Basu, Kim and Lim, 1999; Chen and Zhang, 2003). Moreover, segment information 
is crucial as it facilitates shareholders as well as debtholders’ monitoring over manager’s 
decisions. Previous literature shows that information asymmetries are greater for firms 
providing no disaggregated information than for firms providing comprehensive segment 
information (Greenstein and Sami, 1994; Hope, Thomas, and Winterbotham, 2009). This 
evidence is consistent with improved segment disclosure facilitating the monitoring of 
managers’ decisions. Regarding this monitoring role of segment disclosure, Berger and 
Hann (2003, 2007) find that firms revealing information about the firm’s diversification 
strategy and their resource transfers across segments are easier to monitor, and that more 
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disaggregated information on earnings profits reduces agency costs. Similarly, Hope and 
Thomas (2008) demonstrate that geographic segment information plays an important role in 
monitoring managers. Under SFAS 131, firms are not required to disclose geographic 
segment earnings, which potentially reduces the ability of shareholders to monitor 
managers’ decisions related to foreign operations. They find that firms providing 
information related to geographic earnings show lower expansion of foreign sales, produce 
higher foreign profit margins, and have higher firm value. Summarizing, this literature 
highlights the important role of segment disclosures in monitoring managers’ decisions. 
Next, we describe in detail the specific channels through which we expect segment 
information to improve investment efficiency. 
4.2.1 Segment information and investment cash flow sensitivity 
In an incomplete information framework, where managers have more precise 
information than shareholders, shareholders will require higher return for providing funds 
as they have to monitor the managers’ investment decisions to avoid that they pursue their 
own interests at the expense of shareholders’ wealth (Hubbard 1998). The Pecking Order 
Theory (Myers, 1984; Myers and Majluf, 1984) affirms that cash flow is an important 
determinant of investment spending due to internal finance having important cost 
advantages over external finance. In imperfect markets, due to information asymmetries 
and imprecise information, some firms cannot finance their investments with external funds 
because their cost is very high. This situation leads managers to finance the projects using 
internally generated cash flows as this financial alternative is cheaper than the use of 
external funds. Nevertheless, as the information provided to shareholders becomes more 
accurate and the information asymmetries decrease, the cost of external funds decreases 
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too, which opens the possibility of issuing new debt or new equity as a financing 
alternative. In this situation, firms are less financially constrained and their investment 
decisions are not so sensitive to the internal generation of cash flows. This rationale is 
supported by empirical literature like Fazzari et al. (1988) and Allayannis and Mozumdar 
(2004) among others, who find that the capital investment of financially constrained firms 
is more sensitive to their internally generated cash flows than in those firms which are less 
financially constrained.  
Following this stream of literature, Biddle and Hilary (2006) and Beatty et al. 
(2010) explore whether investment by firms providing better quality accounting is less 
sensitivity to firms’ cash flows. Given that segment information disaggregates the whole 
activity of the firm providing details of different business or geographical lines in which the 
firm is involved, this type of information is crucial for investors and analysts (Foster, 1975; 
Tse, 1989; Wysocki, 1998; Basu, Kim and Lim, 1999). This is so as it contributes to 
increase the value relevance of accounting numbers (Chen and Zhang, 2003), to reduce 
information asymmetries (Greenstein and Sami, 1994), and agency costs (Berger and Hann, 
2003, 2007; Hope and Thomas, 2008). Given this reduction in information asymmetries 
and agency costs, through higher good quality segment disclosure is expected to facilitate 
the estimation of firms’ future cash flows by investors. As a result, firms providing better 
segment disclosure are rewarded with a lower cost of capital (See Chapter 3). This 
reduction in the cost of capital is expected to reduce financing constraints, with which firms 
will rely to a lower extent on internally generated cash flows to finance their investments. 
This leads to the following hypothesis:  
Hypothesis 1: Firms providing higher quality segment information are expected to 
have lower investment cash flow sensitivity.  
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4.2.2 Segment information and suboptimal investment decisions 
The first hypothesis deals with the role of segment information quality in reducing 
the sensitivity of investments to cash flows, which may reduce distortions in investment 
decisions. We further develop whether higher quality segment information mitigates under 
or over-investment problems.  
An investment is efficient and should be implemented if its NPV is positive, 
otherwise it should be rejected (Ross, Westerfield and Jaffe, 2002; Brealey and Myers, 
2003). However, managers are likely to deviate from investment efficiency for several 
reasons. On the one hand, because the cost of external financing is high and consequently 
most projects become unviable. On the other hand, because opportunistic managers pursue 
their own private benefits at the expense of shareholders’ wealth (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976). Opportunistic investment decisions include empire building investments, investment 
in ‘pet’ projects or ‘trophy’ acquisitions. 
Segment information is predicted to increase firm investment efficiency through 
two main channels: (i) firms providing better segment information are rewarded with lower 
cost of capital (as we demonstrate in Chapter 3) so managers can raise funds externally 
through debt or equity at a lower cost (reducing under-investment), and with that are 
subject to external (market or bank) monitoring (reducing over-investment), (ii) managers 
who provide more segment information permit better monitoring of investment decisions 
by shareholders (Berger and Hann, 2003, 2007; Hope and Thomas, 2008). Improved 
monitoring leads in turn to penalties to managers in case they engage in inefficient 
investment, leading to reduced over-investment. Next, we explain these two channels in 
more detail. 
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4.2.2.1 Segment information and underinvestment 
The provision of accurate information is the key element for predicting and 
estimating firm’s risk, which leads to better capital allocation by investors (Lambert et al. 
2007, 2008). As we discussed previously, prior literature shows that segment reporting 
provides useful information to investors, as it helps them in predicting firms’ future cash 
flows more accurately, reducing information asymmetries and agency costs, and 
contributing to reduce cost of capital (See Chapter 3). If a firm has a lower cost of 
financing, more projects become viable. Thus, we expect that higher quality segment 
information, as it facilitates the access to external funds at lower cost, will reduce under-
investment problems.  
Hypothesis 2: The provision of good quality segment information decreases 
underinvestment problems.  
4.2.2.2 Segment information and overinvestment 
Previous literature stresses the important monitoring role of segment reporting. 
Given that segment reporting reduces information asymmetries between managers and 
other parties with an interest in the firm (Greenstein and Sami, 1994), these other parties 
are expected to be better prepared to monitor managerial decisions. Berger and Hann (2003, 
2007) and Hope and Thomas (2008) provide additional evidence of this monitoring role of 
segment reporting. Consequently, we expect improved segment reporting to permit better 
monitoring over managers investment decisions. Given that investors/directors might take 
actions against managers that deviate from optimal investments, the provision of segment 
reporting is expected to dissuade managers from implementing value reducing strategies, 
i.e., empire building, investment in ‘pet’ projects or ‘trophy’ acquisitions, reducing over-
investment problems.  
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Hypothesis 3: The provision of good quality segment information decreases 
overinvestment problems.  
4.3. RESEARCH DESIGN  
4.3.1 Segment information and investment cash flow sensitivity 
To test Hypothesis 1, we estimate a variation of the model of investment cash flow 
sensitivity proposed by Fazzari et al. (1988) and Hoshi, Kashyap and Scharfstein (1991), 
among others, where we also incorporate a measure of segment reporting quality. The 
model is as follows: 
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where Invi,t is  the sum of research and development expenditures (Compustat item 
46), capital expenditures (item 128) and acquisition expenditures (item 129), less cash 
receipts from sales of property, plant and equipment (item 107), multiplied by 100 and 
scaled by lagged total assets (item 6), for firm i in year t. TAi,t-1 is the total assets for firm i 
in year t-1. MTBi,t is the market to book ratio of assets for firm i in year t.1 CFi,t represents 
cash flows of firm i in year t as measured by the sum of income before extraordinary items 
and depreciation and amortization expense.2 Qlt_Seg_Dummyi,t is a dummy variable that 
takes value one if the firm provides good segment reporting and zero otherwise (This 
variable will be defined in detail in Section 4.3.3.2). In their seminal paper, Fazzari et al. 
(1988) find that firms facing high financial constraints, that is, a large difference between 
internal and external financing, have higher investment cash flow sensitivity after 
                                                
1
 Defined as total assets in year t – book value of equity in year t – deferred taxes in year t + market value of equity in year t (i.e., number 
of shares outstanding multiplied by market price at year t) / total assets in year t-1. 
2
 In additional tests, we also use cash flow from operations taken directly from the cash flow statement (Compustat item 308). 
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controlling for their growth opportunities. With this model, they intend to capture how 
firms finance their investments. We expect β1 to be positive indicating firms financing 
investment with cash flows. β2 is expected to be positive, indicating that firms with higher 
growth opportunities invest more. MTB is included to control for the effect of growth 
opportunities in financial constraints. Our first hypothesis is that higher segment 
information quality reduces investment cash flow sensitivity, therefore, we expect 
coefficient β4 to be negative indicating that higher segment information quality reduces 
investment cash flow sensitivity. We exclude negative cash flow observations since when 
this happens, firms’ investment cannot respond to cash flow (Allayannis and Mozumdar, 
2004).  
4.3.2 Segment information and investment efficiency 
To explore whether a firm is deviating from optimal levels of investment we regress 
a fixed effect model of quantity of Investment (Inv) on the main determinants of levels of 
investment and controls. The model is as follows: 
Invj,t+1 = α + β1 Invj,t +β2 LogAssetsj,t + β3 LogAssets2j,t + β4 Tangj,t + 
 + β5 Dividend j,t + β6 Coven j,t + β7  Zscorej,t +β8 OperCyclej,t +                       
+ β9 MTBj,t + β10 Slackj,t  + β11 Leveragej,t + β12  CFOsalej,t +               (2)      
+ β13Agej,t + β14Profitabilityj,t + β15 DevInvj,t + β16 DevSalesj,t+                     
+ β17 DevCFOj,t+ β18 SD j,t +β19 Betaj,t +                                                       
+Σ
 k βk Control year j,t +εj,t    
Hypotheses 2 and 3 predict that firms providing better quality segment information 
are less likely to under/over invest. To test this hypothesis, we take the residuals of model 
(2) as our proxy for deviations from optimal levels of investment. In this model we control 
for innate determinants of investment levels. Following Biddle et al. (2009), we control for 
firm size, tangibility, dividend pay out ratio, bankruptcy risk, operating cycle, MTB, 
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financial slack, capital structure, CFO to sale, age, volatility of investment levels, volatility 
of sales and volatility of cash flow from operations (CFO). We also include controls for 
lagged investment, covenants to investment, profitability, idiosyncratic risk and beta of the 
firm. We include these controls because lagged investment could be view as a benchmark 
of the level of current investment levels (Fiegenbaum, Hart and Schendel, 1996). In the 
same way, we include covenants to investment as firms with this type of covenants are 
expected to invest less (Nash, Netter and Poulsen, 2003). We also include size squared, 
since investment decisions are also driven by life cycle of the firm. Younger firms (smaller 
firms) need to invest more than older firms (bigger firms) (Mueller, 1972; Audretsch and 
Elston, 2002) so we expect a U-shape relation between investment levels and size. We 
include profitability as previous literature finds that investment level is related to firm’s 
profitability (Huang, Ou, Chen and Lin, 2006). Finally, we include proxies of risk, given 
that risk is also affecting investment decisions (i.e., Froot, Scharfstein and Stein, 1993).  
We define firm size (LogAssets) as the log of total assets. Tangibility (Tang) is the 
ratio of property, plant and equipment to total assets. Dividend payout ratio (Dividend) is a 
dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm paid a dividend; 0 otherwise. Covenant 
to investment (Coven) is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm must use the 
free cash flow to pay loans and 0 otherwise. Z-Score is the measure of bankruptcy risk 
defined in Biddle and Hilary (2006) and calculated with the following Compustat data 
items: Z-Score = [3.3*item170 + item12 + 0.25*item36 + 0.5*(item4 – item5)] / item6. 
Length of the operating cycle (OperCycle) is the log of receivables to sales plus inventory 
to COGS multiplied by 360. MTB is the market to book ratio of assets for firm i in year t.  
Financial slack (Slack) is the ratio of cash to property, plant and equipment. Leverage 
(Leverage) is ratio of total debt to total assets. CFO to sale (CFOsale) is measured as the 
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ratio of CFO to sale. Age is measured as the difference between the first year when firm 
appears in CRSP and the current year. Profitability is measured as percentile rank of return 
on assets. Volatility of investment (DevInv) is the firm-specific standard deviation of 
investment levels measured in the five-year period ending in the current fiscal year. 
Volatility of sales (DevSales) is the firm-specific standard deviation of sales measured in 
the five-year period ending in the current fiscal year. Volatility of cash flow from 
operations (DevCFO) is the firm-specific standard deviation of the cash flow from 
operations measured in the five-year period ending in the current fiscal year. Standard 
deviation of returns (SD) is measured as the standard deviation of one year of monthly 
stock returns the returns of the year. Beta (Beta) is the coefficient from firm-specific 
CAPM regressions using the 60 months preceding fiscal year t and a value weighted 
NYSE/AMEX/Nasdaq market index return.  
4.3.2.1 Segment information and deviations from optimal investment levels  
We model the probability of firms deviating from their optimal level of investment, 
conditional on their level of quality of segment information and on other corporate 
governance mechanisms. We control for corporate governance because corporate 
governance mechanisms are associated with investment efficiency (Biddle et al., 2009), and 
also to discard the possibility that segment information quality and our measure of 
corporate governance quality capture the same governance attributes.  Regarding the 
relation between governance and investment efficiency, previous literature shows 
conflicting results. While Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003), Chang, Dasgupta and Hilary 
(2006) and Ferreira and Matos (2008) show that good corporate governance mechanisms 
help to mitigate over- and under-investment problem, others like Zajac and Westphal 
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(1994), Hermalin and Weisbach (2009) and Bargeron et al. (2010) find strong corporate 
governance mechanisms lead to inefficient risk-taking decisions. These conflicting results 
could be mainly attributable to the existence of a non-linear relationship between corporate 
governance mechanisms and investment efficiency. When shareholders are monitoring 
managers’ decisions, managers feel that they cannot risk investing in inefficient projects 
because they put their positions at risk as shareholders are aware of their actions (i.e., Tosi, 
Katz and Gomez-Mejia, 1997). However, when managers feel that shareholders exert 
excess monitoring, managers are likely to react taking actions that shield them from any 
reaction from shareholders that might affect their personal interests negatively (Ashforth 
and Lee, 1990). Under this intensive pressure from shareholders, managers could behave 
taking too risky or too conservative investment decisions, in an attempt to ensure their 
position in the firm (managerial entrenchment). This behavior could turn in over- or under- 
investment problems. On the one hand, managers undertake low-risk projects, which do not 
compromise their position in the firm, as they can allege that they are taking decisions 
aligned with shareholders' interests (Zajac and Westphal, 1994; McAllister, 1995; Hermalin 
and Weisbach, 2009; Bargeron et al., 2010). However, these conservative decisions are 
likely to hinder future profitability. On the other hand, excessive monitoring encourages 
managers to engage in aggressive investment behavior aimed at generating short-term 
profits that might satisfy myopic shareholders, and that might come at the expense of 
reducing firm’s long-term value generation (Bushee, 1998, 2001). 
We take the residuals from model (2) as our proxy for deviations from optimal 
levels of investment. Following the methodology in Biddle et al. (2009) we use these 
residuals to form groups to test hypotheses 2 and 3. We form groups clustering the residuals 
from this model into three groups. Firms in the cluster with more negative residuals are 
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classified as under investing, whilst firms in the cluster with more positive residuals are 
classified as over investing. We use firms in the remaining cluster as the benchmark group, 
given that their investment level is closer to the prediction. We assign values to those 
groups: 1 if the firm is classified as over investing; 2 if the firm is in the benchmark group; 
and 3 if it is classified as under investing. Then we estimate a multinomial logit model that 
predicts the likelihood that a firm will be on the extreme clusters instead of being on the 
benchmark cluster. That is, the likelihood that a firm will not invest in an optimal way. The 
model is as follows: 
Prob(Investmentt=j) = β0 CorpGovi,t + β1 CorpGov2i,t +          
+β2 Dummy_Qlt_Segi,t +β3 Dummy_Qlt_Segi,t* CorpGovi,t +              (3) 
+β4 Dummy_Qlt_Segi,t* CorpGov2i,t + εi,t 
 
where j takes the value of 1, 2 or 3 depending on the group that the firm belongs to. 
CorpGov is our measure of corporate governance quality (this variable will be defined in 
detail in section 4.3.4). If corporate governance mechanisms dissuade firms from over and 
under investing, β0 is expected to be negative both for over investment and under 
investment situations, indicating that firms with better corporate governance mechanisms 
are less likely to be in the groups of over or under investing. That is, firms with better 
corporate governance mechanisms are less likely to deviate from the predicted investment 
levels. However, if the monitoring over managers is excessive, managers can deviate from 
the predicted investment as he/she will be more interested in protecting him/herself than in 
shareholders’ wealth. If this is the case, β1 would be positive both for the over investment 
and for under investment situations. Dummy_Qlt_Seg is a dummy variable that takes value 
1 if the firm provides good segment quality, and zero otherwise (we define in detail our 
proxy for segment reporting quality in the following section). Consistent with hypotheses 2 
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and 3, we expect segment information quality to reduce the likelihood of the firm under- or 
over-investing. As a consequence, β2 is expected to be negative both for the under-
investment and for the over-investment situations. When segment reporting quality 
interacts with other corporate governance mechanisms to monitor managers’ decisions, we 
could expect this will lead to a reduction in the likelihood of managers deviating from 
optimal investment levels. This is so because shareholders are endowed with good 
mechanisms to detect and deter those managerial investment decisions that do not increase 
the value of the firm. In this case β3 is expected to be negative both for the under-
investment and for the over-investment situations. However, under strict governance 
provisions, the provisions of improved disclosure might be seen by managers as excess 
monitoring. In this case, managers can behave taking too risky or too conservative 
investment decisions, in an attempt to ensure their position in the firm. In this case β3 is 
expected to be positive both for the under-investment and for the over-investment 
situations. Finally, if corporate governance provisions, per se, are considered by managers 
to be leading to excess monitoring, we expect segment information to be useful to reduce 
the likelihood of managers deviating from the optimal levels of investment. This is so 
because managers providing detailed information about their business activities have less 
incentives to deviate from optimal levels of investments given that any deviations from the 
optimal will be easy to detect. As a consequence, we expect β4 to be negative both for the 
over investment and for under investment situations.  
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4.3.3 Measuring segment information quantity and quality 
4.3.3.1 Creation of an index of segment information quantity (Qtt_Seg) 
We proxy the quantity of segment information using the index developed in Chapter 
2. We create this index (Qtt_Seg), analyzing disclosures on both business and geographic 
segments. In a first step, we classify segments into mandatory and voluntary reported 
segments. Then, for each mandatory segment, we identify which items are compulsory and 
which are voluntary under SFAS 131. We create the business segment score by adding 1 
point for every voluntary disclosed item in every mandatory business segment, and by 
adding 1 point for every item disclosed in every voluntary business segment. In a second 
step, we do the same for every reported geographic segment in each firm. Finally, we create 
the overall index of quantity of voluntary segment disclosure (Qtt_Seg) by adding the 
business and geographic segment scores. 
4.3.3.2 Creation of an index of segment information quality (Qlt_Seg) 
To create the index of quality of segment information, we replicate our tests in 
Chapter 3. We regress a fixed effect model of quantity of segment information (Qtt_Seg) on 
earnings quality, the main determinants of segment disclosures (business and geographic 
diversification and information asymmetries) and controls. The model is as follows: 
Qtt _Segj,t = α + β1 Earnings Qualityj,t +β2 Business Diversificationj,t +  
 + β3 Geographic Diversificationj,t  + β4 Information Asymmetriesj,t-1 + 
 + β5 Sizej,t + β6 Growthj,t + β7  Leveragej,t +β8 Audit Firmj,t +              (4) 
 + β9 Listing Statusj,t + β10 Proprietary Costsj,t  + 
 + β11 New Financingj,t + β12  Profitabilityj,t + β13Agej,t + 
+Σ
 k βk Control year j,t +εj,t    
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When firms provide more (less) information than predicted by the model, we expect they 
will contribute to improve (reduce) investors’ ability to estimate their cash flows because 
they provide more (less) accurate information.  
To estimate earnings quality, we use the modified Jones model as defined by 
Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney (1995): 
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where: TAj,t3 is firm j’s total accruals in year t; Assetsj,t is firm’s j total assets 
(Compustat #6) at the beginning of year t; ∆REVj,t is firm’s j change in revenues 
(Compustat #12) between year t-1 and t; PPEj,t is firm’s j gross property, plant and 
equipment (Compustat #7) in year t.  
We estimate Equation (5) using data annually for each 2-digit SIC industry groups. 
Next, for each firm j, we calculate its discretionary accruals as: 
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(6)        
where: γβα ˆ,ˆ,ˆ  = the fitted coefficients in model (5) and ∆ARj,t is the change in 
account receivables for firm j (Compustat #2) in year t. We use the absolute values of DA, 
multiplied by minus one, as our main proxy for earnings quality (Earnings_Qlt). Large 
values of (Earnings_Qlt) correspond to good accrual quality, that is, to less discretionary 
accruals. 
Business diversification is a score in which we assign 1 point for every different 2-
digit SIC code assigned by Compustat to the firm as forming part of its primary or 
                                                
3
 Measured as ∆CAj,t – ∆CLj,t – ∆Cashj,t + ∆STDEBTj,t – ∆DEPNj,t;  ∆CAj,t is firm j’s change in current assets (Compustat #4) between year 
t-1 and year t; ∆CLj,t  is firm j’s change in current liabilities (Compustat #5) between year t-1 and year t; ∆Cashj,t is firm j’s change in cash 
(Compustat #1) between year t-1 and year t; ∆STDEBTj,t is firm j’s change in debt in current liabilities (Compustat #34) between year t-1 
and year t; ∆DEPNj,t firm j’s depreciation and amortization expense (Compustat #14) in year t.  
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secondary activities. Geographic diversification is the number of different countries where 
the firm has subsidiaries.4 Information asymmetries is measured by the bid-ask spread. We 
measure firm size as the natural logarithm of firm’s market value, measured at the 
beginning of the fiscal year. We also include firm’s growth, measured as the logarithm of 
the firm’s book to market ratio at the beginning of the fiscal year. We measure leverage as 
the ratio of total debt to total assets. Auditor is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the 
auditor is a Big Four firm, and 0 otherwise. Listing Status is a dummy variable taking the 
value of 1 if the firm is listed in the NYSE or in NASDAQ, and 0 otherwise. The 
Herfindahl index of the industry concentration is a proxy for proprietary costs. New 
financing is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the firm raised new capital funds or 
increased debt this year, and 0 otherwise. We include ROA as a control variable for firm-
specific factors that influence segment disclosure policy, and finally, age is measured as the 
difference between the first year when firm appears in CRSP and the current year. 
4.3.4 Creation of an index of corporate governance quality 
We develop a corporate governance index including both, external and internal 
governance attributes (Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2001; Davila and Penalva, 2006; Garcia 
Lara et al., 2009). Our index (CorpGov) covers eight different attributes of governance that 
previous literature identifies as useful for shareholders to monitor managers’ decisions, and 
that are expected to contribute to reduce agency costs. For each of these eight attributes, we 
assign the firm a score of 1(0) if the firm presents strong (weak) governance with respect to 
the attribute. We create the overall index on corporate governance (CorpGov) by adding the 
                                                
4
 We use subsidiaries information from Osiris. We take into account subsidiaries with a minimum of 25,01% of control by the company 
under analysis. 
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8 scores. Consequently, CorpGov ranges from 0 to 8, and it is increasing in the quality of 
governance. Next, we describe the 8 attributes of governance that we consider. 
4.3.4.1 External governance  
Anti-takeover provisions: We take the antitakeover protection index developed by 
Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003). They develop an index by adding one point for every 
provision that decrease takeover vulnerability. Higher values of the index correspond to 
higher anti-takeover provisions. Previous literature documents that takeovers are beneficial 
for shareholders (Cremers and Nair, 2005), so low anti-takeover provisions are associated 
with better corporate governance. We create a dummy variable (InvG_INDEX), which takes 
value of 1 if firm has low anti-takeover provision (if the inverse of Gompers et al. (2003) 
index is above the median) and zero otherwise.  
Auditor: Previous literature finds that being audited by a large auditing firm is 
associated with higher accounting quality, since these audit firms are more able to detect 
accounting irregularities (i.e., Becker, DeFond, Jiambalvo and Subramanyam, 1998). Given 
this, we see being audited by a large auditing firm as a good corporate governance 
provision per se. We create a dummy variable (Auditor), which takes value of 1 if the firm 
is audited by a Big-4 auditor and zero otherwise. 
Analysts following: Previous literature documents that financial analysts monitor 
firm and managerial performance (Bushman, Chen, Engel and Smith, 2004). Given this, 
greater analysts’ coverage is expected to be associated with corporate governance quality. 
We create a dummy variable (Analysts), which takes value of 1 if the firm has high 
analysts’ coverage (if the number of analysts is above the median) and zero otherwise.  
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4.3.4.2 Internal governance  
Ownership concentration: Previous literature finds ownership concentration is a 
crucial corporate governance mechanism (Sheiffer and Vishny, 1997). We create a 
Herfindahl-type index as the sum of the squared holding proportion of shareholders holding 
more than 5% of shares of the firm. Higher values correspond to higher concentration. If 
ownership is more concentrated, we assume it is easier to monitor managers’ decisions. We 
create a dummy variable (OC), which takes value of 1 if ownership is concentrated (values 
above the median of the index) and zero otherwise.  
Board independence: Prior research shows that the board of directors is more 
effective when it is more independent from the CEO (Hermalin and Weisbach, 1998, 2003). 
We create a dummy variable (Board_Ind), which takes value of 1 if the % of executive 
directors on the board is below the median, and zero otherwise. 
Number of Board meetings: Adams (2000), among others, suggests that higher 
numbers of board meetings is a good proxy for directors’ monitoring effort. We create a 
dummy variable (Meetings), which takes value of 1 if the number of meetings is above the 
median and zero otherwise. 
Non-duality of CEO: We include an indicator on whether the CEO and chairman in 
a firm is not the same person, since the CEO will have less influence on governance when 
he/she is not also the chairman. We expect non-duality will be related to higher corporate 
governance quality. We create a variable (Non_dual), which takes value of 1 if the CEO is 
not the chair of the board and zero otherwise. 
CEO tenure: We include also an indicator of the number of years that the CEO has 
been in office, since previous literature shows that at the beginning of their tenure CEOs 
interests are more aligned with those of shareholders (Morck, Shleifer and Vishny, 1988; 
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Hill and Phan, 1991; Allgood and Farrell, 2000). It is also documented that higher CEO 
tenure is associated with a reduced number of board meetings and with a higher proportion 
of inside directors on the board (Hermalin and Weisbach, 1998; Hermalin, 2005). We 
create a dummy variable (InvCEOten), which takes value of 1 if CEO tenure is below the 
median and zero otherwise.  
4.3.4.3 Endogeneity of corporate governance  
We use an instrumental variable of corporate governance to consider the 
endogenous nature of governance. To create this instrumental variable, we take the 
prediction values from a negative binomial model of governance choice of 
DummyCorpGov (1 corresponds to strong values of corporate governance, that is, values of 
CorpGov above the industry-year median) on the main determinants of corporate 
governance taken from previous literature. In addition, with this model we can also assess 
the validity of CorpGov as a measure corporate governance quality. The model is as 
follows: 
Probability (DummyCorpGovt=1) =  β0 Sizej,t + β1Growthj,t + β2  Agej,t +               
+β3 FCFj,t  + β4 SDj,t + β5 Leveragej,t  + β6 Business Diversificationj,t +       (7) 
+ β7 Geographic Diversificationj,t +β8  Profitabilityj,t +                                   
+ Σ
 k βk Control year j,t +εj,t  
 
Previous literature documents that larger firms are more complex and demand 
stronger governance structures (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; Garcia Lara et al., 2009). We 
measure Size as the natural logarithm of market value of equity. In this context we also 
include Business and Geographic diversification, as the firm’s complexity increases as 
diversification increases (Bushman et al., 2004). As in model (4) we measure Business 
Diversification with a score in which we assign 1 point for every different 2-digit SIC code 
assigned by Compustat to the firm as forming part of its primary or secondary activities. 
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Geographic Diversification is the number of different countries where the firm has 
subsidiaries. Also growth opportunities explain differences across corporate governance 
structures, so we include growth opportunities as the natural logarithm of book-to-market 
value. Previous literature also shows that age is related with the governance structure of the 
firm. We measure it as the difference between the first year when the firm appears in CRSP 
and the current year. In the absence of appropriate incentives or sufficient monitoring to 
align managers’ interests with those of shareholders, managers can use their discretion to 
expropriate firm cash flows from shareholders by implementing value reducing strategies, 
i.e., empire building, investment in ‘pet’ projects or ‘trophy’ acquisitions, as these projects 
are used as entrenchment mechanisms or to maximize their own wealth (Jensen and 
Meckling; 1976). Higher Free Cash Flow (FCF) is expected be associated with stronger 
corporate governance structures. We measure it as the ratio of operating cash flow minus 
preferred and common dividends to total assets if the book-to-market ratio is greater or 
equal to one, and zero otherwise. Higher noise in the firm’s operating environment will 
increase the demand on the corporate governance structure as it is more costly to monitor 
managers’ decisions (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985). We include the standard deviation of one 
year of monthly stock returns as our measure of noise. Highly leveraged firms are less 
likely to be the object of a takeover, so in these firms, anti-takeover mechanisms are less 
effective (Cremers and Nair, 2005; Garcia Lara et al., 2009). We include the ratio of total 
debt to total assets as a proxy of firm’s leverage. Finally, it is well documented in previous 
literature (Hermalin and Weisbach, 1988; Murphy and Zimmerman, 1993) the association 
of past firm performance and corporate governance. We measure it as the mean of returns 
over the 36 previous months.  
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We use model (7) to calculate predicted values of DummyCorpGov that are then 
used as an instrumental variable in model (3). 
4.3.5 Capital expenditure and non-capital expenditure investment measures 
Similar to Biddle et al. (2009), we divide investments into Capital expenditures 
(Capex) and Non-capital expenditures (NonCapex). We measure Capex as the capital 
expenditures, scaled by lagged property, plant and equipment. We measure NonCapex as 
the sum of R&D expenditures and acquisitions, scaled by lagged total assets. We re-
estimate our models from (1) to (3) using these two alternative (more restrictive) measures 
of investment. We expect similar results using these disaggregated measures. 
4.3.6 Sample selection  
We extract a sample of non financial and non regulated firms from the Compustat 
annual files, for the period 2001 to 2006, with the necessary data to calculate the earnings 
quality measures and all variables needed for our disclosure tests. The number of 
subsidiaries and ownership data are extracted from BvD Osiris.5 Market data are extracted 
from CRSP and covenants data from DealScan. Number of analysts covering the firm is 
extracted from I/B/E/S. The anti-takeover provisions index is extracted from Andrew 
Metrick’s webpage.6 Board characteristics data are extracted from ExecuComp. We 
exclude firms having negative cash flow observations. These data requirements yield 5,172 
firm-year observations with data on all variables. We exclude observations with missing 
                                                
5
 We assume the number of subsidiaries does not change if the data is not available for one year. (i.e., if a firm has no data for 2004, we 
assume that the number of subsidiaries is equal to that of 2005)  Results are robust to the use of a smaller sample in which we drop firms 
with no available data on the number of subsidiaries in all the years of the sample. 
6
 http://finance.wharton.upenn.edu/~metrick/governance.xls 
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data from any of the variables needed. To mitigate the undesirable effect of outliers, we 
delete the top and bottom percentile of the distributions of all variables.  
[Insert Table 1 about Here] 
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the variables described above. The mean 
(median) Inv across all firm-years equals 14.90 % (13.36%) of prior years’ assets. 
Regarding Capex and NonCapex, they represent 24.15% (18.37%) and 10.33% (8.32%) 
respectively. The mean (median) value for Dummy_Qlt_Seg in the sample is 0.57 (1), 
indicating more firms providing better segment information quality. The mean (median) 
value of our corporate governance index (CorpGov) is 3.85 (4), indicating that, in mean, 
shareholders use half of the mechanisms used to create the index to monitor managers’ 
decisions. Control variables are also consistent with prior research. In Table 2 we present 
pairwise correlations among main variables, and they behave as expected according to 
previous literature.  In Table 3 we show the results of an industry fixed effect regression of 
Qtt_Seg. In the first column, we only include the controls. We find that the quantity of 
segment disclosure (Qtt_Seg) increases with firm size, the book to market ratio, leverage, 
being audited by a big-four firm, being listed in NYSE or NASDAQ, issuing new financing 
and age, and decreases with profitability and proprietary costs. All of the firm controls are 
significantly associated with quantity of segment information at conventional levels. These 
results corroborate that the index of voluntary segment information (Qtt_Seg) is a valid 
measure of disclosure. In the second column we also include determinants of disclosure 
drawn from prior literature. As expected, firms providing better quality earnings,7 operating 
                                                
7
 The results are robust to the use of other measures of earnings quality, based on the residuals of the Jones (1991), Dechow and Dichev 
(2002) and McNichols (2002) models. We also use earnings quality measures based on the standard deviation of the residuals of these 
models, calculated at the firm level using rolling five year windows, as in Francis et al. (2004). 
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in a higher number of industry sectors and countries, and subject to higher information 
asymmetries, provide more segment information. 
[Insert Table 2 about Here] 
[Insert Table 3 about Here] 
4.4. RESULTS  
4.4.1 Segment information and investment cash flow sensitivity 
[Insert Table 4 about Here] 
In Table 4 we show the results of a firm-year fixed effect regression of different 
measures of investment, on CF, MTB, Dummy_Qlt_Seg and the interaction term between 
CF and Dummy_Qlt_Seg. In this table we present the results on whether firms providing 
higher segment information quality reduce investment cash flow sensitivity. As expected, 
we find β1 is positive indicating firms financing investment with cash flows (β1 =0.0048, p-
value = 0.007), and we also find β2 is positive (β2 =0.93, p-value=0.000), indicating that 
firms with higher growth opportunities invest more.  
In this table we show the results using Inv, Capex and NonCapex as proxies for 
investment quantity in the first, second and third column respectively. The regression 
results show that the coefficient on cash flow is statistically different (and robust to the use 
of different measures of cash flows) between firms providing high quality segment 
information and firms providing low quality segment information, as the coefficient on 
(CFi,t/TAi,t-1)* Dummy_Qlt_Segi,t is negative and statistically significant, (β3 =-0.0094, p-
value=0.000). This suggests that firms providing higher segment information quality have 
lower investment-cash flow sensitivity, supporting our Hypothesis 1. 
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Following Beatty et al. (2010), we perform the same analysis using the following 
industry-year fixed effect regression of different measures of investment:  
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Untabulated results show that even when firms face contractual restrictions on 
investments, firms providing higher segment information quality have lower investment-
cash flow sensitivity, providing strong evidence in favor of the previous findings. As Beatty 
et al. (2010), we find that when firms have covenants to investment earnings quality does 
not affect the sensitivity of investments to internally generated cash flows. 
4.4.2 The role of segment information in corporate governance and deviations from 
optimal investment  
[Insert Table 5 about Here] 
In Table 5 we show the results of a regression of investment proxies on its 
determinants. We take the residuals of these regressions as proxies for deviations from 
optimal levels of investment. Previous levels of investment appear as an important 
benchmark explaining the levels of investment. Size shows a U-shape relation with 
investment levels, confirming that smaller firms need to invest more than bigger firms. Our 
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results also show that covenants to investment, as expected, reduce levels of investment. In 
our sample, more profitable firms invest more in capital expenditures, but not in non-capital 
investments. Riskier firms allocate fewer funds to investments.  
[Insert Table 6 about Here] 
Using the residuals from the regressions presented in Table 5 as proxies for 
deviations from optimal levels of investment, we group firms into three median clusters 
according to the Euclidean distance.8 Firms in the cluster with more negative residuals are 
classified as under investing, whilst firms in the cluster with more positive residuals are 
classified as over investing. In Table 6 Panel A we present results on the likelihood of 
under-investing (cluster with more negative residuals) with respect to a benchmark group of 
firms (the firms in the intermediate cluster). In the first column of the table we show the 
results of the likelihood of under-investing when we include only segment information 
quality as independent variable. As expected, better segment information reduces the 
likelihood of under-investing (significantly negative coefficient on Dummy_Qlt_Seg). In 
the second column, we test whether corporate governance helps in reducing investment 
inefficiencies, and we find that they reduce such inefficiencies up to a certain threshold (the 
coefficient on CorpGov is significantly negative). However, beyond that threshold 
(CorpGov above 4.67 (calculated from estimates of Equation (3) for Investment proxy), 
corporate governance stimulates underinvestment (significantly positive coefficient on the 
square of CorpGov). These results indicate that managers respond to excess monitoring 
taking inefficient investment decisions (underinvestment) aimed at securing their position 
in the firm, rather than at maximizing shareholders’ wealth. In columns 4, 5 and 6, we 
                                                
8
 The results are robust to the use of other criteria to divide the sample (i.e.: clustering residuals from the regressions presented in Table 5 
using different measures of distance (i.e., Squared Euclidean distance and Chebychev distance) and criteria (i.e., mean)). Results are also 
robust to form groups dividing residuals into three groups sorting residuals into quartiles and quintiles, as in previous literature (Biddle et 
al., 2009, Garcia Lara et al., 2010b). 
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include segment information quality interacted with corporate governance to test whether 
segment information quality ameliorates the problems caused by corporate governance 
mechanisms that lead to excess monitoring. We find a positive coefficient for the linear 
interaction (Coeff.=0.87, p-value=0.000) and a negative one for the quadratic interaction 
(Coeff.=-0.10, p-value=0.000). As we predicted, managers feel that they are under intensive 
pressure from shareholders, so they behave taking too conservative investment decisions, in 
an attempt to ensure their position in the firm. However, when corporate governance is too 
strong, segment disclosure quality prevents managers’ negative reaction leading to 
underinvestment. In Table 6 Panel B we present results on the likelihood of over-investing 
(cluster with more positive residuals) with respect to a benchmark group of firms (the firms 
in the intermediate cluster). The findings are similar to those presented in Panel A. We find 
that higher segment disclosure quality reduce the likelihood of over-investing, and that 
firms with better corporate governance mechanisms are less likely to belong to the groups 
of over investing. We also see that under excessive monitoring (CorpGov above 4.56), 
managers have more incentives to deviate from optimal levels of investment to protect their 
job status (Coeff. on CorpGov2=0.24, p-value=0.000). As before, we find that segment 
information quality ameliorates the problems caused by corporate governance mechanisms 
in exacerbating investment inefficiencies (the coefficient on the interaction between 
squared governance and segment reporting quality is significantly negative). Overall, the 
results show that, both, corporate governance mechanisms to monitor manages’ decisions 
and higher quality segment information quality reduce investment inefficiencies (over-
investment and under-investment) individually. We also show that better segment reporting 
contributes to reduce inefficiencies in the investment process driven by excess monitoring 
over the managerial team.  
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In order to provide robust results, we tackle the potential endogeneity problems 
between corporate governance and investment inefficiencies. To this end, we use an 
instrumental variable for corporate governance. To create this instrumental variable, we use 
the prediction values from a negative binomial model of governance choice of 
DummyCorpGov (1 correspond with strong values of corporate governance, which is 
CorpGov having values above the median) on the main determinants of corporate 
governance taken from previous literature. The correlation between DummyCorpGov and 
the instrumental variable is 39.55%, so it seems to be a relevant instrument to use. 
[Insert Table 7 about Here] 
In Table 7 we show the results of the negative binomial model in which we regress 
DummyCorpGov, our proxy for the corporate governance mechanisms that shareholders 
use to monitor managers’ decisions, on the determinants of corporate governance. We find 
that corporate governance (DummyCorpGov) increases with firm size, the book to market 
ratio, Free Cash Flow, standard deviation of returns, business diversification and 
geographic diversification, and decreases with age, leverage and profitability. All of the 
firm controls are significantly associated with corporate governance at conventional levels. 
These results corroborate that of our index of mechanisms to monitor managers’ decisions 
(CorpGov) is a valid measure of corporate governance.  
[Insert Table 8 about Here] 
In Table 8 we replicate the tests from Table 6, on the effects of segment reporting 
and governance on the likelihood of under and over-investing, but using our instrumental 
variable to measure corporate governance.9 The results provide strong evidence in favor of 
                                                
9
 Our results are robust to (1) the use of Heckman Two-Step Estimation Models; (2) the use of an alternative proxy for CorpGov: first 
principal component of CorpGov as a proxy for CorpGov (correlation between First Principal Component and CorpGov = 73.13%), and 
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the previous findings, and are robust to the use of Capex and NonCapex as alternative 
proxies of investment.  
4.5. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper we analyze the effects of segment disclosure quality and other 
governance provisions firm investment efficiency. Segment disclosure quality is predicted 
to increase firm investment efficiency as: (i) firms providing better segment information are 
rewarded with lower cost of capital (See Chapter 3), so more projects become viable, 
decreasing the sensitivity of investments to internally generated cash flows, and also 
reducing under-investment problems, and (ii), more segment information facilitates 
monitoring over managers’ decisions (Berger and Hann, 2003, 2007; Hope and Thomas, 
2008), dissuading them from implementing value reducing strategies, which in turn will 
reduce over-investment problems.  
Some firms cannot finance their investments with external funds because their cost 
is very high when information asymmetries between managers and outside suppliers of 
capital are large. In this case, firms have to finance their investments with internally 
generated funds. But when information provided to shareholders becomes more accurate 
and information asymmetries decrease, the cost of external funds decreases too, which 
opens the possibility of issuing new debt or new equity as a financing alternative. In this 
situation, firms are less financially constrained and their investment decisions are not so 
sensitive to the internal generation of cash flows. We provide empirical evidence showing 
that in firms providing better segment disclosure, the sensitivity on investments to 
internally generated cash flows is lower than in firms with poorer segment reporting. 
                                                                                                                                               
to the use of the mean of CorpGov by industry-year as a proxy for CorpGov (correlation between mean industry-year CorpGov and 
CorpGov = 27.19%).  
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Additionally, we find that firms providing better segment disclosure are less likely to 
deviate from the optimal investment policies (they are less likely to under and over invest). 
Our results also show that firms under strong governance structures are less likely to 
deviate from optimal investment levels, but that if governance mechanisms to monitor 
managers are too tight, managers react exacerbating under-investment and over-investment 
problems. This is consistent with claims in prior literature about the negative effects of very 
stringent governance structures (Hermalin and Weisbach, 2009; Bargeron et al., 2010). 
Finally, we show that segment information quality contributes to decrease the undesired 
effects of excess monitoring. 
Our results add to the recent stream of empirical literature on the effects of 
accounting information quality in investment efficiency and more concretely, on whether 
the provision of good segment reporting has economic effects. We contribute to the current 
debate, started after the passage of SFAS 131, on whether it is advisable to reduce the 
amount of geographic segment information that firms are required to present. We find that 
segment information quality helps in detecting and deterring those managerial investment 
decisions that do not increase the value of the firm by showing that better segment 
information enhances investment efficiency. We also show that in situations of excess 
monitoring through other corporate governance provisions, in which corporate governance 
stimulates deviations from the optimal investment policies, segment information quality 
contributes to decrease the negative effects of excess monitoring and improves investment 
efficiency. 
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Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
 
Variable 
 
 
N 
 
Mean 
 
Std. Dev. 
 
10% 
 
25% 
 
Median 
 
75% 
 
90% 
Invt+1 
 
5,172 14.9094 11.8376 5.8977 9.9940 13.3647 14.9503 24.6753 
Capext+1 
 
5,172 24.1582 21.4450 5.4593 10.8134 18.3779 29.2253 51.4084 
NonCapext+1 
 
5,172 10.3332 10.2481 1.6508 5.3649 8.3297 10.9964 20.8657 
Dummy_Qlt_Seg 
 
5,172 0.5760 0.4942 0 0 1 1 1 
CorpGov 
 
5,172 3.8591 1.4215 2 3 4 5 6 
LogAssets 
 
5,172 5.9093 0.8197 4.8295 5.3950 5.9195 6.4626 6.9773 
Tang 
 
5,172 0.2496 0.2302 0.0131 0.0431 0.1900 0.3785 0.6116 
Dividend 
 
5,172 0.5805 0.4935 0 0 1 1 1 
Coven 
 
5,172 0.0741 0.2619 0 0 0 0 0 
Zscore 
 
5,172 1.2910 1.2292 0.0381 0.6132 1.3122 1.9245 2.6345 
Opercycle 
 
5,172 3.8370 1.1784 2.2341 3.0606 4.0694 4.6543 5.1664 
MTB 
 
5,172 1.6596 0.7405 0.9781 1.2052 1.5281 1.7883 2.6142 
Slack 
 
5,172 1.2539 1.6245 0.0294 0.1507 0.6864 1.5030 3.5942 
Leverage 
 
5,172 21.2135 18.1546 0.0000 4.1915 19.6705 32.5675 45.2965 
CFOsale 
 
5,172 0.2753 1.6934 0.0000 0.0001 0.0013 0.0356 0.3210 
Age 
 
5,172 14.3751 10.6064 4 7 11 19 33 
Profitability 
 
5,172 0.0386 0.1160 -0.0553 0.0125 0.0508 0.0907 0.1338 
DevInv 
 
5,172 9.2792 6.9251 3.6293 5.6742 7.1513 9.9465 19.0926 
DevCapex 
 
5,172 15.2939 13.7594 6.3683 9.0126 12.0913 15.5249 28.0988 
DevNonCapex 
 
5,172 6.2175 6.4967 0.8647 3.0174 3.8228 8.3829 16.3954 
DevSales 
 
5,172 19.3958 18.9909 0.9038 5.1806 16.3332 26.9979 41.5093 
DevCFO 
 
5,172 13.4737 13.1627 1.9615 6.6536 9.8622 13.7397 29.5507 
SD 
 
5,172 1.9144 3.4289 0.1300 0.3246 0.8372 1.9250 4.6624 
Beta 
 
5,172 0.8106 0.8516 0.1523 0.4745 0.6222 1.0359 1.8077 
CF 
 
5,172 1.093 1.4060 0.0291 0.1014 0.4381 1.6065 3.2706 
 
The sample consists of 5,172 firm-year observations for the period 2001-2006. Inv is a measure of investment calculated as the sum of research and development expenditure, 
capital expenditure, and acquisition expenditure less cash receipts from sale of property, plant and equipment multiplied by 100 and scaled by lagged total assets.  Capex is a 
measure of investment calculated as capital expenditure multiplied by 100 and scaled by lagged property, plant and equipment. NonCapex is a measure of investment 
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calculated as the sum of research and development expenditure and acquisition expenditure multiplied by 100 and scaled by lagged total assets. Dummy_ Qlt_Seg is dummy 
variable taking value 1 if Qlt_Seg is positive and zero otherwise, where Qlt_Seg is the firm-year-specific residual obtained from a regression of the firm’s year t quantity of 
segment disclosure on controls and determinants of segment disclosure.  CorpGov is a measure of corporate governance. LogAssets is the log of total assets. Tang is the ratio 
of property, plant and equipment to total assets. Dividend is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm paid dividends and 0 otherwise. Coven is a dummy variable 
that takes the value of 1 if the firm has to use the excess of cash flow to paid loans and 0 otherwise. Z-Score is a measure of bankruptcy risk. OperCycle is the log of 
receivables to sales plus inventory to COGS multiplied by 360. MTB is the ratio of the market value of total assets to book value of total assets. Slack is the ratio of cash to 
property, plant and equipment. Leverage = debt to total assets ratio in percentage. CFOsale is the ratio of CFO to sales in percentage. Age is the difference between the first 
ear when the firm appears in CRSP and the current year. Profitability = return on assets. DevInv is the firm-specific standard deviation of Inv over the last three years (t-2 to t) 
in percentage. DevCapex is the firm-specific standard deviation of Capex over the last three years (t-2 to t) in percentage. DevNonCapex is the firm-specific standard 
deviation of NonCapex over the last three years (t-2 to t) in percentage. DevSales is the firm-specific standard deviation of sales over the last three years (t-2 to t) in 
percentage. DevCFO is the firm-specific standard deviation of cash flow from operations over the last three years (t-2 to t) in percentage. SD is the standard deviation of 
monthly returns in percentage. Beta is the coefficient from firm-specific CAPM regressions using the 60 months preceding the fiscal year end.  CF is the sum of income 
before extraordinary items and depreciation and amortization expense multiplied by 100 and scaled by lagged total assets. 
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Table 2 
Pairwise correlations between Inv, Capex, NonCapex, Dummy_Qlt_Seg, CorpGov and control variables 
 (p=0.05) 
 
 Variable a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p q r s t u v w x 
a Inv 
 
1                        
b Capex 
 
0.18 1                       
c NonCapex 
 
0.61 0.17 1                      
d Dummy_Qlt_Seg 
 
-0.15 -0.07 -0.19 1                     
e CorpGov 
 
-0.03 -0.01 -0.04 0.01 1                    
f LogAssets 
 
-0.01 0.00 -0.03 0.00 0.08 1                   
g Tang 
 
0.12 -0.13 -0.12 0.02 0.02 0.21 1                  
h Dividend 
 
-0.01 -0.02 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.44 0.03 1                 
i Coven 
 
-0.02 -0.04 -0.03 0.02 0.01 -0.08 0.07 -0.18 1                
j Zscore 
 
-0.04 0.01 -0.05 0.02 -0.02 -0.03 -0.13 0.25 -0.19 1               
k Opercycle 
 
-0.08 0.06 -0.03 0.00 0.00 -0.16 -0.15 -0.13 0.03 -0.04 1              
l MTB 
 
0.12 0.10 0.11 0.00 0.06 -0.07 -0.13 -0.13 0.04 -0.05 0.02 1             
m Slack 
 
0.12 0.23 0.17 -0.01 -0.02 -0.12 -0.11 -0.03 0.02 -0.03 0.00 0.07 1            
n Leverage 
 
-0.13 -0.11 -0.14 0.00 -0.06 0.11 0.12 -0.01 0.25 0.05 -0.08 -0.08 -0.06 1           
o CFOsale 
 
0.07 0.09 0.07 0.02 0.01 0.10 0.08 0.10 -0.09 -0.04 -0.03 -0.14 -0.09 0.03 1          
p Age 
 
-0.11 -0.12 -0.11 0.00 -0.04 0.19 0.06 0.21 -0.11 0.02 -0.01 -0.08 -0.03 0.06 0.05 1         
q Profitability 
 
0.02 0.02 0.01 0.00 -0.07 0.05 -0.02 -0.04 -0.03 0.01 0.00 0.12 -0.01 -0.02 0.02 0.07 1        
r DevInv 
 
0.17 0.06 0.09 0.01 0.01 -0.03 -0.11 -0.08 0.09 -0.09 -0.03 0.12 0.03 0.03 -0.03 0.07 0.01 1       
s DevCapex 
 
0.06 0.19 0.08 0.01 0.02 -0.02 -0.12 -0.10 0.13 -0.11 -0.04 0.08 0.02 0.02 -0.05 0.04 0.03 0.22 1      
t DevNonCapex 
 
0.08 0.06 0.13 0.01 0.01 -0.04 -0.11 -0.11 0.15 -0.08 -0.02 0.10 0.05 0.03 -0.03 0.08 0.03 0.88 0.13 1     
u DevSales 
 
-0.02 -0.02 -0.02 0.01 -0.01 -0.12 -0.08 -0.07 0.09 0.02 -0.05 0.11 0.09 -0.04 -0.06 -0.03 0.01 0.05 0.04 0.06 1    
v DevCFO 
 
0.13 0.16 0.12 -0.02 0.01 -0.14 -0.06 -0.06 0.13 -0.03 0.05 0.13 0.11 -0.08 -0.09 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.23 1   
w SD 
 
-0.06 -0.08 -0.04 0.01 0.04 -0.03 0.02 0.02 0.07 0.02 0.01 0.03 -0.03 0.03 -0.01 -0.01 0.05 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.01 1  
x Beta 
 
-0.05 -0.09 -0.08 0.01 0.05 -0.02 0.03 0.01 0.05 0.01 0.00 0.05 -0.04 0.02 -0.01 -0.02 0.04 0.01 0.03 0.04 0.01 0.00 0.26 1 
 
The sample consists of 5,172 firm-year observations for the period 2001-2006. Inv is a measure of investment calculated as the sum of research and development expenditure, 
capital expenditure, and acquisition expenditure less cash receipts from sale of property, plant and equipment multiplied by 100 and scaled by lagged total assets.  Capex is a 
measure of investment calculated as capital expenditure multiplied by 100 and scaled by lagged property, plant and equipment. NonCapex is a measure of investment 
calculated as the sum of research and development expenditure and acquisition expenditure multiplied by 100 and scaled by lagged total assets. Dummy_ Qlt_Seg is dummy 
variable taking value 1 if Qlt_Seg is positive and zero otherwise, where Qlt_Seg is the firm-year-specific residual obtained from a regression of the firm’s year t quantity of 
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segment disclosure on controls and determinants of segment disclosure.  CorpGov is a measure of corporate governance. LogAssets is the log of total assets. Tang is the ratio 
of property, plant and equipment to total assets. Dividend is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm paid dividends and 0 otherwise. Coven is a dummy variable 
that takes the value of 1 if the firm has to use the excess of cash flow to paid loans and 0 otherwise. Z-Score is a measure of bankruptcy risk. OperCycle is the log of 
receivables to sales plus inventory to COGS multiplied by 360. MTB is the ratio of the market value of total assets to book value of total assets. Slack is the ratio of cash to 
property, plant and equipment. Leverage = debt to total assets ratio in percentage. CFOsale is the ratio of CFO to sales in percentage. Age is the difference between the first 
ear when the firm appears in CRSP and the current year. Profitability = return on assets. DevInv is the firm-specific standard deviation of Inv over the last three years (t-2 to t) 
in percentage. DevCapex is the firm-specific standard deviation of Capex over the last three years (t-2 to t) in percentage. DevNonCapex is the firm-specific standard 
deviation of NonCapex over the last three years (t-2 to t) in percentage. DevSales is the firm-specific standard deviation of sales over the last three years (t-2 to t) in 
percentage. DevCFO is the firm-specific standard deviation of cash flow from operations over the last three years (t-2 to t) in percentage. SD is the standard deviation of 
monthly returns in percentage. Beta is the coefficient from firm-specific CAPM regressions using the 60 months preceding the fiscal year end.  CF is the sum of income 
before extraordinary items and depreciation and amortization expense multiplied by 100 and scaled by lagged total assets. 
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Table 3 
Industry Year Fixed Effect Regression of Qtt_Seg on earnings quality, diversification, information asymmetries and control 
variables 
 
Qtt_Segj,t = α + β1 Earnings_Qltj,t +β2 Business Diversificationj,t + β3 Geographic Diversificationj,t  + β4 Information  Asymmetriesj,t-1 + β5 Sizej,t + β6 Growthj,t + β7  Leveragej,t +β8 Audit Firmj,t +β9 Listing 
Statusj,t + β10 Proprietary Costsj,t  + β11 New Financingj,t + β12  Profitabilityj,t + β13Agej,t +Σ k βk Control year j,t +εj,t 
 
 
Variable 
 
Expected sign 
Coef. 
(p-value) 
Coef. 
(p-value) 
 
Earnings_Qlt 
 
 
 
+ 
 
 
6.8121 
(0.000) 
BusDiversif 
 
 
+ 
 
 
5.2645  
(0.000) 
GeoDiversif 
 
 
+ 
 
 
0.2195  
(0.000) 
Spread 
 
 
+ 
 
 
1.8667  
(0.048) 
Ln mve 
 
 
+ 
 
4.8034  
(0.000) 
4.1831  
(0.000) 
Ln bm 
 
 
+ 
 
4.3507  
(0.000) 
4.1777  
(0.000) 
Leverage 
 
 
+ 
 
0.0945  
(0.000) 
0.0884  
(0.000) 
Auditor 
 
 
+ 
 
3.6362  
(0.000) 
3.1667  
(0.000) 
StockExch 
 
 
+ 
 
9.4565  
(0.000) 
7.6444  
(0.000) 
Herf 
 
 
- 
 
-0.7403  
(0.000) 
-0.5108  
(0.000) 
Newfin 
 
 
+ 
 
1.5899  
(0.047) 
1.6824  
(0.040) 
Roa 
 
 
+/- 
 
-0.0621  
(0.000) 
-0.0531  
(0.000) 
Age 
 
 
+ 
 
0.1766  
(0.000) 
0.0932  
(0.000) 
Cons 
 
 
 
7.7317  
(0.000) 
1.8993  
(0.403) 
R2  0.1755 0.3074 
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The sample consists of 5,172 firm-year observations for the period 2001-2006. Qtt_Seg = the number of voluntary disclosure elements found in the sample firms’ for 
segment disclosure;; Earnings_Qlt = The absolute value, multiplied by minus one, of discretionary accruals calculated as the residual of the modified version of the Jones 
(1991) accruals model (Dechow et al. 1995), as applied to total accruals;  BusDiversif = number of the different sectors in which the firm operates. GeoDiversif = number of 
the different countries where the firm operates. Spread = bid-ask spread, calculated as 
2/)(
||
askbid
askbid
+
− measured in t-1. Ln mve = the logarithm of firm’s market value of equity 
measured at the beginning of fiscal year for 2001-2006; Ln bm = the logarithm of firm’s book-to-market ratio measured at the beginning of fiscal year 2001-2006; Leverage 
= debt to total assets ratio in percentage. Auditor = 1 if auditor firm is a Big-Four and 0 otherwise. StockExch = 1 if firm is listed in NYSE or NASDAQ and 0 otherwise. 
Herf = Herfindahl index in percentage, calculated as 
2
1
∑
=








=
N
i j
ij
j S
S
Herf . NewFin= 1 if the firm has issued new debt or equity and 0 otherwise. Roa = percentile rank of 
return on assets. Age = the difference between the first year when the firm appears in CRSP and the current year. 
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Table 4 
Firm Year Fixed Effect Regression of Inv, Capex and NonCapex on Qlt_Seg, CF and MTB 
 
titi
ti
ti
titi
ti
ti
titi
ti DummySegQlt
TA
CF
DummySegQltMTB
TA
CF
TATA
Inv
,,
1,
,
4,3,2
1,
,
1
1,
0
1,
,
__*__ εβββββ +++++=
−−−−
 
 
 
Variable 
 
Expected sign 
Inv 
Coef. 
(p-value) 
Capex 
Coef. 
(p-value) 
NonCapex 
Coef. 
(p-value) 
 
CF 
 
+ 
0.0048 
(0.007) 
0.0069 
(0.048) 
0.0033 
(0.003) 
 
Dummy_Qlt_Seg 
 
? 5.0719 (0.000) 
6.5785  
(0.000) 
4.0118 
(0.000) 
 
CF*Dummy_Qlt_Seg 
 
- 
-0.0094 
(0.000) 
-0.0181 
(0.000) 
-0.0082 
(0.000) 
 
MTB 
 
+ 
0.9313  
(0.000) 
1.3258  
(0.000) 
0.9171 
(0.000) 
R2  0.3101 0.3082 0.3029 
 
The sample consists of 5,172 firm-year observations for the period 2001-2006. Inv is a measure of investment calculated 
as the sum of research and development expenditure, capital expenditure, and acquisition expenditure less cash receipts 
from sale of property, plant and equipment multiplied by 100 and scaled by lagged total assets.  Capex is a measure of 
investment calculated as capital expenditure multiplied by 100 and scaled by lagged property, plant and equipment. 
NonCapex is a measure of investment calculated as the sum of research and development expenditure and acquisition 
expenditure multiplied by 100 and scaled by lagged total assets. CF is the sum of income before extraordinary items and 
depreciation and amortization expense multiplied by 100 and scaled by lagged total assets. Dummy_ Qlt_Seg is dummy 
variable taking value 1 if Qlt_Seg is positive and zero otherwise, where Qlt_Seg is the firm-year-specific residual 
obtained from a regression of the firm’s year t quantity of segment disclosure on controls and determinants of segment 
disclosure. MTB is the ratio of the market value of total assets to book value of total assets.  
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Table 5 
Industry Year Fixed Effect Regression of Inv, Capex and NonCapex on determinants of Investment levels 
 
Invj,t+1 = α + β1 Invj,t +β2 LogAssetsj,t + β3 LogAssets2j,t + β4 Tangj,t + β5 Dividend j,t + β6 Coven j,t + β7  Zscorej,t +β8 OperCyclej,t +  β9 MTBj,t + β10 Slackj,t  + β11 Leveragej,t + β12  CFOsalej,t +β13Agej,t + 
β14Profitabilityj,t + β15 DevInvj,t + β16 DevSalesj,t+β17 DevCFOj,t+ β18 SD j,t +β19 Betaj,t +Σ k βk Control year j,t +εj,t 
 
 
Variable 
 
Expected sign 
Inv 
Coef. 
(p-value) 
Capex 
Coef. 
(p-value) 
NonCapex 
Coef. 
(p-value) 
 
Lagged Investment proxy 
 
 
+ 
 
0.1681 
(0.000) 
0.2221 
(0.000) 
0.1424 
(0.000) 
LogAssets 
 
+ 
 
6.6628 
(0.001) 
6.5766 
(0.062) 
3.3583 
(0.032) 
LogAssets2 
 
- 
 
-0.5608 
(0.001) 
-0.5408 
(0.079) 
-0.3012 
(0.027) 
Tang 
 
+/- 
 
1.2388 
(0.043) 
-2.2002 
(0.051) 
-1.2134 
(0.015) 
Dividend 
 
- 
 
-0.0801 
(0.779) 
-0.9744 
(0.092) 
-0.3672 
(0.151) 
Coven 
 
- 
 
-1.0997 
(0.037) 
-3.4298 
(0.000) 
-1.0754 
(0.012) 
Zscore 
 
+/- 
 
-0.0824 
(0.044) 
0.1392 
(0.065) 
-0.0553 
(0.097) 
Opercycle 
 
+/- 
 
-0.2493 
(0.037) 
0.4769 
(0.031) 
-0.0877 
(0.336) 
MTB 
 
+ 
 
0.2748 
(0.000) 
0.2942 
(0.000) 
0.1825 
(0.000) 
Slack 
 
+ 
 
0.1176 
(0.000) 
0.4835 
(0.000) 
0.1632 
(0.000) 
Leverage 
 
- 
 
-0.0265 
(0.003) 
-0.0381 
(0.018) 
-0.0125 
(0.081) 
CFOsale 
 
+ 
 
0.3149 
(0.000) 
0.6457 
(0.000) 
0.2103 
(0.000) 
Age 
 
- 
 
-0.0235 
(0.081) 
-0.0433 
(0.081) 
-0.0104 
(0.340) 
Profitability 
 
+/- 
 
-0.0017 
(0.755) 
0.0180 
(0.077) 
-0.0033 
(0.464) 
Dev Investment proxy 
 
+ 
 
0.3579 
(0.000) 
0.0529 
(0.076) 
0.3126 
(0.000) 
DevSales 
 
- 
 
-0.0153 
(0.048) 
-0.0312 
(0.076) 
-0.0120 
(0.056) 
DevCFO 
 
+ 
 
0.0189 
(0.067) 
0.0333 
(0.079) 
0.0144 
(0.086) 
SD 
 
+/- 
 
-0.0989 
(0.014) 
-0.1331 
(0.069) 
-0.0567 
(0.080) 
Beta 
 
+/- 
 
-0.3407 
(0.042) 
-0.5672 
(0.065) 
-0.2764 
(0.083) 
R2  0.1228 0.1717 0.1197 
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The sample consists of 5,172 firm-year observations for the period 2001-2006. Inv is a measure of investment calculated as the 
sum of research and development expenditure, capital expenditure, and acquisition expenditure less cash receipts from sale of 
property, plant and equipment multiplied by 100 and scaled by lagged total assets.  Capex is a measure of investment calculated 
as capital expenditure multiplied by 100 and scaled by lagged property, plant and equipment. NonCapex is a measure of 
investment calculated as the sum of research and development expenditure and acquisition expenditure multiplied by 100 and 
scaled by lagged total assets.  Lagged Investment proxy corresponds to Inv in year t, Capex in year t and lagged NonCapex in 
year t. LogAssets is the log of total assets. Tang is the ratio of property, plant and equipment to total assets. Dividend is a dummy 
variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm paid dividends and 0 otherwise. Coven is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 
if the firm has to use the excess of cash flow to paid loans and 0 otherwise. Z-Score is a measure of bankruptcy risk. OperCycle is 
the log of receivables to sales plus inventory to COGS multiplied by 360. MTB is the ratio of the market value of total assets to 
book value of total assets. Slack is the ratio of cash to property, plant and equipment. Leverage = debt to total assets ratio in 
percentage. CFOsale is the ratio of CFO to sales in percentage. Age is the difference between the first ear when the firm appears 
in CRSP and the current year. Profitability = return on assets. DevInv is the firm-specific standard deviation of Inv over the last 
three years (t-2 to t) in percentage. DevCapex is the firm-specific standard deviation of Capex over the last three years (t-2 to t) in 
percentage. DevNonCapex is the firm-specific standard deviation of NonCapex over the last three years (t-2 to t) in percentage. 
DevSales is the firm-specific standard deviation of sales over the last three years (t-2 to t) in percentage. DevCFO is the firm-
specific standard deviation of cash flow from operations over the last three years (t-2 to t) in percentage. SD is the standard 
deviation of monthly returns in percentage. Beta is the coefficient from firm-specific CAPM regressions using the 60 months 
preceding the fiscal year end. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 4: The Role of Segment Disclosure in Corporate Governance and its Effect on Firm Investment Efficiency 
 142
Table 6 
Effect of Qlt_Seg and CorpGov on the likelihood of under- or over- investing with respect to a  
benchmark group of firms 
Prob(Investmentt=j) = β0 CorpGovi,t + β1 CorpGov2i,t + β2 Dummy_Qlt_Segi,t +β3 Dummy_Qlt_Segi,t* CorpGovi,t + β4 Dummy_Qlt_Segi,t* CorpGov2i,t + εi,t 
Panel A. Under-investment versus normal investment 
 
 
Variable 
 
Expected sign 
Inv 
Coef. 
(p-value) 
Inv 
Coef. 
(p-value) 
Inv 
Coef. 
(p-value) 
Inv 
Coef. 
(p-value) 
Capex 
Coef. 
(p-value) 
NonCapex 
Coef. 
(p-value) 
 
Dummy_Qlt_Seg 
 
 
- 
 
-0.5299 
[-0.0852] 
(0.000) 
 
-0.4712 
[-0.0792] 
(0.017) 
-1.5873 
[-0.2625] 
(0.000) 
-0.4619 
[-0.0367] 
(0.092) 
-1.6826 
[-0.2577] 
(0.000) 
 
CorpGov 
 
 
- 
 
 
-0.6033 
[-0.0985] 
(0.000) 
-0.5432 
[-0.0881] 
(0.000) 
-0.7138 
[-0.1153] 
(0.000) 
-0.1672 
[-0.0090] 
(0.007) 
-0.5976 
[-0.0877] 
(0.000) 
 
CorpGov2 
 
 
+ 
 
 
0.0647 
[0.0105] 
(0.000) 
0.0510 
[0.0082] 
(0.000) 
0.0822 
[0.0132] 
(0.000) 
0.0159 
[0.0006] 
(0.159) 
0.0648 
[0.0094] 
(0.000) 
 
Dummy_Qlt_Seg*CorpGov 
 
 
+ 
 
  
0.1038 
[0.0173] 
(0.034) 
0.8738 
[0.1441] 
(0.000) 
0.1755 
[0.0131] 
(0.242) 
0.8169 
[0.1266] 
(0.000) 
 
Dummy_Qlt_Seg*CorpGov2 
 
 
- 
 
   
-0.1076 
[-0.0177] 
(0.000) 
-0.0131 
[-0.0003] 
(0.511) 
-0.0968 
[-0.0150] 
(0.000) 
Year Fixed Effect 
 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm cluster 
 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 
 
0.3847 0.4331 0.4344 0.4383 0.1526 0.3317 
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Panel B. Over-investment versus normal investment 
 
 
Variable 
 
Expected sign 
Inv 
Coef. 
(p-value) 
Inv 
Coef. 
(p-value) 
Inv 
Coef. 
(p-value) 
Inv 
Coef. 
(p-value) 
Capex 
Coef. 
(p-value) 
NonCapex 
Coef. 
(p-value) 
 
Dummy_Qlt_Seg 
 
 
- 
 
-1.9967 
[-0.0510] 
(0.000) 
 
-0.9796 
[-0.0164] 
(0.005) 
-3.0952 
[-0.0695] 
(0.000) 
-1.6555 
[-0.1424] 
(0.000) 
-2.2893 
[-0.1172] 
(0.000) 
 
CorpGov 
 
 
- 
 
 
-1.7956 
[-0.0285] 
 (0.000) 
-1.6861 
[-0.0270] 
(0.000) 
-2.0874 
[-0.0333] 
(0.000) 
-0.8336 
[-0.0657] 
(0.000) 
-1.2204 
[-0.0588] 
(0.000) 
 
CorpGov2 
 
 
+ 
 
 
0.1970 
[0.0031] 
 (0.000) 
0.1727 
[0.0027] 
(0.000) 
0.2409 
[0.0038] 
(0.000) 
0.0860 
[0.0068] 
(0.000) 
0.1353 
[0.0065] 
(0.000) 
 
Dummy_Qlt_Seg*CorpGov 
 
 
+ 
 
  
0.1893 
[0.0028] 
(0.062) 
1.8058 
[0.0278] 
(0.000) 
0.7732 
[0.0602] 
(0.000) 
1.1485 
[0.0521] 
(0.000) 
 
Dummy_Qlt_Seg*CorpGov2 
 
 
- 
 
   
-0.2304 
[-0.0035] 
(0.001) 
-0.0739 
[-0.0058] 
(0.012) 
-0.1338 
[-0.0060] 
(0.001) 
Year Fixed Effect 
 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm cluster 
 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 
 
0.3847 0.4331 0.4344 0.4383 0.1526 0.3317 
 
The sample consists of 5,172 firm-year observations for the period 2001-2006. Dummy_ Qlt_Seg is dummy variable taking value 1 if Qlt_Seg is positive and zero otherwise, where 
Qlt_Seg is the firm-year-specific residual obtained from a regression of the firm’s year t quantity of segment disclosure on controls and determinants of segment disclosure.  CorpGov 
is a measure of corporate governance. This table presents result from multinomial logit pooled regression. The dependent variable is based on the level of unexplained investment. 
Firms in the cluster with more negative residuals are classified as under investing, whilst firms in the cluster with more positive residuals are classified as over investing. Firms in the 
remaining cluster are the benchmark group, given that their investment level is closer to the prediction. The assigned values are: 1 if the firm is classified as over investing; 2 if the 
firm is in the benchmark group; and 3 if it is classified as under investing. Square brackets show marginal values.  
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Table 7 
Negative binomial regression of CorpGov on its determinants 
 
Variable 
 
Expected sign 
 
Coef. 
(p-value) 
 
Ln mve 
 
+ 
0.0812  
(0.000) 
 
Ln bm 
 
+ 
0.1846  
(0.000) 
 
Age 
 
- 
-0.0026  
(0.015) 
 
FCF 
 
+ 
0.0031 
(0.089) 
 
SD 
 
+ 
0.0058 
(0.045) 
 
Leverage 
 
- 
0.0011  
(0.100) 
 
BusDiversif 
 
+ 
0.0509 
(0.000) 
 
GeoDiversif 
 
+ 
0.0057 
(0.006) 
 
Profitability 
 
- 
-0.0054 
(0.000) 
Year Dummies  Yes 
 
Wald χ2 
 
 478.35 
p-value  0.000 
The sample consists of 5,172 firm-year observations for the period 2001-2006. Dependent variable is a dummy variable which takes value of 1 if CorpGov is above median of 
this variable. Ln mve is the logarithm of firm’s market value of equity measured at the beginning of fiscal year for 2001-2006; Ln bm is the logarithm of firm’s book-to-
market ratio measured at the beginning of fiscal year 2001-2006; Age is the difference between the first ear when the firm appears in CRSP and the current year.  FCF is 
(operating cash flow minus preferred and common dividends)/total assets if book-to-market ratio is greater or equal to one, and zero otherwise. SD is the standard deviation of 
monthly returns in percentage. Leverage = debt to total assets ratio in percentage. BusDiversif = number of the different sectors in which the firm operates. GeoDiversif = 
number of the different countries where the firm operates.  Profitability = return on assets.  
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Table 8 
Effect of Qlt_Seg and Instrument variable on CorpGov on the likelihood of under- or over- investing 
with respect to a benchmark group of firms 
Prob(Investmentt=j) = β0 CorpGovi,t + β1 CorpGov2i,t + β2 Dummy_Qlt_Segi,t +β3 Dummy_Qlt_Segi,t* CorpGovi,t + β4 Dummy_Qlt_Segi,t* CorpGov2i,t + εi,t 
Panel A. Under-investment versus normal investment 
 
 
Variable 
 
Expected sign 
Inv 
Coef. 
(p-value) 
Capex 
Coef. 
(p-value) 
NonCapex 
Coef. 
(p-value) 
 
Dummy_Qlt_Seg 
 
 
- 
-4.6490 
[-0.0256] 
(0.058) 
-3.8087 
[-0.4842] 
(0.087) 
-6.1510 
[-0.4069] 
(0.081) 
 
CorpGov 
 
 
- 
 
-0.7938 
[-0.1241] 
(0.000) 
-0.2937 
[-0.0381] 
(0.030) 
-0.4968 
[-0.0684] 
(0.005) 
 
CorpGov2 
 
 
+ 
 
0.1002 
[0.0155] 
(0.004) 
0.0486 
[0.0081] 
(0.146) 
0.0392 
[0.0046] 
(0.375) 
 
Dummy_Qlt_Seg*CorpGov 
 
 
+ 
 
2.4460 
[0.3775] 
(0.048) 
1.7234 
[0.3250] 
(0.129) 
3.1926 
[0.4849] 
(0.083) 
 
Dummy_Qlt_Seg*CorpGov2 
 
 
- 
 
-0.3207 
[-0.0493] 
(0.042) 
-0.1887 
[-0.0356] 
(0.197) 
-0.4198 
[-0.0632] 
(0.083) 
Year Fixed effect 
 
Yes Yes Yes 
Firm cluster 
 
Yes Yes Yes 
R2 
 
0.4470 0.1555 0.3359 
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Panel B. Over-investment versus normal investment 
 
 
Variable 
 
Expected sign 
Inv 
Coef. 
(p-value) 
Capex 
Coef. 
(p-value) 
NonCapex 
Coef. 
(p-value) 
 
Dummy_Qlt_Seg 
 
 
- 
 
-16.6034 
[-0.9851] 
(0.000) 
-4.9820 
[-0.2777] 
(0.094) 
-8.8271 
[-0.5290] 
(0.085) 
 
CorpGov 
 
 
- 
 
-2.4716 
[-0.0405] 
(0.000) 
-0.8685 
[-0.0633] 
(0.000) 
-1.3360 
[-0.0656] 
(0.000) 
 
CorpGov2 
 
 
+ 
 
0.3421 
[0.0056] 
(0.002) 
0.0932 
[0.0061] 
(0.077) 
0.1675 
[0.0085] 
(0.022) 
 
Dummy_Qlt_Seg*CorpGov 
 
 
+ 
 
8.9546 
[0.1484] 
(0.020) 
2.2919 
[0.1328] 
(0.119) 
4.9780 
[0.2276] 
(0.068) 
 
Dummy_Qlt_Seg*CorpGov2 
 
 
- 
 
-1.2038 
[-0.0199] 
(0.017) 
-0.2497 
[-0.0144] 
(0.079) 
-0.6990 
[-0.0323] 
(0.089) 
Year Fixed effect 
 
Yes Yes Yes 
Firm cluster 
 
Yes Yes Yes 
R2 
 
0.4470 0.1555 0.3359 
 
 
The sample consists of 5,172 firm-year observations for the period 2001-2006 Dummy_ Qlt_Seg is dummy variable taking value 1 if Qlt_Seg is positive 
and zero otherwise, where Qlt_Seg is the firm-year-specific residual obtained from a regression of the firm’s year t quantity of segment disclosure on 
controls and determinants of segment disclosure.  CorpGov is an instrumental variable of corporate governance, measured as predicted values obtained 
form a negative binomial regression of CorpGov on its determinants. This table presents result from multinomial logit pooled regression. The dependent 
variable is based on the level of unexplained investment. Firms in the cluster with more negative residuals are classified as under investing, whilst firms in 
the cluster with more positive residuals are classified as over investing. Firms in the remaining cluster are the benchmark group, given that their 
investment level is closer to the prediction. The assigned values are: 1 if the firm is classified as over investing; 2 if the firm is in the benchmark group; 
and 3 if it is classified as under investing. Square brackets show marginal values.  
 
 
 
 
